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PRIVATE COMMERCIAL LAW IN THE
COTTON INDUSTRY: CREATING
COOPERATION THROUGH RULES,
NORMS, AND INSTITUTIONS
Lisa Bernstein*

The cotton industry has almost entirely opted out of the public le
gal system, replacing it with one of the oldest and most complex sys
tems of private commercial law.1 Most contracts for the purchase and
sale of domestic cotton, between merchants or between merchants and
mills, are neither consummated under the Uniform Commercial Code
("Code") nor interpreted and enforced in court When disputes arise.
Rather, most such contracts are concluded under one of several pri
vately drafted sets of contract default rules and are subject to arbitra
tion in one of several merchant tribunals. Similarly, most international
sales of cotton are governed neither by state-supplied legal rules nor
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1. For an overview of the origins of the cotton industry's private legal system, see A.W.
Brian Simpson, Contracts for Cotton to Arrive: The Case of the Two Ships Peerless, 1 1
CARDOZO L. REV. 287, 293-314, 321 (1989).
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by the Convention on the International Sale of Goods, but rather by
the rules of the Liverpool Cotton Association.2
The institutions that create and administer the industry's private
legal system work extraordinarily well. The trade rules are periodically
revised to respond to technological advancements, market changes,
and ambiguities revealed during disputes. Their content is known and
understood by most market participants. The arbitration tribunals that
resolve disputes do so expeditiously and inexpensively. Their deci
sions, which are recorded in written opinions, reveal a distinctive and
coherent jurisprudential approach. Within the industry, arbitration
awards are widely respected and complied with promptly. In short, the
industry has succeeded in creating and maintaining a private legal sys
tem ("PLS") in which transactions costs, error costs, legal system
costs, and collection costs are low. This system has endured since the
mid-1800s, surviving widespread social change, years of extreme price
volatility, and substantial changes in the background public legal re
gime.
This Article draws on a detailed case study of contractual relations
in the cotton industry to examine the ways that the rules, norms, and
institutions that constitute the industry's PLS create value for transac
tors. Part I describes the formal operation of the PLS and discusses the
ways that its substantive rules, adjudicative approaches, and arbitral
procedures improve on those provided by the Code and the public le
gal system. Part II describes the many steps taken by cotton industry
institutions to strengthen the social and informational infrastructures
of trade. It discusses how these efforts combine to make reputation
based nonlegal sanctions a powerful force in the industry and explores
how the availability of these sanctions makes important features of the
PLS work better than they would in their absence. It also suggests that
the availability of such sanctions may enable transactors to create
value-enhancing contract governance structures that might be either
unavailable or prohibitively expensive if their transactions were gov
erned by the public legal system. Part III takes a step back and ex
plores how the industry's efforts to support the legal and extralegal
aspects of contracting relationships, together with certain other fea
tures of cotton institutions, have succeeded in creating conditions that
are conducive to the creation, maintenance, and restoration of coop
erative contracting relationships. Part IV concludes by suggesting that
understanding how the cotton industry's institutions create value for
transactors may help identify other industries and other contexts in
which private institutions can play a positive role in supporting trade.
·

2. Email from Linda Mawdsley, Membership Manager, Liverpool Cotton Exchange, to
author (Oct. 27, 1997) (noting that the Liverpool Cotton Association trading rules govern
approximately fifty percent of international cotton contracts).
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THE PRIVATE LEGA L SYSTEM

The Formal Operation of the Private Legal System

There are numerous sources of private commercial law in the do
mestic cash markets for the purchase and sale of cotton.3 Most mer
chant-to-mill transactions are governed by the Southern Mill Rules
("SMRs"),4 a set of trade rules that is jointly adopted by the American
Cotton Shippers Association ("ACSA"),5 a trade association repre
senting merchants, and the American Textile Manufacturers Institute
("ATMI"),6 a trade association representing mills.7 Most merchant-to
merchant transactions are governed by the trade rules of one of four
regional cotton shippers' associations, all of which are members of
ACSA,8 or by the rules of the Memphis Cotton Exchange ("MCE"),
whose ninety member firms typically "handle about 75 percent of the
U.S. cotton trade and about 35 percent of the world's cotton trade."9

3. A cash market for a commodity is one in which the commodity is bought and sold on any of a variety of payment terms - for actual delivery.
4. Minutes of the American Cotton Shippers Association/American Textile Ma nufac
turers Institute Joint Meeting (1984) (75-80% of the cotton bought by United States mills is
subject to the SMRs).
5. ACSA "is the spokesman for private cotton merchants of the United States." Am.
Cotton Shippers Ass'n, Southern Mill Rules, in SOUTHERN MILL RULES FOR BUYING AND
SELLING OF AMERICAN COTTON 2 (1996), available at http://www.acsa-cotton.org/
About_ACSA/Search%20Rules/about_acsa.html [hereinafter SMRs]. This rulebook also
includes the Rules and Regulations of the Cotton States Arbitration Board [hereinafter CSAB
Rules] and an Outline of Services A vailable for Quality Arbitrations By Cotton States Arbi
tration Board and Technical Arbitrations By the Board ofAppeals Under Southern Mill Rules
[hereinafter Outline of Services]. Id.
6. The ATMI is the "trade association for manufacturers of textile mill products . . . [Its]
members . . . . process some 75 percent of all domestically grown cotton consumed annually
in the United States." Id.
7. The ACSA and ATMI rules committees meet together at least once a year to con
sider revising the SMRs. However, because the associations' interests are often antagonistic,
and amendments must also be ratified by the membership of both organizations, the revision
process is slow. See Letter from R. C. Dickerson, Executive Vice-President and Secretary of
ACSA, to R. K. Vincent (January 21, 1952), in connection with SEAB Case No. 61 ("With
regard to your suggestions about clarifying some of the Southern Mill Rules, beg to say that
this is a long and tedious process . . . it is very difficult to secure any changes and it usually
takes a couple of years at least before such changes can be effective.").
8. These organizations are the Western Cotton Shippers Association ("WCSA"), the
Atlantic Cotton Association ("ACA"), the Southern Cotton Association ("SCA"), and the
Texas Cotton Association ("TCA"). A fifth organization, the Arkansas-Missouri Cotton
Trade Association, existed as late as 1990 but is now defunct. Its former members were ab
sorbed by the other regional associations. In the past, there were also numerous local and
regional cotton exchanges. Today, with the exception of the Memphis and Greenwood Ex
changes, most are either defunct or have greatly curtailed their activities.
9. Charles Conner, Julien Fall Year Ago Changed Industry, COM. APPEAL, Jan. 20, 1991,
at Cl.
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Both shippers' associations and regional exchanges provide arbi
tration services.10 Most require members to arbitrate disputes with
other members as a condition of membership.11 In addition, the ACSA
and the ATMI have created a joint arbitration tribunal, the Board of
Appeals ("BoA"),12 to arbitrate contract disputes that arise under the
SMRs.13 They have also created a separate· tribunal, the Cotton States
Arbitration Board ("CSAB"), to make binding quality determina
tions.14 Although .merchants and mills are not required to contract un
der the SMRs, or to arbitrate disputes with one another as a condition
of membership in their respective trade associations, most merchant
to-mill contracts nevertheless provide for BoA arbitration.15
The formal operation of the cotton industry's PLS can best be un
derstood by looking at the procedural rules, substantive rules, adjudi
cative approaches, and judgment enforcement mechanisms that have
been adopted by the two most important private commercial law insti
tutions in the domestic cash cotton trade:16 the BoA, which resolves

10. A modest fee is charged for these services, see MEMPHIS COTTON EXCHANGE BY
LAWS, Art. IV, § 9 (1993) (hereinafter MCE BY-LAWS] (providing that "[i]n all cases of Ar
bitration concerning cotton, the charges shall be as determined by the Board of Directors").
11. See, e.g., id. at Art. IV, § 8 ("Any member refusing to submit to an arbitration when
asked for by another member or a nonmember, providing the Arbitration Committee con
sider [sic] there exist good grounds for an arbitration, or to abide by any award or decision of
said Committee when rendered," may be expelled from the Exchange).
12. In earlier years, these organizations sponsored two sets of trade rules and two arbi
tration boards. One of these boards, the New England Board of Appeals ("NEBoA"), re
solved disputes in the New England region. The other, the South Eastern Appeal Board
("SEAB"), resolved disputes in the Southern region. Today, the Board of Appeals ("BoA"),
sometimes referred to as the "Southeastern Appeal Board," uses the Southern Mill Rules to
resolve all disputes regardless of where in the country . they arise. Am. Cotton Shippers
Ass'n, Outline of Services, supra note 5. Although these tribunals are referred to as "ap
peals" boards, they are tribunals of first instance.
13. The BoA requires each litigant who is a member of ACSA or ATM! to pay a filing
fee of $400 per case, but refunds the fee to the prevailing party. When cases are filed by
nonmembers or their attorneys, a fee of the larger of $800 or the actual cost of the arbitra
tion is charged. Id. at 38.
14. See SMRs, supra note 5, at Art. XI, § 43 (authorizing the CSAB - which is super
vised by representatives of both ATM! and ACSA - to arbitrate quality disputes between
shippers and mills). In 1972, however, "[t]he Executive Committee [of the CSAB] made ar
rangements with the Board of Supervising Cotton Examiners . . . now the Quality Control
Section, of the U.S. Department of Agriculture in Memphis, to perform [quality] arbitration
services for the industry." Outline of Services, supra note 5, at 34.
15. Supra note 4. This is usually achieved by incorporating the SMRs into the contract.

16. The importance of these institutions is suggested by, among other things, the fact
that the MCE Trading Rules and By-Laws, the SMRs and BoA procedures, and the trading
and arbitration rules of the Liverpool Cotton Association are an important focus of the cur
riculum at the educational institute for new industry participants held at Rhodes College
each summer. See infra note 224 and accompanying text.
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disputes between merchants and mills, and the MCE arbitration tribu
nal, 17 which resolves disputes primarily between merchants.
1.

Procedural Rules

The BoA is composed of one arbitrator appointed by the president
of the ATMI and one appointed by the president of the ACSA.18 Ar
bitrators are selected for their "experience in their respective industry
and their reputation for integrity and fairness."19 The BoA does not
hold hearings. It decides cases solely on the basis of briefs and docu
mentary evidence, most commonly: verified copies of confirmations,
correspondence, mail receipts, telephone logs, weight slips, quality de
termination reports, and affidavits from lawyers and employees who
played roles in the questioned transaction. All evidence has the names
of the parties redacted.
The MCE arbitration tribunal is composed of seven arbitrators,
appointed annually by the Exchange's board of directors. It holds oral
hearings,2? complete with the calling of witnesses and cross
examinaiion.21

17. Unless otherwise noted, the expression "MCE arbitration tribunal," refers to the
Excha'nge's "regular standing Arbitration" tribunal. TRADING RULES OF THE MEMPHIS
COTION EXCHANGE, R. 34, cl. 2 [hereinafter MCE TR]. Since the early days of the ex
change, this tribunal has handled disputes between members, between members and
nonmembers, and even, on occasion, disputes between two nonmembers. In 1995, however,
in an attempt to create a public perception of fairness, the MCE established a separate tri
bunal for disputes involving nonmembers. This tribunal operates under its own, somewhat
different procedural rules. The arbitration panel consists of three arbitrators, arbitrators are
chosen by agreement of the parties, and there are no appeals. If the claim is for less than
$25,000 and the parties agree, only one arbitrator need hear the case. Nonbinding pre
arbitration mediation is also available if agreed to by the parties . .
One of the more striking differences between regular MCE arbitrations and these spe
cial arbitrations is that the special tribunal's procedures make it easier for parties to get in
formation from one another. See id. at R. 43, cl. 4 ("Upon the request of any party to the
arbitration made in writing with notice to the other party, the Chairman of the Rule 43 Arbi
tration Committee shall issue subpoenas as provided in the Federal Arbitration Act and/or
the Tennessee Uniform Arbitration Act."). This provision was considered undesirable by
the MCE board but was adopted on the advice of a prominent industry attorney who told
the board that it was needed in order to maintain the perception that the tribunal was fair to
nonmembers. Telephone Interview with MCE Executive (Feb. 1997).
18. See Outline of Services, supra note 5, at 35. When the arbitrators do not agree, they
are authorized to jointly appoint a third arbitrator. From 1975 to 1996, however, the BoA
heard twenty-eight cases, none of which required the appointment of a third arbitrator. See
BoA opinions 1975-1996.
19. Outline of Services, supra note 5, at 35.
20. See, e.g., Case Record, MCE Case No. 832 (1985) (noting that multiple hearings
were held); Letter from the MCE Vice-President and Secretary, to the Parties (March 1 1 ,
1985), in connection with MCE'.Case No. 832 (informing the parties that they will have to
'
appear in front of the ar.bitration committee).
21. MCE arbitrators also take an active role in questioning the parties and witnesses.
See, e.g., Questions Reference, typewritten sheets filed with the case record for MCE Case
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Neither the BoA nor the MCE's arbitration tribunal permit uncon
strained party-initiated discovery, though both permit the arbitrators
to request additional information.22 The SMRs do not contain a gen
eral limitations period, but they do contain rules specifying the proper
time frame for raising certain types of objections.23 The MCE trading
rules provide that all claims are to be reported to the arbitration
committee "within thirty days after the matter in controversy arises,"24
and also specify time frames for raising particular types of objections.25
Both tribunals produce written opinions. Most opinions include a
statement of the facts; a short discussion of the rule to be applied, a
few paragraphs discussing the arbitrators' reasoning, and an award.26
Some opinions, however, simply state the outcome of the case.27 BoA

No. 835 (1991) (listing questions for the arbitrators to ask the parties); MCE Case No. 839
(1991) (revealing in the transcript that arbitrators questioned the parties).
22. See Outline of Services, supra note 5, at 36 (noting that the BoA can "ask either of
the parties for additional information or clarification of statements made in their briefs"); see
also Memorandum of the Arbitrators (Aug. 24, 1953), in connection with SEAB Case No. 71
(referring to a request for submission of additional information); Letter from ACSA Secre
tary to Arbitrator (Jan. 23, 1996), in connection with BoA Case No. 139 ("Should you re
quire any further details pertaining to this case, please contact me and I'll make every effort
to_obtain the information requested"); Letter from Arbitrators to the CSAB Secretary
(March 28, 1984), in connect.ion with BoA Case No. 118 (requesting additional information);
NEBoA Case No. 280 (1929) (declining to render a judgment pending submission of addi
tional information); Letter from the MCE Executive Vice-President and Secretary, to the
Plaintiff's Attorney (March 9, 1988), in connection with MCE Case No. 833 (requesting in
fonpation about the nature of the plaintiff's business and additional documents).
23. See SMRs, supra note 5, at Art. VII, § 32 ("Claims for loss in weight or payment for
gain in weight must be made within seven business days from receipt of the cotton, or of the
last portion of the shipment."); id. at Art. VIII, § 36 ("Notice of claims for variations in in
voice tare allowances must be given seller by buyer within twenty business days from receipt
of cotton."); id. at Art. VIII, § 37 ("All claims for variations in invoice tare allowances must
be filed within nine months from receipt of cotton."); ·id. at Art. IX, § 39 ("Claims as to
quality must be made within teri business days from the date of the receipt of the last portion
of the shipment except, where cotton is deliverable in monthly installments, the claims shall
be based on each separate installment.").
24. MCE TR, supra note 17, at R. 34, cl. l.
25. Sedd. at R. 5, cL 5 ("[A]ny rejection for differences in grade and/or staple will only
apply on cotton if it is shipped out of the point of origin or resampled within ninety (90) days
from date of payment by Buyer."); id. at R. 18, cl. 1 ("[When cotton is rejected as being of
nonstandard density], market difference is to be adjusted between Buyer and Seller pro
vided a claim is made within 10 days from invoice date."); id. at R. 22, cl. 1 ("[R]eplacements
must be made within ten days from 'date of rejections.").
26. BoA Case No. 135 (1992); BoA Case No. 117 (1983); BoA Case No. 121 (1985);
MCE Case No. 839 (1991).
27. See, e.g., MCE Case No. 835 (1991) (stating only that "[t]heArbitration Committee
of the Memphis Cotton Exchange based on written evidence supplied by both parties as well
as the .oral testimony of both parties rules that [Defendant) .is not entitled to carrying charges
and [Plaintiff] is not entitled .to penalties. This decision wa.s the unanimous decision of this
Arbitration Committee"); BoA Case No. 139 (1996); BoA Case No. 129 (1990). It is not en
tirely clear why the format of opinions is so variable. One BoA arbitrator explained that he
was not an eloquent man, so when he wrote, the opinions were short, while his fellow arbi
trator, with whom he served for many years, was a "wordsmith," educated at Yale (actually,

1730

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 99:1724

opinions are circulated to all ACSA and ATMI members.28 The names
of the parties are redacted,29 but the names of the arbitrators1 are
given. MCE opinions contain the names of both the parties and the
arbitrators, but they are not made public. Neither tribunal formally
accords prior decisions precedential authority.30
a check of alumni rolls indicated it was Harvard), who liked to go on at length. Telephone
Interview with Mill Representative #2, former BoA arbitrator (no date).
28. The ATMI and the ACSA keep BoA opinions, along with the briefs and evidence
submitted, on file for inspection by their members. They occasionally receive requests for
further information about cases or copies of the supporting papers. See, e.g., Letter from the
Chairman of the Board of [very large] Cotton Company to the ACSA Executive Secretary
(June 19, 1967), in connection with BoA Case No. 98 ("I think there is something in the libel
laws which prevents you from naming the buyer and the seller in this case, but I think it is
proper for you to give the name of the seller on request and I do hereby request that you
give us the name of the seller who refuses to be bound by a trade arbitration because an Act
of God (crop failure) makes it impossible for him to deliver what another seller has offered
to deliver at 8¢ higher."). Such requests are more common when the BoA's opinion does not
contain a clear description of the facts found and the reasoning used. Telephone Interview
with ACSA Executive (no date); see also Entire SMR Case No. 130 Sent To Following Ac
tive Members Per [ACSA Executive], BoA Case No. 130 (Feb. 5, 1991) (noting that the en
tire record of the case was sent to thirty-three members who had requested it, most likely
because the opinion was brief and unclear).
In earlier years, the associations routinely circulated briefs and supporting evidence with
the opinions. See, e.g. , ACSA Series A-Circular Letter No. 41 (Dec. 21, 1951) ("We are en
closing herewith for your information and guidance copies of briefs and summary of ques
tion [sic) submitted together with decision and minority report in Southeastern Appeals
Board Case No. 62. This case is rather involved, but we recommend that it be studied care
fully by all shippers to domestic mills.".). Although the reasons for this practice are unclear,
giving transactors access to the same information as the tribunal makes it easier for them to
determine whether the tribunal was impartial. Establishing its impartiality might have been
especially important to the BoA, which resolves disputes between defined groups of market
participants with often conflicting interests. Today, these supporting materials are only cir
culated in exceptional circumstances. See, e.g. , ACSA Series A-Circular No. 96 (Feb. 25,
1987), addressing BoA Case No. 124 (noting that in addition to the opinion, the association
was "also enclosing 'Seller's Statement of Facts' and 'Seller's Argument and Brief.' Sup
porting documents on pages 15-17 are also provided. We did not deem intervening docu
mentation necessary for reproduction").
29. Although in important BoA cases, parties' identities become quickly known through
gossip, Telephone Interview with ACSA Executive (June 1996); infra note 172, the nonpub
lication of names may nevertheless be desirable from the perspective of industry insiders.
BoA opinions often contain information indicating that a firm may be on the verge of finan
cial distress (but not yet within the legal preference period). The practice of not revealing
names keeps this information from industry outsiders - such as railroads, truckers, and in
surance companies - for as long as possible, while the industry's well-developed gossip net
works help to spread it to industry insiders. See infra notes 124-129 and accompanying text
(describing these networks). The practice may therefore enable insiders to better protect
their positions with the distressed firm, by, for example, cashing out their position. See
SMRs, supra note 5, at Art. XIX, § 56 (providing, in part that, "[i]f either party to the con
tract enters bankruptcy or admits insolvency, the other party may cancel the undelivered
portion of the contract,.with the market difference to be adjusted between the buyer and the
seller, with one-half cent per pound penalty against the party in bankruptcy or admitting in
solvency").
30. In the past, BoA opinions sometimes mentioned prior opinions as persuasive or con
trolling authority. See, e.g. , NEBoA Case No. 181 (1924) (citing NEBoA Case No. 97 as con
trolling authority for the interpretation of Rule 61, defining "receipt of cotton"); NEBoA
Case No. 187 (1924) (holding that NEBoA Case No. 60 governs). Arbitrators also occasion-
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The BoA's awards are final judgments, but the MCE tribunal gives
parties the right to appeal to a three-person appeals board in cases
where the decision of the original panel was not unanimous.31 At the
BoA, the rules require the time from filing to the close of evidence to
be between fifteen and thirty days. Decisions are rendered as soon
thereafter as possible.32 At the MCE, the length of time from filing to
disposition varies but is typically just over a month.33 Both the BoA
and the MCE require prompt payment of awards.34
2.

Substantive Rules

The BoA decides contract disputes by applying the SMRs,35 a
comprehensive set of bright-line contract default rules36 that cover
ally attempted to distinguish earlier cases. See, e.g. , NEBoA Case No. 276 (1929) (rejecting
an argument based on an earlier decision, and explaining that the opinion cited, "was based
on special circumstances and does not apply in this case"). However, references to prior
cases gradually became less common and are quite rare today. One case explicitly repudiates
the duty of the BoA to consider prior decisions. See SEAB Case No. 75 (1955) (noting that
"[t]his Appeal Board has recently stated that it was not bound by previous decisions of the
Board"). Nevertheless, the long service of certain individuals on the BoA ensures that there
is ,some continuity in the tribunal's decisions. For example, from 1978-1996, the same ACSA
representative served in seventeen of the twenty-seven cases decided by the BoA and the
same ATMI representative served in fifteen of the cases.
Mention of prior decisions was even rarer at the MCE. From 1944-1991, only one MCE
opinion mentions a prior case, and even there it is only mentioned because it was raised by
one of the parties and the arbitrators give it no weight. See MCE Case No. 786 (1951) .
31. MCE BY-LAWS, supra note 10, at Art. IV, § 5. From 1944 to 1991, only four of the
ninety-two decisions rendered by the MCE arbitration tribunal were not unanimous. Of
these four decisions, three were appealed. Two of the decisions were affirmed. See MCE
App. Case No. 28 (1952) ; MCE App. Case No. 29 (1952) . One of the decisions was reversed.
See MCE App. Case No. 27 (1947) . When an appeal is requested, the "party whose claim
differs most from the final award" must pay the actual cost of the appeal. MCE BY-LAWS,
supra note 10, at Art. V, § 3.
32. Outline of Services, supra note 5, at 36-38; MCE BY-LAWS, supra note 10, at Art.
XV, § 3 ("Any claim [of indebtedness] allowed by the Arbitration Committee and remaining
unpaid for ten days may then be pressed for immediate settlement by requesting same in
writing to the Secretary . . . and five days shall be allowed for settlement.").·
33. Based on information in the moving papers and opinions in all MCE cases decided
from 1978-1991, the average time from filing to disposition was thirty-nine days. The longest
case took eighty-four days, while the shortest took eleven days. Although the MCE Rules do
not dictate a precise time frame for resolving a dispute, the fact that a defendant is given
only three days to respond to a claim before the committee is permitted to hear the case ex
parte suggests that the Exchange considers prompt dispositions important. MCE TR, supra
note 17, at R. 34, cl. 1.
34. The MCE rules also attempt to ensure payment by requiring the defendant to post a
pre-arbitration bond in the amount of the claim. MCE BY-LAWS, supra note 10, at Art. IV,
§ 4. In the past, strict compliance with the rule was enforced, but today bonds are not always
required in practice. Telephone Interview with MCE Executive (no date).
35. The SMRs, however, "reserve [to the BoA] the privilege of refusing action on any
dispute submitted if it feels the case at point has disagreements not involving SMR[s] or it
does not have sufficient evidence to properly judge the issues." Outline of Services; supra
note 5, at 35-36; see also ACSA, Series A-Circular Letter No. 40 (1953) (discussing this
privilege). This privilege is occasionally exercised. See, e.g. , BoA Case No. 125 ( 1987) (de-
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contract formation, performance, quality, delay, payment, repudiation,
excuse, and damages, and include numerous industry-specific defini
tions of terms like "prompt,"37 "raingrown,"38 and "long staple."39 The
MCE decides cases on the basis of the Exchange's own Trading
Rules,40 which also define numerous industry-specific terms and con
tain primarily·bright-line provisions. Although most SMRs and MCE
Trading Rules would be enforceable under the Code if included in a
contract,41 they nonetheless differ from the Code in fundamental ways.
First, the industry-drafted trade rules do riot, for the most part, in
clude the types of standard-like words, such as "reasonable,"42 "seadining to issue a ruling without giving an explanation); SEAB Case No. 64 (1952) (same);
BoA Case No. 115 (1981) (declining jurisdiction on the grounds that the BoA "should not
act as a general referee or become an ·instrument for making general market determina
tions"); BoA Case No. 114 (1981) ("In the request for a Board of Appeals decision seller did
not specify a rule section under which the Board of Appeals might concern itself. Further,
the members of the Board of Appeals are not aware of any specific rule section which would
appropriately apply to the dispute in question, under which it could determine an allowance
as settlement . . . it would be improper for the Board of Appeals to render a decision in this
case.").
36. See SMRs, supra note 5, at Art. XVII, § 54 ("Buyer and seller shall have the privi
lege of incorporating any other rules, not in conflict with the spirit of the above rules, in their
contracts.").
37. Id. at Art. IV, § 16.
38. Id. at Art. III,§ 13.
39. Id. at Art. III, § 10.
40. See MCE T R, supra note 17, at R. 2, cl. 1 ("These Trading Rules shall apply to all
purchases and sales between members of the Memphis Cotton Exchange unless otherwise
agreed in writing."). The MCE Trading Rules contain only two mandatory provisions. Id. at
R. 31, cl. 1 ("Any exception to these rules can be made by mutual.agreement at time of sale
excepting Rule 1, Clause 4 and Rule 2."); id. at R. 1, cl. 4 ("Both Buyer and Seller shall be
primarily liable to each other for the fulfillment of all contracts.").
41. Some trade rules, however, would be of questionable validity if included in a con
tract adjudicated under the Code. First, at times when cotton prices were very low, the trade
rules that provide for the payment of a one-half cent per pound penalty might, if included in
a contract subject to' the Code, have been vulnerable to attack under U.C.C. § 2-718 (1991)
and the relevant case law, on the grounds that they were invalid penalties since they were
not a genuine attempt to pre-estimate damages. See, e.g. , Equitable Lumber Corp. v. IPA
Land Dev. Corp., 344 N.E.2d 391 (N.Y. 1976). Today, however, these damage measures, if
included in a contract subject to the Code, would most likely be enforceable, since their
magnitude is insignificant given world cotton prices. Second, SMR Art. XIX, § 56, SMRs
supra note 5, which provides that, "(i)f either party to the contract enters bankruptcy or ad
mits insolvency, the other party may cancel the undelivered portion of the contract, with the
market difference to be adjusted between the buyer and the seller, with one-half cent per
pound penalty against the party in bankruptcy or admitting insolvency," might be deemed an
invalid ipso facto clause under the 1978 Bankruptcy Code.
42. The SMRs use the word "reasonable" once. See SMRs, supra note 5, at Art. XI, § 47
(requiring the buyer to "exercise all reasonable care of rejected bales"). The MCE Rules use
it twice. See MCE T R, supra note 17, at R. 43, cl. 2 (requiring complaints filed in arbitration
to be written "in reasonable detail"); id. at R. 5, cl. 5 (requiring claims of fraudulently
packed cotton or false substitutions to be "presented within a reasonable length of time"). In
addition, from 1944-1991, only one MCE opinion used the word "reasonable," and the case
was one that 'involved the proper time for making a claim for fraudulently packed bales,
something the MCE rules explicitly state must be done within a "reasonable length of time."
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sonable," and "without objection in the trade," that permeate the
Code. Rather, they contain primarily clear, bright-line rules.
Second, the types of damage measures available in the private sys
tem differ in important ways from the measures used in the public sys
tem. The Code's damage measures are designed to protect the expec
tancy interest by putting the "aggrieved party . . . in as good a position
as if the other party had fully performed."43 In contrast, the damage
measures in the SMRs and the MCE Trading Rules tend to be under
compensatory.44 Under the SMRs, the aggrieved party is entitled only
to market difference damages plus a one-half cent per pound penalty
(a penalty that is trivial given contemporary cotton prices).45 The re
covery of consequential damages is not permitted, although the SMRs
do impose fixed fines for certain types of misbehavior.46 The MCE
uses the same measure for breach of contract,47 and also imposes a va
riety of other fines such as per-day fines for delayed delivery48 and late

Id. ; MCE Case No. 760 (1945) (noting that "in reaching its decision [the arbitration panel]

could find no evidence of fraudulent packing," and that because the buyer had failed to in
spect the cotton for six months, "the elapsed time cannot be termed 'reasonable' in this case
for making a claim").
43. u.c.c.§ 1-106 (1991).
44. See infra note 135 and accompanying text (discussing the reasons that the market
difference measure is under-compensatory, particularly in merchant-to-mill transactions).

45. SMRs, supra note 5, at Art. IV, § 18C. See also BoA Case No. 139 (1996) (where the
buyer claimed $158,500 in consequential damages in its brief, but this was not mentioned in
the arbitrators' opinion and no consequential damages of any kind were awarded). The
SMRs further provide that the market price shall be determined from "three bona fide offers
on the identical quality and with identical terms to that contracted," given to the aggrieved
party, and that "[a] buyer's purchase [when the seller breaches] . . . shall be based on the
lowest of the three offers. [While a] seller's sale [when the buyer breaches] . . . shall be based
on the highest of the three offers." Id. In addition, "[t]he party to receive market differences
must present [a] detailed settlement amount in writing to the other party within three busi
ness days. [And t]he party receiving bona fide settlement invoice must pay with good funds
within five business days of receving [sic] such invoice." Id. In the A CSA-ATMI debates
over the adoption of the three-quote rule, the shippers "felt it would be better to have an
understanding [of the magnitude of damages] at the time [of breach], rather than after the
fact, and thus avoid referring matters to the Board of Appeals." Minutes of the ACSA
ATMI Joint Meeting (1976).
46. See SMRs, supra note 5, at Art. V, § 26 (requiring a penalty of one-half cent per
pound in addition to interest when the buyer does not pay the draft or invoice within five
business days after delivery); id. at Art. XVIII,§ 55 (providing that if the seller fails to cer
tify the origin or growth of the cotton, or certifies "growth other than that contracted for and
such certification shows the cotton to be of irrigated growth, where raingrown cotton is
specified or raingrown cotton where irrigated cotton is specified, the seller shall pay to the
buyer a penalty of one cent per pound on that portion of the contract").
47. See MCE TR, supra note 17, at R. 22, cl. 2.
48. See id. at R. 11, cl. 1 ("The penalty for failure on the part ofthe Seller to d�liver cot
ton within the required time under above rules, shall be 10¢. per bale per day minimum to be
paid by the Seller to Buyer and in no event shall this,penalty exceed 25¢ per bale per day,
but any excess over and above the 10¢ per bale per day is to be subject to the Buyer's.being
able to furnish sufficient proof of loss for such excess.").
·
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payment.49 Neither set of rules requires the aggrieved party to reveal
any firm-specific information - such as profit margins, inventory
stocks, or the identity of other customers or suppliers - in order to
obtain a monetary recovery.50
Another notable difference between the trade rules and the Code
is the absence of a trade rule equivalent of the Code's nonwaivable
duty of good faith. Although briefs often make arguments based on
good faith,51 no such duty is implied by the arbitrators52 and notions of
good faith and fairness do not appear to affect case outcomes. How
ever, arbitrators sometimes do note in their opinions that they con
sider a particular outcome to be unjust,53 or that one or both of the
parties engaged in undesirable business practices.54
49. Id. at R. 11, cl. 2 ("The penalty for failure on the part of the Buyer to pay for cotton
or furnish shipping instructions in accordance with the above rules shall be 10¢ per bale per
day plus storage, insurance and interest accumulated against the Seller during delay. Penal
ties accruing against the Buyer shall be added to the invoice, and those accruing against the
Seller shall be deducted from the invoice.").
50. In addition, the MCE's sensitivity to transactors' possible desire to keep information
private is reflected in MCE T R, at R. 11, cl. 1, reprinted in part supra note 48 (providing for
late penalties a buyer can get without revealing any firm-specific information, and larger
penalties he is permitted to seek if he reveals additional information).
51. See, e. g., Buyer's Brief at 23, BoA Case No. 135 (1992); Seller's Brief at 8, BoA Case
No. 135 (1992) (where arguments relating to "good faith" and "bad faith" are made in the
briefs but are not taken into account in the arbitration opinion); Buyer's Brief at 2, BoA
Case No. 126 (1987) ("[T]here is an obligation of good faith implied in all contracts and in all
commercial dealings between buyers and sellers."); Buyer's Brief at 4, BoA Case No. 85
(1961) ("Seller has failed to live up to a contract, made in good faith and binding in every
respect.").
52. From 1944-1990, good faith was mentioned in only one MCE arbitration opinion.
See MCE Case No. 816 (1966) (noting that the "[d]efendant acted in good faith and did eve
rything he could to expedite the shipment;" the arbitrators ruled for the defendant but also
noted that they were ruling as they did because the mill had agreed to take the cotton at a
later time). Similarly, from 1978-1990, the BoA issued eighteen opinions, none of which
mentioned "good faith." It is possible, however, that in the few cases where compromise de
cisions were rendered on the grounds that both parties behaved badly, notions of good faith
may have implicitly influenced arbitrator decision making.
53. BoA Case No. 122 (1987) (where BoA arbitrators considered the result they
reached under the rules so unjust that their opinion contained a nonbinding "recommenda
tion" that the Seller give the Buyer a type of offset that many other sellers in the market
were giving to their buyers at that time); MCE Case No. 832 (1985) ("This Committee has
abided to the best of its ability by the applicable rules of the Memphis Cotton Exchange. It is
the feeling of this Committee, however, that a penalty is being imposed unjustly and even
though we were committed to follow the rules, it is the very strong feeling of this Committee
that, had both parties deligently [sic] and agressively [sic] pursued the committment [sic] of
this contract, this Arbitration would not have been necessary. Unfortunately, this was not
the case.").
54. See, e. g., BoA Case No. 137 (1996) ("This Board's opinion is that the contract was
poorly handled by both parties under unusual circumstances and that their gross misunder
standing .should be shared."); BoA Case No. 130 (1990) ("We feel this transaction was
poorly handled by both parties and that blame should be shared."); MCE Case No. 837
(1991) (noting that "(Plaintiff] did not exercise dilligence (sic] in the maintenance of the con
tract in dispute"); MCE Case No. 822 (1971) (where the committee ruled: "(1) that the
Committee take no part in a case involving a transaction which was, as admitted in writing in
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Adjudicative Approaches

The most important difference between courts applying the Code
and cotton industry arbitration tribunals applying the trade rules lies
in their adjudicative approaches. Broadly speaking, the Code directs
courts to look to immanent business norms reflected in course of
dealing, course of performance, and usage of trade, to fill gaps and in
terpret contracts,55 and directs them to take parties' actions under a
contract as the best indication of what they intended their contract to
mean.56 In contrast, despite the fact that cotton arbitrators are chosen
for their industry expertise, they use a relatively formalistic adjudica
tive approach that gives little explicit weight to elements of the con
tracting context.57
Cotton trade rules do not contain provisions making course of per
formance or course of dealing relevant to gap filling or interpretation,
and arbitrators are reluctant to take these considerations into ac
count.58 Similarly, unlike the Code, cotton trade rules do not have a
general provision making usage relevant to the interpretation of either
contract provisions or trade rules.59 Unlike courts applying the Code/'0
the evidence submitted, in direct violation of the regulations governing such transactions; (2)
that the parties involved would have been wise to settle their differences in this particular
case as quickly and as quietly as possible"); MCE Case No. 809 (1960) ("This Committee
would like to point out that the risk involved in a contract of this nature is very great for all
concerned.").
SS. This philosophy is reflected in numerous Code provisions and Official Comments.
See, e. g. , U.C.C. § 1-102 (b) (1991) ("Underlying purposes and policies of this Act are . . . to
permit the continued expansion of commercial practices through custom, usage and agree
ment of the parties . . . . "); id. at§ 1-103,§ 2-314(2) (a),§ 2-S04(b),§ 2-609(2), § 1-102 cmt. 1;
§ 1-20S cmt. 1; id. at§ 2-202 cmt. l(b) (explaining that language is to be given the "meaning
which arises out of the commercial context in which it was used"); id. at§ 2-202 cmt. 2.
S6. See id. at § 2-208 cmt. 1 ("The parties themselves know best what they have meant
by their words of agreement and their action under that agreement is the best indication of
what that meaning was.").
S7. Given the expertise of these arbitrators, however, these considerations may enter
the moving papers and/or influence the arbitrators' decision-making processes in ways too
subtle to detect.
S8. When ten merchants who had served as MCE arbitrators were asked: "[I)f the par
ties could establish that despite what was written in their contract they always behaved in a
different way, would you apply this different, informal understanding, rather than the rele
vant trade rule," two said yes, seven said no, and one was uncertain, explaining that it would
depend on the identity of the parties. Briefs occasionally make arguments based on course of
performance or course of dealing, but these considerations do not appear to influence arbi
tral decisions. See, e. g. , Record, BoA Case No. 122 (1987) (where both briefs contain nu
merous references to course of performance and course of dealing, but these considerations
are not mentioned in the arbitrators' opinion).
S9. However, the MCE Trade Rules contain one particularized reference to custom, see
MCE T R, supra note 17, at R. 23, cl. 1 (" Rules 20, 21, and 22 are in no way to change or nul
lify the present rules and customs of handling sales of consigned or F.0.B. cotton when sold
·
on actual samples."), and in quality arbitrations conducted ·by the ·CSAB; custom may be
looked to when there are gaps not covered by the contract or relevant trade rules, see CSAB
rules, supra note S, at III, R. 8. ("All arbitrations will be held strictly in accordance with the
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BoA arbitrators do not permit custom to trump or vary trade rules or
explicit contractual provisions.61 In practice, BoA arbitrators only look
to custom when there are no trade rules or contract provisions on
point.62 On the whole, references to custom or usage in BoA opinions
are extraordinarily rare,63 perhaps because, given the amount of detail
in the trade rules, cases involving contractual gaps are uncommon.
The MCE rules are silent on the applicability of custom. Some
MCE arbitrators express a willingness to consider it, but in practice
they do not seem to take it explicitly into account. Although custom is
sometimes mentioned in parties' briefs, from 1944 to 1991, of the
ninety-one opinions issued by the MCE, only three contain references
to custom.64
letter and intent of contract and in case all points of any contract are not covered by the
rules .. . such points are to be arbitrated according to the general interpretation of the trade
in regard to the same . . . . ") .

60. See Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code's
Search for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765 (1996) [hereinafter Merchant
Law] (discussing the ways that courts applying the Code permit custom to vary or trump ex
plicit contractual provisions).

61. See, e.g., SEAB Case No. 77 (1956) (noting the buyer's contention that when "mills
buy cotton from . . . Group B . . . according to precedent and established custom . . . it is un
derstood to be compressed cotton," but rejecting it on the grounds that "while we recognize
that precedent and established custom play a part in any transaction, the terms of the pur
chase [in this case) were definitely stated as subject to Southern Mill Rules and under Rule
XVI, Section 53, DENSITY is covered . . .we therefore think Seller is right"); see also BoA
Case No. 94 (1964) ("There were many contentions in very long briefs from both sides.
However, this Board can only rule on the contract.").
62. In one case decided in 1935, the BoA looked to custom to define a term used but not
fully defined in the either the contract or the trade rules. See NEBoA Case No. 313 (1935)
(holding that because the contract used but did not define the term "Western Growth," and
the relevant trade rules did not define it either, "the Board must therefore base this decision
on trade custom"); see also NEBoA Case. No. 278 (1929) (noting that the terms of the con
tract were indefinite, and looking to the "correspondence submitted and the custom of the
trade" in rendering its judgment). However, BoA opinions do occasionally refer to custom
as an additional justification for a result reached on other grounds, or mention it in passing
while attaching no particular significance to it.
A similar approach to the role of custom in adjudication is used at the WCSA. See, e.g. ,
Telephone Interview with WCSA Executive (May 28, 1997) ("Whether [custom and usage)
are viewed as relevant [in arbitration) depends on whether it relates to a subject about which
there is a trade rule. If there is a trade rule on point, the custom is irrelevant.If there is not,
then it might be looked to, to fill a gap, assuming that the contract too is silent on the
point. ").
63. For example, from 1929-1951, only four of the forty-two opinions issued by the BoA
even mentioned custom or usage of trade.See NEBoA Case No. 313 (1935) supra note 62;
NEBoA Case No. 308 (1931) (rejecting a buyer's claim that "the custom of the trade re
quires the Seller' to ship bales not pounds" on the grounds that the New England Terms [a
precursor to the SMRs) governed the trade and that Rule 27 of those terms "definitely states
that cotton shall be delivered on a poundage basis."); NEBoA Case No. 280 (1929) Supple
mentary Decision (noting', in passing, that something was not a custom and withdrawing the
original judgment pending submission of additional information); NEBoA Case No. 278
(1929), supra note 62.
. 64. See MCE Case No. 807 (1960) (holding that the plaintiff prevailed since it shipped
on a route "usually used by shippers to this destination"); MCE Case No. 791 (1952) (re-
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In general, cotton arbitrators decide cases in a highly formalistic
manner,65 even when their sense of fairness suggests that additional
considerations are relevant or that a contrary result should be
reached.66 As one arbitrator explained, "[w]e look to the contract and
then to the trade rules; this is all we have to base it [our decision] on.
Other things like custom and the background [of the deal] are infi
nitely variable so we don't look to them."67
4.

Enforcement

The awards of both the BoA and the MCE's arbitration tribunals
can be enforced by seeking an entry of judgment in court.68 However,
this is rarely necessary. Failure to comply with a BoA award is
grounds for expulsion from most shippers' associations, and failure to
abide by an MCE award is grounds for expulsion from the Exchange.69
jecting a position based on custom and deciding the case on the basis of the SMRs); MCE
Case No. 793 (1952) ("In ruling on the staple length the committee took into consideration
the custom of the Trade in the territory involved . . . . also four affidavits furnished by the
plaintiff."). In addition, custom is mentioned in one MCE Appeal, MCE Appeal of Case No.
787 (1952) (where, in affirming the decision below, which made no mention of custom, a cus
tom is mentioned).
65. Formalistic adjudicative approaches are not uncommon in merchant-run private
commercial law systems. See, e.g., aernstein, Merchant Law, supra note 60 (describing the
formalistic adjudicative approach of the National Grain and Feed Association's merchant
arbitration system). See generally Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law, in THE NEW
PALGRAVE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW (Peter Newman ed., 1998)
[hereinafter Bernstein, PALGRA VE].
·

66. See, e.g., BoA Case No. 97 (1967) (revised) ("In most appeal cases, there are state
ments made by one side or the other, or both, that should in all fairness be taken into con
sideration in a friendly settlement. However, the Appeal Board must adhere strictly to the
rules. To deviate therefrom would cause endless confusion and arguments. This Board can
rule only upon the written contract."); see also supra note 53 (discussing MCE Case No.
832).
67. Telephone Interview with Merchant #4, retired BoA arbitrator (Mar. 1997).
68. See Outline of Services, supra note 5, at 37 ("Should either party seek to have
judgement entered upon the award pursuant to the 9 U.S.C. § 9, they may do so by applying
to a court of competent jurisdiction located in Memphis, Tennessee."); MCE T R, supra' note
17, at R. 43, cl. 1 (noting that when the MCE enters an award "judgment upon the arbitra
tors' award [in a proceeding under the new arbitration rule, see supra note 17] may be en
tered in any court having jurisdiction thereof').
69. MCE BY LAWS , supra note 10, at Art. IV,§ 8. The MCE has also implemented an
other safeguard against the judgment-proof problem. In addition to paying the annual mem
bership fee, members are required to purchase a membership in the Exchange. The By-Laws
provide that when a member fails to pay an arbitration award, the prevailing party has a
right to make a claim against his membership. If the noncomplying party still refuses to pay,
his membership is auctioned off and the award is paid from the proceeds. At one time, these
memberships were valued at about $20,000, Telephone Interview with MCE Executive (Feb.
1997), although their value appears to have fluctuated widely, at least wh�n "sold at forced
auctions. See Keyer v. MCE, 135 Tenn. 414, 420 (1916) (noting that an MCE membership
sold for $2,500); MCE v. Pope, 13 Tenn. App. 518 (1931) (noting that a MCE membership
sold for $4,500); Capps v. Comm'r, 14 T. C.M. (CCH) 505 (1955) (noting that a MCEmem
bership sold for $10,000). Today, however, the value of membership is approximately $2,500,
-
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Expulsions are widely publicized. Because membership in a shippers'
association strongly affects the profitability of a merchant's domestic
business70 and is essential to participation in the international cotton
trade, these association and exchange imposed penalties, together with
their attendant social and reputational sanctions,71 are usually suffi
cient to induce merchants to promptly comply with arbitration deci
sions unless they are bankrupt or in severe financial distress.72
Telephone Interview with MCE Executive (Feb. 1997), so this bond offers far less protection
than it did in the past.
70. See infra notes 176-178 (discussing how a merchant's membership status in these as
sociations affects mills' willingness to deal with him).
71. See infra notes 177-179 and accompanying text (providing evidence that transactors
are very reluctant to deal with expelled members).
72. Moreover, even when the noncomplying party is in financial distress, the associa
tions, most notably the shippers' associations, have succeeded in creating an implicit bank
ruptcy system that increases the likelihood that intra-industry debts, even those that are dis
charged in whole or in part in the public bankruptcy system, will nevertheless eventually be
paid in full.
When a member of a cotton shippers' association becomes insolvent or files for bank
ruptcy, his membership in both his regional association and the ACSA is suspended. ATL.
COTTON ASS'N BY-LAWS, Art. VI, § 2 (1995) (hereinafter ACA BY-LAWS]; S. COTTON
ASS'N BY-LAWS, Art. 6, § 11 (1995) [hereinafter SCA BY-LAWS]; TEX. COTTON ASS'N BY
LAWS, Art. VI, § 10 (1993) [hereinafter TCA BY-LAWS]; w. COTTON SHIPPERS Ass'N BY
LAWS, Art. VI, § 6 (1994) [hereinafter WCSA BY-LAWS]; see also AM. COTTON SHIPPERS
AsS'N BYLAWS, Art. 6, § 2 (1999), available at http://www.acsacotton.org/About_ACSA/
Search %20Rules/about_acsa.html [hereinafter ACSA BY-LAws ]. Members of these associa
tions are then notified of the action through association-promulgated circulars. See, e.g. ,
ACSA Letter to Members (Oct. 19, 1995) (noting that [name of shipper] filed for reorgani
zation "under Chapter 11 of the Federal Bankruptcy Act [and that t]he Southern Cotton
Association has suspended the membership of . . . the above firm in accordance to their By
Laws pending further review and any action by their Board of Directors"). If, after going
through the public bankruptcy process, a merchant wants to reenter the cotton business, he
will, as a practical matter, have to gain readmission to an association. See infra notes 176-178
and accompanying text (discussing transactors' reluctance to deal with someone who has
been suspended or expelled from a shippers' association). However, an affirmative vote of a
large percentage of both the board of directors and the membership-at-large is required for
readmission, and every member has the right both to object to a membership candidate and
to publicize the reason for his objection at the association's expense. As a consequence, a
former debtor who applies for readmission without arranging to repay his intra-association
creditors in full is unlikely to be readmitted, even though the rules provide that readmission
is formally contingent "upon establishing, through the presentation of sufficient proof, that
all outstanding financial obligations have been fully satisfied or that the repayment schedule
for <ill existing financial obligations is current." ACA BY-LAWS, supra. There have been in
stances where a former debtor was denied readmission for failure to comply with the repay
ment norm, subsequently paid his former creditors in full, and was then readmitted. Tele
phone Interview with SCA and ACA Executive (July 1996) (describing such incidents at the
SCA and ACA); Telephone Interview with TCA Executive (no date) (describing such inci
dents at the TCA); Telephone Interview with Merchant #5 (no date) (explaining that being
suspended or expelled has a large impact on a trader's ability to do business, and that to be
readmitted to an association, you would have to pay 100% of your debt notwithstanding any
legal discharge).
This implicit bankruptcy system may also partially mitigate the familiar incentive which is especially acute in cash commodities markets - for firms to engage in overly risky
activity when they are on the verge of insolvency. Because merchants who anticipate want
ing to reenter the business after bankruptcy know that they will have to pay all of their intra
association (and perhaps intra-industry) creditors in full before being readmitted, they are
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The ATMI does not expel mills that fail to comply with arbitration
decisions, perhaps because ATMI membership is not a prerequisite
for maintaining a profitable mill and such a sanction would have little
force. However, in part because there are far fewer mills than mer
chants, when mills do not comply with arbitration awards, their non
compliance quickly becomes known throughout the merchant and
banking communities, and the mill typically finds itself either unable
to purchase cotton, or able to purchase it only at a relatively high price
or for cash prior to delivery. As a result, noncompliance with arbitral
decisions is uncommon unless the mill is in severe financial distress.
B.

Comparison of the Private and Public Legal Systems

Some of the more important benefits created by the PLS stem
from rather straightforward ways that its formal structures improve on
aspects of the public legal system.73
less likely to engage in certain types of overly risky behavior and end-period opportunism
than they would be in the absence of the industry's well-organized associations. The indus
try's PLS, and the behavorial norms it encourages, make it possible to impose a sanction that
exceeds the wealth of the party in financial distress (albeit by a finite amount, since a trans
actor can also become judgment proof with respect to reputational harm if he engages in
enough wrongdoing that he is unlikely to be readmitted to a shippers' association even if he
makes good his debts). The availability of these nonmonetary sanctions, like the punishment
of incarceration rather than, or in addition to, a fine in the criminal context, in turn, miti
gates the incentive of a transactor in financial distress to engage in end-period opportunism.
73. Some of the benefits of the private system could be partially captured through the
public system, or through straightforward public legal system reform. Some of the benefits of
the PLS's adjudicative procedures, for example, could be obtained if cotton contracts simply
provided for American Arbitration Association ("AAA") administered arbitration. How
ever, AAA-administered arbitration is often as costly and delay-prone as litigation. See
Herbert M. Kritzer & Jill K. Anderson, The Arbitration Alternative: A Comparative Analysis
of Case Processing Time, Disposition Mode, and Cost in the American Arbitration Associa
tion and in the Courts, 8 JUST. SYS. J. 6, 18 (1983) (concluding that "[o]ne does not save
money by going to the AAA," rather than to state or federal court for claims above $5,000).
In addition, because the AAA's general arbitration rules give arbitrators wide-ranging dis
cretion to grant continuances, see AM. ARBITRATION ASS'N, WHAT EVERY ADVOCATE
NEEDS TO KNOW - A COMMENTARY ON THE COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES OF THE
AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION 20-21, 27 (1993) (discussing the granting of �'post
ponements" and "extensions of time"), and because unlike cotton industry tribunals, the
AAA cannot put any special pressures on parties to comply with its judgments, both pre
and post-award delay would likely remain a significant problem.
It is possible, however, that careful drafting of an arbitration clause and the adoption of
special rules regarding the selection of industry-expert arbitrators and the avoidance of delay
might reduce or eliminate these problems. At least one of the AAA's industry-specific tri
bunals has attempted these sorts of reforms. See, e.g. , AM. ARBITRATION ASS'N, WIRELESS
INDUSTRY ARBITRATION RULES (1997), available at http://www.adr.org/rules/
commercial/wireless_rules.html (providing the option of "fast-track" arbitration with a "45day 'time standard' for case completion" in front of a panel staffed by experts who are "en
gaged directly in the telecommunications industry").
Some of the benefits created by the trade rules could also be obtained if detailed,
association-promulgated, standard-form contracts that contained rule-like provisions and
that provided for general commercial arbitration were widely used by transactors in a par
ticular market. However, if the arbitrators interpreting these contracts did so under the
Code, which they would be likely to do since they are supposed to apply the law, many of the
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The procedural rules reduce the cost and delay of obtaining and
enforcing a judgment. They provide a streamlined process that, com
pared to the public system, makes it more likely that transactors will
enter into new contracting relationships,74 makes it easier for large and
small firms to transact with each other,75 makes smaller-sized transac
tions viable,76 limits the ability of transactors to use the arbitral process
to engage in strategic behavior,77 and reduces the actual harm suffered
benefits of the rule-like provisions would be diminished. The Code's nonwaivable duties of
good faith and reasonableness, see U.C.C. § 1-102 (1991) ("[T]he obligations of good faith,
diligence, reasonableness and care . . . may not be disclaimed by agreement."), as well as its
highly contextualized adjudicative approach, together with the AAA's direction to its arbi
trators to achieve equitable results, may have the effect of transforming even rule-like coµ
tractual provisions into standards and transforming many of the transactors' extralegal un
derstandings into enforceable contractual obligations. In addition, although reversal of
arbitration decisions for failure to apply the law is quite rare, particularly when, as in AAA
arbitrations, no opinion is written, an arbitral agreement making it clear that the law is not to
be enforced would be problematic. See Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules from Mandatory
Rules: Privatizing Law Through Arbitration, 83 MINN. L. REV. 703 (1999).
In contrast, in the industry tribunals, the arbitrators can simply pledge to uphold the
trade rules, and because their reputations are on the line, they are likely to do so, particu
larly in industries like cotton where arbitrators sign their opinions. Moreover, a party who
has lost an arbitration under the trade rules is unlikely to challenge the arbitrators' decision
in court, unless an extraordinary sum is involved or he is planning to leave the industry.
Bringing such a legal action would likely result in extraordinary reputational harm and per
haps de facto ouster from the industry. As a consequence, even a general commercial arbi
tration tribunal charged with interpreting detailed standard-form contracts under expedited
procedural rules could not provide all of the benefits of a PLS.
·

74. By reducing the cost of dispute resolution and increasing the likelihood that arbitral
awards will be paid, the procedural rules, together with the shipper association membership
rules, see infra note 167 and accompanying text, may make transactors more willing to initi
ate new trading relationships since they will be better protected in the event of nonperform
ance.
75. For example, if a small merchant were forced to contract with a large mill under the
public legal system, the small merchant might decline to file even a meritorious claim,
knowing that legal costs are generally high and that the mill's in-house legal staff would be
able to use many delaying tactics that, combined with the delay inherent in the judicial proc
ess, might put him out of business. As a consequence, large firms would, in effect, be unable
to make legally enforceable promises to small firms.
76. By reducing the cost of dispute resolution, the PLS transforms some meritorious
claims that would have had a negative expected value in the public system, and therefore
would most likely not have been filed, into positive expected value claims. As a conse
quence, the system makes it possible to enter into smaller contracts that are more likely to
be performed, since each party has a credible threat to go to arbitration if they are not. The
ability to enter into smaller-sized transactions not only helps small firms compete with larger
ones, but is also beneficial to mills. When a mill is able to purchase smaller amounts from
multiple suppliers, it is better able to diversify away the risk of inadvertent breach, a risk that
remains significant even when merchants take the optimal amount of care. See infra text accompanying notes 216-219.
·

77. For example, because cotton tribunals do not permit unrestrained party-initiated
discovery, transactors have no incentive to bring the type of nonmeritorious suit that if
brought in the public legal system might nonetheless result in a settlement since the defen
dant would have an incentive to settle for any amount below the discovery costs that the
plaintiff could credibly threaten to impose on him before incurring significant costs herself.
See David Rosenberg & Steven Shavell, A Model in Which Suits Are Brought for Their Nui
sance Value, 5 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 3 (1985). Moreover, because these tribunals endeavor
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by transactors who do not have access to capital on reasonable terms
during the pendancy of a dispute.78 In addition, by providing for the
appointment of industry-expert arbitrators, who can make many fac
tual determinations more accurately and less expensively than a judge
or jury can, the rules greatly expand the "contractible" aspects of an
exchange. The use of stream-lined procedures together with the ap
pointment of expert adjudicators transforms considerations that in the
public legal system would have been only observable to the parties that is, knowable by the parties but not worthwhile for them (from an
ex ante perspective) to prove to a tribunal in the event of a dispute into considerations that are also verifiable - that is, worthwhile to
prove to a tribunal in the event of a dispute79 - thereby encouraging
transactors to enter into more complete contracts.80
The substantive rules provided by the PLS also facilitate contract
ing in ways the Code does not. They reduce the cost of entering into
an agreement by providing a comprehensive set of well-tailored de
fault rules that reduce the negotiation costs, specification costs, infor
mation costs,81 and relational costs82 of contracting, as well as the risk
to keep the existence of a dispute secret, at least until a judgment is rendered, the arbitral
process discourages the filing of suits solely for the settlement value that is created by their
cloud on title effect, that is, for the harm that the mere existence of a lawsuit causes to
someone's reputation during the pendancy of the dispute. See Edward Bernstein, Law &

Economics and the Structure of Value Adding Contracts: A Contract Lawyer's View of the
Law & Economics Literature, 74 U. OR. L. REV. 189 (1995) (discussing the cloud on title

theory of the nuisance suit). Even though the existence of a dispute sometimes leaks out
through gossip, because disputes are resolved faster, the monetary effect of the cloud will be
much smaller. In addition, industry arbitrators' reluctance to grant continuances or post
ponements of hearings and decisions, limits the ability of a party to use the threat of delay to
persuade his adversary to accept a lower settlement.
78. See Telephone Interview with MCE Executive (Feb. 1997) ("When a little guy [mer
chant] isn't paid, he may suffer huge financial harm.").
79. Alan Schwartz, Relational Contracts and the Courts, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 271 (1992)
(defining and discussing the distinction between observable and verifiable information).
80. Encouraging more complete contracts reduces the number of unprovided-for con
tingencies, and may therefore reduce the number of disputes.
81. Information costs are the costs to a transactor of understanding the terms of a par
ticular transaction. When deals are concluded against the background of detailed standard
ized defaults, and variations are prominently noted in the special remarks section of a con
firmation, transactors bear the costs of learning the meaning of the defaults only once and in
an individual transaction need only take note of the modified terms. When transactors un
derstand the terms of their contracts, they are less likely to seek legal advice before entering
into deals, thus reducing legal costs.
82. Relational costs are costs that arise from the fact that, in many contexts, transactors
approach the task of reaching an agreement " with an idea of how similar transactions are
usually structured; they have in their minds an implicit form contract made up of clauses
such as price that are commonly negotiated, boilerplate provisions, and legal default rules
[and extralegal provisions]. A party may be wary of suggesting too many deviations from the
impl icit form contract since these might be interpreted as a signal that he is a less reliable or
more contentious trading partner than the average market participant. . . . [T]his signal
might, in turn, lead the other party to either propose additional provisions or demand a price
adjustment to compensate him for the added perceived risk that a dispute will arise. It might
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of transaction breakdown. The clarity of the rules, together with the
efforts associations make to ensure that transactors understand them,83
reduces the likelihood that misunderstandings will arise and helps to
promote settlement when disputes do arise by making arbitral out
comes relatively predictable. In addition, as compared to individually
drafted and negotiated contracts, where free rider problems and net
work externalities often lead to the undersupply of innovative provi�
sions and the lock-in of inefficient contractual provisions,84 the avail
ability of industry trade rules facilitates the creation and introduction
of new contract governance provisions.85 The industry's private legisla"
tive process overcomes the free rider problem by collectivizing the
costs and benefits of the new provisions and reduces the network bias

also increase the risk of transaction breakdown as well as the likelihood that the transaction
will not be consummated by the relevant deadline." Lisa Bernstein, Social Norms and De
fault Rules Analysis, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 59, 71-72 (1993). Avoiding relational costs is
particularly important in merchant-to-mill transactions where the value of the transaction as
a whole is strongly affected by the ability of the transactors to cooperate during its execu
tion.
83. See infra notes 192-196 and accompanying text (describing the ways the associations
try to educate member transactors about the content of the rules).
84. See Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analy
sis of the Interactions Between Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 CAL. L. REV. 261
(1985).
85. Another advantage of industry-provided trade rules over individually drafted con
tracts is that they may enable transactors in the market as a whole to overcome coordination
problems. Evolutionary game theory models suggest that, in an environment where two co
ordination achieving norms are initially available, coordination will be achieved over time
even when each market transactor independently decides which norm to follow. However,
there is nothing in these models to suggest that these individual choices will necessarily lead
to the adoption of the more efficient norm. Which norm will ultimately win out depends,
among other things, on the initial distribution of norm-following strategies selected by mem
bers of the relevant group at the time the game begins. In such situations, if the less efficient
norm wins out, it is likely to retain its dominance since the norm will constitute a Nash equi
librium. See Jack Hirshleifer, Evolutionary Models in Economics and Law: Cooperation Ver
sus Conflict Strategies, 4 RES. L. & ECON. 1 , 13 (1982). In the cotton industry, where coordi
nation of terms and behavior is important, the centralized provision of trade rules increases
the pace at which norm convergence is achieved, and when transactors wind up locked into
an inefficient norm, trade rule changes can provide the exogenous shock that moves transac
tors to the more efficient equilibrium. An examination of trade rule amendments in numer
ous industries that have PLSs demonstrates that adapting to technological innovations and
other changes that require a coordinated response from market participants is a very com
mon reason for trade rule amendments.
One of the interesting features of these evolutionary equilibria is that the proportion of
the initial population adopting a particular norm does not have to be notably large for the
norm to become an evolutionary Nash equilibrium. This suggests that in a market where
large firms such as cotton mills have· a preference for a particular norm and choose to follow
it, they may constitute a high enough proportion of the initial population of traders to ensure
that the norm is adopted market-wide. This may be a reason that an industry as a whole may
be better off if its rules are made through a legislative process in which each firm, regardless
of its size, has one vote, thereby more ne·arly equalizing the effect of firm size on the rules
creation process.
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against new terms by ensuring that the new provisions will be incorpo
rated into most industry contracts in the future.86
The adjudicative approach used by the industry tribunals also
benefits transactors. It encourages settlement by making arbitral out
comes easier to predict and promotes flexibility in the course of con
tracting relationships by refusing to transform extralegal understand
ings or patterns of adjustments into legally enforceable obligations.
This adds significant value to contracting relationships. Cotton trans
actors consider one another's willingness to make such adjustments
important. There are often stages in a contracting relationship at
which adjustments that create tremendous benefits to one party while
imposing minimal costs on the other can, in fact, be made; yet transac
tors would be far less willing to make these adjustments if there was
even a small risk that they might be required to do so in the future, a
risk that is very real in the public legal system due to the Code's
course of dealing and course of performance provisions.87 For exam86. This benefit is more substantial in the exchanges and shippers' associations, in which
(at least at the time the initial sets of rules were adopted) most transactors were buyers one
day and sellers the next, than it is with respect to the SMRs, which govern merchant-to-mill
disputes. A review of the minutes of the joint ACSA-ATMI annual meetings devoted to
SMR revisions, from 1947 to 1990, suggests that changing the SMRs is a long and arduous
process rife with interest group politics. Nevertheless, over that same time period, sixty-six
amendments to the rules (some important, others not) were passed.
The availability of well-tailored trade rules may, however, have the undesirable effect of
reducing the rate of contract innovation through individually drafted contractual provisions.
The cost of drafting new provisions will be nearly the same as it would have been were the
contract to have been governed by the legal system, while the marginal benefit of including
an innovative term may be smaller since the trade rules are already well suited to the trans
actions they govern. This effect may be reinforced if the terms supplied by the trade rules
become part of an embedded reference transaction that transactors become increasingly
unwilling to depart from. On the other hand, industry tribunals' willingness to give effect to
contractual language increases the incentive to draft and include innovative provisions.
87. As both mills and merchants have grown into larger, more complex entities, this fea
ture of the system has become increasingly important. In many contracting relationships, the
people who enter into the agreements are not the same people that perform them (such as
shipping clerks, truckers, and loading dock managers). In such situations, it makes sense for
companies .tp give their employees the authority to make one-time adjustments where it
seems desirable to do so. For example, if a truck arrives an hour after closing one Friday,
and the loading dock manager happens to be around finishing some paper work, it would be
desirable for him to agree to permit unloading of the truck - it does not cost him much and
it saves the merchant the cost of paying the trucker to stay with the load over the weekend.
If, however, the loading dock manager thought that by agreeing to unload in this particular
instance, he would be giving the trucker the right to require him or another loading dock
employee to keep the loading dock open late on another Friday, he might not agree to un
load the truck. Although under the Code, one act does not constitute a course of perform
ance, one loading dock employee might not know if anot!ier employee had agreed to a simi
lar adjustment the previous Friday, or if another employee would agree to a similar
adjustment the next Friday, thereby enabling the trucker to claim that failure to accept a late
delivery on a Friday was a breach of contract by the mill (assum.ing the mill did not issue a
wf.tten ):lOtice that no late deliveries would be accepted again and that strict compliance was
required). Alternatively, the loading dock manager could simply be instructed by the com
pany to have the trucker sign a waiver as a condition of unloading. However, such an ap
proach might undermine the "good old boy" aspect of the relationship, which plays an im
portant role in reducing the types of frictions that increase the cost of performance. In

1744

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 99:1724

ple, in merchant-to-mill transactions, the inventory costs to a merchant
of giving a mill an absolute right to demand early or postponed deliv
ery would be prohibitively high, yet there are many instances when, if
a mill asks for early or postponed delivery, the cost of accommodating
the request turns out to be low. Indeed, although cotton industry trade
rules and contracts provide clearly specified delivery times, it is under
stood that when making an adjustment is not too costly to the mer
chant, the adjustment will be made. As one merchant explained, it is
important to have a reputation for being flexible since "adjustments
are a common part of doing business. If someone is short of ware
house space, you agree to delay delivery; if someone needs a shipment
early, you are ready to go, so you do it."88 Conversely, on the mill side,
"a mill's reputation for being flexible [when the merchant wishes to
deliver early or late] is factored directly into the price; a much higher
price is charged to those who are not flexible� "89
Finally, the private system has a number of features that are de
signed to ·reduce the most serious problem facing PLSs generally,
namely, the risk of arbitral bias.9()
addition, a system of written waivers would .impose administrative costs on the firm. If these
intra-firm transaction costs were high enough, firms might simply instruct their agents not to
make these types of accommodations, thereby introducing considerable rigidity into con
tracting relationships as compared to the situation created by the PLS where these adjust
ments can be made by agents on the ground without creating costly risks for their principals.
For a more complete discussion of the inflexibility costs introduced by the Code's course of
dealing and course of performance provisions, see generally Bernstein, Merchant Law, supra
note 60.

88. Telephone Interview with Mill Representative #1 (Apr. 2, 1997).
89. Telephone Interview with Merchant #12 (June 1997).
90. The PLSs' adoption of bright-line trade rules that leave less discretion to the adjudi

cator than the Code does may help to reduce arbitral bias by making it easier to catch and
therefore less likely to occur. The effectiveness of bright-line rules in constraining bias de
pends, in part, on the type of bias to be resisted. If, for example, the arbitrators themselves
are assumed to be neutral actors who are subject to pressure by industry interest groups,
being·able to justify their decisions on the grounds that the result was "required" by a clear
rule (and thus not a matter of individual choice) may help them withstand this type of pres
sure. A desire to reduce the incentives of various groups to apply this type of pressure may
be one of the reasons that arbitral opinions are not accorded precedential value, and that
rule-making authority is clearly allocated to the associations' private legislatures. If, how
ever, the arbitrators themselves are assumed to have a preference for rendering biased
judgments, rule-like provisions will impose only weak constraints. Fact-finding can often be
manipulated to make outcomes appear dictated by the rules themselves. As a consequence,
a desire to demonstrate the impartiality of the tribunal may be a partial explanation for the
BoA's old practice of circulating the evidence and arguments submitted to arbitrators to
gether with its written opinion. See supra note 28.
Another feature of the system, the fact that BoA arbitrators are not permitted to know
the names of the parties, is also a way of reducing the likelihood of bias against a particular
individual. It is not, however, particularly helpful in reducing another type of bias that might
arise in this tribunal, namely industry-segment bias - since the Board does know which
party is the merchant and which is the mill. Nevertheless, the circulation of BoA's opinions
may discourage the Board from systematically favoring one segment over another, since this
would become apparent to industry participants, who might then opt not to include BoA
arbitration provisions, or the SMRs, in their contracts.
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Conclusion

Despite the fact that the cotton industry's PLS is so well run and so
well tailored to the needs of the industry, cotton transactors do not
rely exclusively, or even primarily, on the easy access to monetary
remedies it provides to create the desired incentives for contractual
performance. Rather, individual transactors attach great weight to the
reputations of their transacting partners, and the institutions that cre
ate and administer the PLS also engage in many activities that are de
signed to strengthen the social basis of trade and to promote the flow
of reputation-related information through the industry. These efforts
succeed in making reputation-based nonlegal sanctions (lik(! negative
gossip, which may lead to refusal to deal) an important force in the in
dustry. They work in tandem with the monetary sanctions available in
arbitration to provide desirable brea�h-or-perform incentives and to
enable transactors to· devise better contract governance structures
than they could in their absence. As a consequence, in order . to fully
understand the ways that cotton industry institutions influence cotton
transactions, it is useful to look at the importance of reputation at dif
ferent stages of a typical transaction as well as the myriad of ways that
cotton institutions . seek to strengthen both the social and informational infrastructures of trade.
·

II.

REPUTATION AND REPUTATION-BASED NONLEGAL SANCTIONS
A.

The Creation and Importance of Reputation-Based
Nonlegal Sanctions
.
The importance of commercial reputation in the cotton industry is
due, in large part, to the type of commodity cotton is, as well as to the
ways that standard trades are structured and financed. Unlike many
commodities that can be graded objectively, cotton grading has tradi
tionally been a subjective . process.91 There are numerous grades and
At the MCE, the norm of consensus in arbitral decision making (from 1944-1991, only
four of the .ninety-two cases decided were not unanimous) and the use of seven-arbitrator
panels may also be ways of attempting to constrain arbitral bias.
91. See, e.g., FRANK A. RICHARDS, THE MARKETING OF COTTON AND THE FINANCING
OF COTTON MERCHANTS 3 (1949) ("The classification [of cotton] is . . . an art, not a sci
ence."); JOHN A. TODD, THE MARKETING OF COTTON: FROM THE GROWER TO THE
SPINNER 102 (1934) ("The value of cotton is judged by its grade, length and strength of sta
ple, and character . . . Grade is largely a question of appearance, and judgment is a matter of
a good eye . . . [b]ut it is in judging the staple that expert · knowledge is particularly neces
sary . . . -There is no absolute opinion on staple, however, experts often differing over the
same sample; indeed, the same bale will often appear to vary every time it is sampled."). In
1981, however, a more objective grading technique known as High Volume Instrument
(HVI) Classing was introduced. The cost of HVI classing has limited its use in small and me
dium-sized private transactions, but it is widely used in grading cotton subject to govern-
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over forty other features that go into the description of a single lot of
cotton.92 The nonhomogeneity of cotton, and the difficulty of describ"
ing a particular bale with precision, is one reason that cotton is often
sold "on sample. "93 It is also a reason that the commercial reputation
of the seller is so important to the buyer, particularly when the sale is
concluded over the phone without physical inspection of the goods. As
one merchant put it: "You want to do business where you know peo
ple and can depend on what they say about quality, since it is so subtle
and so subjective. You are more likely to rely on quality when you
know the guy."94 The short-term volatility of cotton prices, the high
volume, low profit margin nature of a typical merchant's operations,
and the fact that many agreements are not confirmed in writing until
days after they are made, make all transactors concerned about the
reputations of the people they deal with. As one market participant
explained: "[R]eputation is essential in this business. Millions of dol
lars of business will be done on the basis of a thirty-second phone call.
Agreements are essentially oral; they are documented for tax; invoice,
or customs reasons."95 And, as another noted, " [r]eputation matters
because you conclude sales one day, and the confirmations do not
follow for as much as a week or ten days, so during that time period,
the integrity of a person's word is the only thing that bonds the con
tract."96
ment-sponsored programs. COTION COUNCIL INT'L 1996 COTION USA BUYERS GUIDE 13
(1996).

92. See COTION COUNCIL INT'L 1996 COTION USA BUYERS GUIDE § 6 (1996) (de
scribing the sixty-nine varieties of American Upland Cotton, together with their staple
lengths, micronaire ranges, and fiber lengths, as well as "25 color grades and five categories
of below.grade color" and "seven leaf grades . . . [and) one below leaf grade category").
'
93. A sale " 'on sample' means the sale of particular bales by the samples drawn from
them; that is, the purchaser receives the specific bales represented by the samples he se
lects." TODD, supra note 91, at 95. Other methods of designating quality include: a sale "on
type" which "is practically equivalent to sale on private brands. The type samples are not
offered as representing specific bales, but as the type of cotton the merchant can deliver,"
and sale "on description," which "means the sale of cotton with a certain designated grade
and staple, without the presentation of samples." Id.
94. Telephone Interview with Merchant #8 (July 1996).
95. Telephone Interview with Merchant #4, retired BoA arbitrator (Mar. 1997). Oral
contracts are enforceable irrespective of their size. See SMRs, supra note 5, at Art. I, § 2
(noting that a contract may be formed orally but "all contracts for the sale of cotton must be
confirmed promptly in writing by both parties to the contract"); MCE TR, supra note 17, at
'
R.1, cl. 1, 3 ("A contract for the sale of cotton shall be deemed final when the price, quantity,
quality, time and place, or places, of delivery and terms of sale have been agreed upon be
tween the Buyer and Seller and no contract can be rescinded without the mutual consent of
both parties thereto" but "[w)ritten confirmations of all sales shall be presented or mailed by
Sellers to member Buyers within twenty-four hours after the sale is made."). However, it is
difficult to establish the existence of an oral contract since arbitrators are reluctant to rule on
the basis of conflicting oral testimony alone.
96. Telephone Interview with Merchant #5 (no date); see also Telephone Interview.with
Merchant #6 (no date) (noting that the cotton industry is "a community of people who are in
the business of trading with one another, which requires that more integrity must exist. . .
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Commercial reputation is particularly important in merchant-to
mill transactions. When a mill needs a particular type of cotton to
keep its looms running, and this type of cotton may not be readily
available on the spot market, the mill must rely on the merchant's
reputation for timely delivery of the precise type of goods promised.97
Similarly, mills can take many actions that strongly affect the value of
the transaction to the merchant but are not strictly prohibited by ei
ther the governing trade rules or most merchant-to-mill contracts,
such as refusing to accept delivery outside of narrowly defined times,
thereby forcing merchants to incur the cost of holding cotton in trucks
over nights and weekends.98
The way cotton transactions are financed also contributes to the
importance attached to commercial reputation. Most merchants oper
ate on a slim cash flow margin.99 Typically, more than eighty-five per
cent of the operations of all but the largest merchants are financed by
one of three banks. This type of merchant banking is very personal.
Banks inquire directly into the commercial reputations of their bor
rowers, and a merchant's reputation, along with the reputations of the
mills he sells to, strongly affects the interest rate he will have to pay. 100
As one merchant noted, "[b]anking institutions have veto power over
who merchants do business with."101· And, as a prominent industry
banker explained, "[w]hen approached by a merchant for credit, a
bank lending officer's first task is to become intimately acquainted

[you] don't need explicit contract[s] or confirmation to backup what you said. What you say
is key to the buyer . . . face to face, telephone conversation, fax machines, long distance, by
voice; you have to be able to know the person you are dealing with [and] in markets of our
size this is possible"); Cotton Merchants and Cowboys - Diamonds and Denim, THE
COTION DIGEST INT'L, Vol. 74, No. 1 (1999) 10, 12 ("The Cowboy and the Cotton Merchant
are also honest and loyal. . . . [With the cowboy, a]ll you had in life was your word, your
handshake, and the image you portrayed. The cotton merchant today lives by these same
rules, his word is his bond in trading, and if he does not perform on his obligations, he
quickly finds himself where no one will trade with him (or ride with him as we say out
West)).
97. Telephone Interview by Connie Rogers with MCE Merchant #8 (Aug. 13, 1997)
("[P]erformance on fulfilling contracts is what determines reputation - basically quality, on
time delivery.").
98 . For more examples of these costs, see infra notes 135-136 and accompanying text.
.

99. Moreover, mills typically pay merchants ten days to two weeks after delivery, leav
ing merchants to finance this cash gap, which in tum makes a mill's reputation for prompt
payment very important to the merchant.
100. See, e.g., FRANKLIN w. RYAN, THE COTION MILL SALE-NOTE: AN ANALYSIS
FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF BANK CREDIT ADMINISTRATION, 5 (1921) (explaining that when
a bank lends to a merchant there is "an indirect credit extension to the cotton mill. The bank
lends to the merchant to enable him to sell cotton to the mill on credit. The bank looks to
the merchant primarily for the final payment of the loan but the biggest element in the loan
is the moral risk and the mill management is an important factor in the moral risk when the
cotton is stored in the mill's own warehouse as is the usual procedure").
101. Telephone Interview with MCE Merchant #10 (no date).
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with the merchant's character, background, experience, and conserva
tism."102
Given these considerations, it is not surprising that cotton transac
tors view commercial reputation as an essential business asset whose
value will often be reflected in the selection of transactional partners103
as well as in the transaction price,104 the transaction structure; and
other terms.105
The most important determinants of a cotton transactor's reputa
tion are his record for prompt payment of his debts, his willingness to
meet his contractual commitments (that is, not to "lay down" on a
contract),106 his willingness to be flexible in work-a-day interactions,107
102. See Cotton Financing, typewritten pages with the card of C.W. Butler III, First
Vice-President, National Bank of Commerce Memphis, stapled to it; see also. RICHARDS,
supra note 91, at 37-38 ("As the cotton business is highly specialized, the merchant's experi
ence and competence are important factors to be considered," and "[m]any bankers make a
regular practice of extending more liberal credit to established, reputable merchants than
they ordin�rily extend to borrowers in other types of business ventures.").
10�. Telephone Interview with TCA Executive (no date) ("In this business, you just
won't deal with folks you don't know; you need a really large price differential to take a
chance."). ·
104. Telephone Interview with Merchant #1 (no date) ("Mills get a reputation about
how flexible they are when certain circumstances arise [and] a merchant considers this very
valuable business knowledge, this information about how flexible a mill will be. Some mills
are more stringent about adjustments, and are very strict about demanding exact conformity
to the contract .. These mills have to pay more for cotton than mills who are willing to· be
more flexible. The market knows."); Telephone Interview with Merchant #7 (June 1997)
("Reputation is figured discreetly into the price someone has to pay for goods."); Telephone
Interview with Merchant #8 (July 1996) ("One's reputation is an integral part of the price
another is willing to pay for his goods . . . If a merchant has a bad reputation, there are mills
who won't deal with him, and other mills who might deal with him, but only at a discounted
price.").
·

·

·

105. Telephone Interview with Mill Representative #1 (Apr. 2, 1997) (explaining that
mills who refused to work with merchants after severe weather affected the micronaire of a
crop that had been sold for forward delivery "found that now merchants do not want to en
ter into long-term contracts with the[se] mills although they are still willing to enter into
shorter-term contracts with them"); Telephone Interview with Merchant #9 (July 1996)
(noting that the influence of reputation on the selection of contracting partners depends on
the length of the contract).·

106. See, e.g., Telephone Interview by Connie Rogers with MCE Merchant #1 (July 17,
1997) (citing "laying down on a contract, bankruptcy, [and] not paying a debt," as actions
that would lead him not to deal with someone); Telephone Interview by Connie Rogers with
MCE Merchant #2 (July 18, 1997) (explaining that you get a bad reputation when you "book
a head and can't pay for it," or when you "lay down on a contract"); Telephone Interview by
Connie Rogers with MCE Merchant #4 (Aug. 8, 1997) (explaining that "past history deter
mines reputation," adding that he wouldn't deal with someone who would "lay down on the
contract"); Email from merchant participant to author, to Cotton-L Listserv (Sep. 29, 1 997,
2:33:26 PM) ("A cotton merchant or buyer who has a good reputation is one that honors his
word, whether it be in writing or is oral. He does what he said he'd do. If something goes to
arbitration in a dispute, he agrees to go along with the decision. He expects to be treated
fairly. A bad reputation comes from not honoring one's word, lying, or failing to fullfil [sic]
on a commitement [sic]. This can be done by either of the parties involved. An example is
changing the class on cotton traded to reflect a quality difference. Another is selling one type
of cotton, and knowingly delivering another quality that has a different value.").
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and his willingness to renegotiate commitments . when circumstances
change or adverse events occur.108 Other important attributes include a
merchant's record of on-time delivery of the precise quality of goods
specified109 and a mill's reputation for promptly accepting delivery.
The rules of most cotton associations as well as the rules governing
merchant-to-mill transactions implicitly recognize the importance of
each transactor's reputation by making cotton contracts non
assignable. 110
The importance of reputation and the industry's reliance on repu
tation-based nonlegal sanctions ("NLSs") goes back to the early days
of the industry when NLSs were a rather inexpensive way to support
exchange.111 Deeply rooted social forces, such as the culture of honor
in the Old South and the close-knit nature of many small town mill
communities,112 helped to ensure that a transactor's sense of self
esteem, his position in the community, and his social connections were
intertwined with his business reputation, making breach of contract
something that would hurt not only his business prospects but also his
standing in his social community.113 As one transactor explained, "the
head of a mill used to be a senior citizen in the community. His self
esteem depended on how he did business."114And, as another noted,
"[u]ntil quite recently, most of them [MCE members] had their offices

107. Telephone Interview with Merchant #1 (no date) ("Reputation is key. I care about
how long someone has been in the business, and I care about whether, if there is a problem,
they come to me immediately and try to work it out."); Telephone Interview with Merchant
#12 (June 1997) ("A mill's reputation for being flexible is factored directly into the price; a
much higher price is charged to those who are not flexible."); see also supra text ·accompa
nying notes 87-89.
108. See, e.g. , Telephone Interview with Mill Representative #2, former BoA arbitrator
(no date) ("When I deal with an honest man, I know whatever happens we can work it out.
If a guy has a tarnished reputation, I can't count on this and will not deal with him!").
109. See, e.g., Telephone Interview by Connie Rogers with MCE Merchant #8 (Aug. 13,
1997) supra note 97.
110. See, e.g. , SMRs, supra note 5, at Art. IV, § 21 ("All contracts for the sale of cotton
must be filled and received by the parties making the contracts."); MCE TR, supra note 17,
at R. 9, cl. 1 ("No order for the delivery of cotton is transferable without the knowledge and
consent of Seller.").
1 1 1 . Another consideration that might have motivated the industry to actively promote
the availability of NLSs in the early days of the PLS is that prior to 1920, arbitration awards
were not legally enforceable, so the reputational harm of being known as a welcher and be
ing expelled from an association was the only force that the associations could harness to
induce transactors to comply with arbitral'awards.
112. See generally JACQUELYN DOWD HALL ET AL., LIKE A FAMILY: THE MAKING OF
A SOUTHERN COTTON MILL WORLD (1987).
113. See generally GEORGE S. BUSH, AN AMERICAN HARVEST: THE STORY OF WEIL
BROTHERS-COTTON 421-39 (1982) (exploring this theme in the chapter Now I Lay Me
Down to Cheat) .
1 14. Telephone Interview with Merchant #9 (July 1996).
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on Front Street in Memphis; they saw one another each day and
viewed themselves as being part of the same club."115
Although these background social and communal forces have
gradually become weaker,116 over time, cotton industry institutions
have sponsored a variety of activities designed to recreate and main
tain the types of deeply interconnected business and personal relation
ships that made social trust-based reputation enforcement mechanisms
effective. Over the years, the MCE has sponsored the local debutante
ball, an annual civic cotton carnival that came to be viewed as the
Mardi Gras of Memphis,117 golf tournaments, a Cotton Wives Club
with its own · publication, "Cotton Tales,"118 a well-known domino
tournament, and numerous other civic events.119 And, to this day, re1 15. Telephone Interview with MCE Executive (Feb. 1997).
116. Despite the weakening of these social and communal forces, industry publications
continue to romanticize the values of the south. See, e.g. , Mac Isaacs, Editorial, Despite It
All, People Are Still the Industry's Most Important Asset, TEXTILE WORLD, May 1999, at 9
(observing that the "senseless acts of violence [in Littleton, Colorado] turns (sic] one's
thoughts to yesteryear in the annals of this great textile industry. Time was, in those days of
family owned and operated companies and mill villages, the company not only provided em
ployment, but offered safe havens that met the needs of most families as well . . . Above all,
(there was] a genuine care and concern").
1 17. See, e.g., EVERETI R. COOK, MEMPHIS: COTION'S MARKET PLACE 11, 12 (1942)
(describing the 1931 origins of the MCE sponsored cotton carnival, which by 1942 had grown
to "include an Indian fight with De Soto on the levee, a parade taking for its theme 'Way
Down South', a pet parade, a marathon race. . . . [and a] horse drawn carriage . . . holding
the King and Queen . . . (that] ranks now only next to the New Orleans Mardi Gras in its
spectacular exhibition and attendance").
During Carnival's heyday, "(t]he arrival of the royal couple at the river front" would be
"followed by a series of parades . . . interspersed by beauty pageants, sporting competitions,
luncheons, fashions [sic] shows, and public and private dances." Robert McLean, Cotton
Carnival and Cotton Makers Jubilee: Memphis Society in Black and White 8 (1994) (unpub
lished thesis, George Mason University). All of this glittering activity was sustained by "[t]he
business and social elite from the tri-state area," many of them cotton men, of course. These,
"joined by local residents, fellow members in one of Carnival's 'secret societies,' . . . spon
sor[ ed] many of Carnival's events, especially those not open to the public." Id. at 3. Over
time, however, the Cotton Carnival began a decline, suffering from "charges of class and ra
cial elitism.:' .Id. at 170. For the next three decades after the death of Martin Luther King Jr.
in Memphis, the process of dissolution continued. "The concept of mock royalty by those
who in many ways, were in charge of the 'kingdom,' became ludicrous. Carnival ceased to
entertain and instead became the embodiment of the divisions - social, economic, and ra
cial - that prevented the city from developing." Id. at 148. Today, the Carnival is scarcely a
visible presence.
1 18. By 1979, over eighty cotton wives clubs existed nationwide. Letter from the Club
President, to Friends of Memphis Cotton Wives (Oct. 17, 1980).
1 19. Forrest Orren Lax, The Memphis Cotton Exchange From Beginning to Decline 128
(1970) (unpublished thesis, Memphis State University) ("Because the Memphis Cotton Ex
change was composed of the most influential men in Memphis it was easily the most impor
tant institution in the city. For many years the Exchange was not only an organization of cot
ton men but also civic minded men who used the Exchange to help the city. City problems
were discussed in many Exchange meetings with little mention of cotton. At times one gets
the impression that the Memphis Cotton Exchange 'was' the city of Memphis . . . . It was
probably the first organization in Memphis to actively participate in charity drives for the
poor of the city. It certainly was a leader in combating disease in Memphis. Many victims of
floods also had reason to hold the Exchange in high esteem.").
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gional shippers' associations continue to encourage social interaction
among their members and their families by making their annual con
ventions family events, complete with special entertainment for chil
dren and "the ladies."120 The interweaving of business and social iden
tities is further encouraged by the light-hearted social tidbits that can
still be found in industry-sponsored publications.121 The close connec
tion between transactors' business and social relationships is aptly
summed up by one merchant who explained that:
Merchants take mill buyers on hunting trips just like in any other busi
ness . . . In the process, relationships . . . develop[]. Over time, a buyer
gets the idea that he wants to deal with me not just because of our busi
ness relationship, but also because of our personal relationship. So you
tell me, when you want to do business, who will you call, the guy you
like, or the guy you don't like?122

Cotton industry institutions' efforts to maintain and strengthen so
cial trust-based group solidarity and to facilitate the informal flow of
reputation information were greatly aided by the organization of ship
pers' groups into close-knit regional associations and exchanges with
their own well-developed social groups123 and gossip networks.124
120. See, e.g., Convention News, Newsletter (WCSA, Feb. 1, 1984) (billing the special
offering for "the ladies" as a "very exciting presentation of music, gowns and dance").
121. For example, the Cotton Digest International has maintained a focus on industry
personalities. In the past, typical covers displayed the portraits of association executives, and
a short bio was printed somewhere in each issue. An edition of the Digest devoted to the
Diamond Anniversary of ACSA included a history of the association - a list of its presi
dents, with photographs - and a quiz entitled Bits and Pieces About A CSA Presidents and
Personalities. COTTON DIGEST INT'L 37, Vol. 58, No. 12 (May 12, 1984). Questions from the
quiz included the following: "Which ACSA President graciously accepted the President's gift
of a silver service, returned home and turned it in for a pair of bird dogs?"; "Which ACSA
President, corrected extensively while reading a resolution from the Chair, threw his pencil
down in disgust and said, 'O.K., some of you educated sons-of-bitches write it'?" For several
years, a column called Facts, Fiction and Rumors reported retirement regrets, see� e.g. , Facts,
Fiction and Rumors, COTTON DIGEST INT'L 38, Vol. 50, No. 33 (April 8, 1978) (mourning
the loss of WCSA's executive vice-president, Dick Doan, who "is hanging them up after
more than a decade of service on the job. He'll be missed! When Dick (and his wife) ar
ranged a convention, they included wax for the dance floor"), tidbits on social events, see,
e.g. , id. (exclaiming: "Man, this is (or was) a busy week-end: Conventions in Costa Mesa,
Charleston, Austin, followed a few days with meetings in San Francisco and Hot Springs. A
man could stay loaded (from drinks) and broke (from expenses) trying to make all of
them"), and legislative rumors, see, e.g., id. ("As for farm bill changes, looks like Secretary
Bergland and the administration are trying to 'cut them off at the pass,' with the 10 per cent
acreage diversion plan. But congress will be back this week, and they'll have the final word
on farm legislation."). In earlier years, the magazine Textile Industries had a column called
Personal Notes about Men You Know containing similar sorts of information.
122. Telephone Interview with Merchant #8 (July 1996); Telephone Interview with Mill
Association Executive (Oct. 1996) ("The identity of merchants is important. [There is] tre
mendous loyalty between mills and merchants who literally know one another and are
friends who work together in their relationship.").
123. See supra text accompanying notes 113-119; Donna Rogers, Original Blackboard
Discovered During Restoration, AUGUSTA CHRON., (June 21, 1996), available at
http://www.cris.com/-pgarber/exchange.html. ("Besides serving as a place of business, [until
the 1920s, the Augusta Cotton Exchange] was a place to play checkers, gamble and visit

1752

Michigan Law Review

(Vol. 99:1724

These gossip networks remain active today. As transactors explain,
"Front Street [the main cotton trading street in Memphis] is worse
than a bunch of old women;"125 "it is like a sewing circle;"126 "most
breaches of a serious nature are known within a day."127 These net
works are so effective that " [m]ost [transactors] know of each other or
can call someone that is in the region to verify some information on a
person/firm they are considering doing business with. They rely on
past experience/knowledge of that person/firm."128
Over time, cotton institutions also began to encourage the emer
gence of a less personal form of trust, information-intermediary based
trust. They created formal methods for transmitting reputation infor
mation,129 such as circulars reporting the names of transactors who re
fused to arbitrate or to comply with an award rendered against them,
and, in some associations, information bureaus. At the ACSA, for ex
ample:
Members desiring information as to the moral integrity, ability to j udge
cotton, or financial responsibility of any cotton firm or commission buyer
in the cotton belt may ask the Secretary to secure this data for them. The
information is obtained, in confidence, from sources which [ACSA] be-

during the day and witness cockfights and bet on football games after hours - a man's
getaway, because women were not allowed."); MCE Merchant Survey, Respondent #6 (Jun.
17, 1997) (listing "social benefit" as a main benefit of MCE membership); Wayne Risher,
Museum · may be in Future of Cotton Exchange, COM. APPEAL, Feb. 1 1 , 1999, at CCl (de
scribing the MCE as "a rule-making body and a social organization," and noting that it was
"a big component of the story of why Memphis is what it is, socially and economically").
124. See Risher, supra note 123; Times Change for Memphis Cotton Mart, SAN DIEGO
UNION TRIB., April 25, 1989, at AAlO (noting that in the past, "buyers and sellers packed
into the downtown Cotton Exchange [in Memphis] to haggle over prices or trade gossip").
125. Telephone Interview with Merchant #1 (no date).
126. Telephone Interview with Mill Representative #1 (Apr. 2, 1997).
127. Telephone Interview with Merchant #5 (no date).
128. Email from Association Administrator, to Mary LaBrec (Nov. 15, 2000, 9:45:21 ) ;
see also Telephone Interview with Merchant #6 (no date) ("We (the cotton industry] learn
about (transactors' reputations] from constantly talking with people and trading with people.
Information is passed word of mouth from friend to friend. We all know if there is a problem
person.").
129. Several private publications aided in this effort. One such publication was The In
ternational Cotton Buyer and Cotton Seller and Reference Book, which, according to an ad
vertisement for the work, furnished "information regarding the financial responsibility of
cotton shippers and exporters in America, as well as the selling agents and merchants
abroad," but did not, like many similar publications in this or other industries, "depend upon
correspondence or run lists of dead names. We send high-priced and competent men to
every town in the South with enough cotton to sustain one shipper or exporter. These men
procure the information necessary to the rating of these shippers or exporters while on the
ground." COITON FACTS 210 (1926). Another such publication, The American Wool and
Cotton Reporter's Guide, also provided credit-related information. The 1950 edition included
information on many companies including the number of employees, the amount of capital,
balance sheets, and earning statements, as well as each company's name, address, products,
and company contacts.
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lieve[s] to be accurate and authentic; it is passed on to the inquiring
member without identifying the source of such information.B0

These association-sponsored information channels were also sup
plemented by an active trade press that covered all aspects of the in
dustry's operation as well as by information provided by the banks
who financed most of the industry and were quite willing to share gen
eral credit worthiness and other soft information about their custom
ers with market participants.131 However, despite the creation of these
formal and informal information intermediaries, social trust-based
reputation sanctions remained important.132 Today, the industry con
tinues to rely on both social trust and information intermediary-based
trust to support exchange. As one mill association executive explained:
In the past, a lot of cotton was sold on a handshake, with no documenta
tion. This tradition has changed; still many transactions continue to be
done on the basis of reputation and your word. Having a buyer-seller
relationship you are proud of continuing with, with someone you like so
cializing with, is still important. The old ways are the silent partner of the
written agreement; there is a real desire to work out problems.133

130. http://www .acsa-cotton.org/Become_a_Member/become_a_member.html; see also
TCA BY-LAWS, supra note 72, at Art. VII, § 7-8, 10 (authorizing the creation of a "Bureau
for Exchange of Confidential Information," requiring that "[a]ll members of the Association
shall hereafter report to the Secretary. . . any unsatisfactory transaction had with any person,
firm or corporation engaged in the business of buying or selling cotton . . . and upon request
of the Secretary . . . members shall furnish any and all information which they may have
touching the credit, qualifications, character and general reputation of any such persons,
firms or corporations," and granting all members access to the information); REPORT OF
THE SEC'Y TO FIFTH ANNUAL CONVENTION OF THE ATL. COTTON ASS'N (April 2-3, 1928)
("I wish to take this opportunity of suggesting that when our members take on a connection
with a firm with whom they are not thoroughly familiar that they make inquiry of the Asso
ciation regarding them. Precaution of this nature will probably result to the benefit of our
members."); REPORT OF THE SEC'Y TO THE SIXTH ANNUAL CONVENTION. OF ATL. COTTON
ASS'N (April 2-3, 1929) (noting in connection with the previous year's suggestion that mem
bers contact the association for reputation-related information that, "[rri]ahy of our members
have made inquiries, which have resulted to their benefit").
131. When asked how they got information about mills' reputations, many merchants
mentioned bankers. See, e.g. , MCE Merchant Survey, Respondent ·#4 . (May 30, 1997)
("Agents, my competitors, the subjects [sic] competitors, banks, trade journals."); Telephone
Interview by Connie Rogers with MCE Merchant #4 (Aug. 8, 1997) ("[M]y banker."); Tele
phone Interview by Connie Rogers with MCE Merchant #5 (Aug. 8, 1997) ("[B]ank refer
ences.").
132. Mill Survey, Respondent #1 (Aug. 11, 1997) (Reputation "means everything to me.
A merchant with a bad reputation has little chance at business with me. No time has not
changed the importance - that was part of my learning as I grew up"); Mill Survey, Re
spondent #4 (Aug. 6, 1997) (reputation is a "high priority and this has not changed over
time"). Some older transactors, however, feel that the importance of reputation has dimin
ished as the social ties that preserved business relationships and encouraged transactors to
amicably resolve disputes have begun to disintegrate. See, e.g. , Telephone . Interview with
Merchant #3 (no date) (observing that in the 1940s, "reputation counted for more. · Today
there is more emphasis on price. Back then, everyone knew our prices were higher but
wanted to do business with us anyhow. We were the Tiffany of the cotton business").
133. Telephone Interview with Mill Association Executive (Nov. 1996). It is difficult to
trace the demise of the purely handshake-based trade with any precision. However, an ex-

1754

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 99:1724

Together, the social connections and information channels encour
aged by industry institutions have succeeded in making so much repu
tation-related information available, that reputation-based nonlegal
sanctions are able to play an important, and generally positive, role in
commercial transactions, a role that transactors recognize and ma
nipulate quite explicitly.134
B.

Benefits of Reputation-Based Nonlegal Sanctions

The wide variety of efforts cotton industry institutions have made
and continue to make to ensure that reputation-based NLSs are avail
able to transactors, even though transactors have ready access to such
an extraordinarily well-developed and well-run PLS, suggests that
reputation-based NLSs may play a role in cotton transactions that the
PLS cannot replicate through its formal structures. It is therefore use-

ecutive of the SCA noted that until 1987, most members traded on a handshake whereas
now they tend to use written contracts. She attributed the shift not to any breakdown in
reputation but rather to an increased bankruptcy rate in the mill sector, and merchants' re
alization that legally enforceable contracts were needed to preserve their rights in bank
ruptcy. See Telephone Interview with SCA Executive (no date). Similarly, in the diamond
industry, where handshakes and intonation of the phrase "maze! U'bracha" (luck and bless
ings) have traditionally been used to seal deals, written consignment agreements are now
sometimes used to protect the consignor's rights in the event the consignee goes bankrupt.
The writings are still viewed as unnecessary as between the two parties to the agreement.
Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Dia
mond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115, 121-22 (1992) [hereinafter Diamonds).
134. The records in MCE cases reveal instances where damage to reputation appears to
have been used as a threat by one or both of the parties. See, e.g. , Letter between Parties in
directly involved in the case (Mar. 1, 1980), from MCE Case No. 831 (1980) ("With regard to
the Quality settlement, we assure you to do best to settle pending amicably while still main
taining your reputation well in [foreign textile company's] group, i.e . . . [foreign names),
meantime, we wish that you will do utmost to push your ginners friend to settle best possible
too, so that your reputation will be well maintained well in this market.") An additional
communication (dated March 7) records this request: "Pis tk actn to protct ur reputatn.");
Letter from Defendant, to MCE Executive Vice President and Secretary (Nov. 26, 1973), in
connection with MCE Case No. 825 (1973) (Where "one of the contracts in question was
called to [Defendant's] attention," and the Plaintiff told the Defendant that "we would have
to take the cotton or he [Plaintiff] could not show his face on the street. He further stated
that [Defendant's Memphis Rep] would not be able to trade on the street. We agreed to take
the cotton and he proceeded to invoice us cotton on all our contracts"). Similar allusions to
social and business reputation harm can be found in moving papers submitted to the BoA.
See, e.g. , Seller's Brief at 4, BoA Case No. 94 (1964) (quoting a copy of a letter from Seller to
Buyer (July 27, 1964): "I believe that we should settle this dispute as gentlemen considering
what is right and wrong and arriving at the dictates of our conscience . . . I would like to
point out the fact that, as far as I as an individual am concerned, the outcome of our dispute
placed with the Appeal Board will have very little effect on my personal life. This also is true
as far as you as an individual are concerned. The real crux of the matter is - are we able to
settle our differences man to man or do we have to ask outsiders who have absolutely no
interest in neither [sic] your business nor my business to settle our difficulties . . . I appeal to
you again to consider this dispute in the light of right and wrong and let us get along with
properly being friends and business associates. This thing has caused wounds much too deep
than mere money will ever justify").
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ful to explore some of the ways that reputation-based NLSs comple
ment the monetary sanctions available through the PLS.
To begin with, in the absence of these NLSs, the under
compensatory market-difference based damages provided for in the
trade rules would lead to inefficiently high levels of contractual
breach.135 This is something that would be particularly undesirable in
the cotton industry. As one transactor explained, "[y]ou want per
formance, not payment for nonperformance. [Payment] is not fulfilling
your deal."136 And, as another transactor put it, "you do not just
breach and pay. This is not done."137
Transactors' attitudes towards breach of contract are understand
able given the high velocity of transactions in the market as a whole,
the low profit margin on most trades, and many transactors' limited
access to financing during the pendancy of disputes. In such contexts,
keeping the number of disputes low and minimizing the frictions and
uncertainties involved in trade are essential to running a profitable
concern. As one industry participant noted, "any departure from the
135. In merchant-to-mill transactions, both mills and merchants often suffer significant
consequential damages that are not recompensed under trade rule damage measures if the
other breaches. First, if a merchant delivers defective goods and the defect is not detected
before the cotton is used, the cotton may damage machinery (which due to technological
changes is becoming more sensitive to even small deviations in quality),and slow down the
production process. See, e.g., BoA Case No. 127 (1989) (where the "Buyer allege[d) losses
resulting from increased labor costs, slow down of operations, and inferior yam," and while
ruling on other grounds, the arbitrators noted that the "Southern Mill Rules do not provide
for damages of this nature"). Second, if a merchant delivers late, a mill might be forced to
suspend or curtail its production (while continuing to meet its payroll) due to the increasing
prevalence of just-in-time inventory methods. Third, because merchants operate on a tight
cash-flow margin, if a mill refuses a shipment, or accepts it and refuses or delays payment,
the merchant may be forced to suspend or curtail its operations. Finally, whichever transac
tor arranged for the transportation will have to make good to the carrier, another unrecom
pensed and often unsalvageable expense. See Telephone Interview with MCE Executive
(Feb. 1997) (When asked why breach, even with payment of market-difference damages,
upsets someone, he explained that "most of the contracts in the cash market involve a mer
chant buyer who has or will contract with an end-user, or are transactions directly to end
users. These end-users need to get trucks and rail cars and scheduling unloading at particular
times, all of which is very complex").
136. Telephone Interview with Merchant #9 (July 1996). The rules of several shippers'
associations and exchanges show a similar hostility to the idea that breach, even when ac
companied by the voluntary payment of damages, is acceptable commercial behavior. For
example, following several provisions setting out penalties for late delivery and payment, the
MCE Rules state that:
It is not contemplated in prescribing these penalties [for delay] that either Buyer or Seller
shall intentionally be the cause of delays in carrying out the delivery within the time pre
scribed and a continued or repeated violation will be the cause of the party, or parties, vio
lating this rule, to be brought before the Board of Directors of the Memphis Cotton Ex
change [and suspended or expelled from membership].
MCE TR, supra note 17, at R. 12, cl. 1; see also SMRs, supra note 5, at Art. V, § 26 (setting
out penalties for late payment by the buyer, but cautioning that the rules do not "give buyer
any right to delay payment and any failure to pay within the prescribed period will entitle
seller to relief for breach of contract").

137. Telephone Interview with Merchant #1 (no date).
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'my word is my bond' method of doing business [is] viewed as intro
ducing uncertainty into the contract process, something that is viewed
as per se undesirable . . . [T]he desire to run a smooth business is key
to mills and people prefer to deal with reliable folks [for whom] they
are sometimes willing to take a loss."138 Although renegotiation in cer
tain types of situations where breach is efficient is not uncommon, 139
when it fails, transactors want to be able to rely on getting perform
ance. As one transactor explained, renegotiation is sometimes okay,
but when a mill says, "I've gotta have it now - when you have to have
it, you have to have it, and the merchant generally delivers."140 And, as
another merchant noted, while some agreements are renegotiated
willingly when doing so is mutually beneficial, "sometimes . . . the other
guy is not willing to do this. He is just in a bind and will say no, and in
that case, a person of integrity takes his word for it and just deliv
ers. "141 More generally, as a prominent industry lawyer explained,
even if transactors have to forgo the benefits of an occasional profit
able breach in situations where attempts to renegotiate fail, doing so is
worthwhile so long as they can count on their transacting partner to do
the same when the shoe is on the other foot.142
Although the industry could attempt to regulate transactors'
breach-or-perform decisions through the award of fully compensatory
expectation damages, its decision to rely instead on hybrid monetary
and nonlegal sanctions offers several advantages. First, as compared to
a rule that provided for fully compensatory expectation damages, the
use of a market-based measure of damages that does not rely on firm
specific information, reduces the cost of litigation by eliminating the
need for damages-related discovery.143 Second, the use of a market
difference based damage measure makes it unnecessary for the parties
to introduce complex valuation evidence on lost profit.144 Third, be138. Telephone Interview with ACSA Executive (Mar. 25, 1997); see also Telephone
Interview with Merchant #3 (no date) ("Your word is your bond, and any departures from
this way of looking at things bring uncertainty to the process; uncertainty of any kind is
viewed as very undesirable.").
139. See infra note 150 (describing the industry's renegotiation norms in some detail).
140. Telephone Interview with Mill Representative #1 (Apr. 2, 1997).
141. Telephone foterview with Merchant #4, retired BoA arbitrator (Mar. 1997).
142. Telephone Interview with ACSA Executive (no date).
143. Since lost profit is a key component of fully compensatory expectation damages,
and it is calculated by reference to revenues less costs, discovery is needed to ensure accu
racy. In the absence of discovery, a plaintiff would have an incentive to introduce evidence
that overstated revenue and understated costs in ways that would be difficult, if not impossi
ble, to detect.
144. See generally ROBERT L. DUNN, MASS. CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC., INC.,
RECOVERY OF DAMAGES FOR LOST PROFITS (5th ed. 1998) (discussing the wide variety of
information relevant to proving lost profit under the numerous valuation methods accepted
by some courts); 2 ROY RYDEN ANDERSON, DAMAGES UNDER THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 11:27 (1991).
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cause the damages that would be awarded in arbitration can be calcu
lated by both parties shortly after breach,145 the likelihood of pre
arbitration settlement is higher than it would be under an expectation
measure. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, by adopting a dam
ages provision that does not condition on firm-specific information,
the trade rules enable transactors to avoid revealing certain types of
information that they prefer to keep private. In cotton transactions,
transactors' interest in keeping certain information private (their "se
crecy interest")146 may, in some instances, be even stronger than their
interest in receiving full compensation for their losses in a particular
dispute (their "compensatory interest").
Consider, for example, a contract between a merchant and a mill
who, as is quite common, either transact on a repeat basis or enter into
numerous different, but overlapping, contracts, each of which is for in
stallment delivery over a period of months. At the time any one of
these contracts is breached, the mill would not want to reveal its cost
structure, profit margin,147 shipping arrangements, the identity of the
other merchants it buys from, or other information relating to its vul
nerability to non-delivery, to either the merchant or the market as a
whole, something it would need to do to recover fully compensatory
expectation damages as traditionally defined. Revealing this informa
tion might give the merchant additional bargaining power in subse
quent transactions. It might also enable him to engage in hold-up with
respect to other outstanding executory contracts between the parties,
since, among other things, he would know the mill's vulnerability to
non-delivery.148 For example, if a merchant who had entered into sev145. The SMRs require the aggrieved party to get three actual price quotes within three
days and give the breaching party five days to respond with payment. See supra note 45.
146. For a detailed discussion of how the existence of a "secrecy interest" might affect
transactors' litigation decisions, contracting decisions, breach-or-perform decisions, and suit
or settlement decisions, as well as the desirability of various damage measures, liquidated
damages, and specific performance, see Omri Ben-Shahar & Lisa Bernstein, The Secrecy
Interest in Contract Law, 109 YALE L.J. 1885 (2000).
147. Telephone Interview with Merchant #11 (2000) (describing mills' and merchants'
profit margins as "very private information").
148. Similarly, because many merchant-to-merchant contracts are between competitors,
a merchant would not want to reveal his profit margin or, more importantly, the identity of
the mills and other merchants to whom he sells, both pieces of information. that would be
needed to properly calculate the expectation measure. See Telephone Interview with WCSA
Executive (July 1996) ("The arbitrators at the WCSA do write opinions, but these opinions
are only given to the parties. The Board has, on numerous occasions, considered and re
jected proposals to publicize arbitration results. . . . [taking the position that] because most
disputes are among competitors, and most deals are kept secret, so should the results of arbi
trations."). Although liquidated damages clauses might seem to provide an alternative solu
tion to this problem, the process of bargaining for them often reveals information. See
Ben-Shahar & Bernstein, supra note 146, at 1902-04 (discussing the information-revelation
and secrecy-compromising effects of bargaining for liquidated damages clauses, and demon
strating that, while they are not as severe as those associated with seeking expectation dam
ages, they may nevertheless be significant).
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eral forward contracts with a mill for "old crop" cotton learned a
month before delivery on the last contract that the mill needed only
old crop to produce the last shipment of a particular kind of cloth for a
valued customer, and the merchant knew that old crop was not readily
available on the open market, he might threaten not to deliver the cot
ton to the mill unless it agreed to pay a higher price. More generally,
in the cotton industry, most firms are privately held and are extraordi
narily reluctant to release basic balance sheet information to anyone
but their bankers. In such contexts, if expectation damages were the
only remedy available, and a merchant contemplating breach knew
that a potentially aggrieved mill was likely to have a substantial "se
crecy interest," the merchant might view the mill's threat to sue in the
event of breach as incredible and therefore breach in situations where
it was inefficient for him to do so.149 In contrast, if, as in the cotton in
dustry system, the aggrieved mill had the right to obtain a measure of
damages that did not require it to reveal any firm-specific information,
its threat to sue would be credible. In such situations, if the merchant
breached, the mill would go to arbitration and collect market differ
ence damages, whereas under a regime of fully compensatory expecta
tion damages, it would not sue and would therefore obtain no recov
ery. The market-difference-based measure of damages therefore
protects both the mill's secrecy interest and its compensatory interest
better than the fully compensatory expectation measure. However,
because the market difference measure is so under-compensatory, it
would not, standing alone, adequately deter breach. This is one of the
most important reasons industry institutions have gone to such lengths
to maintain the availability of reputation-based NLSs.
In practice, across the market, NLSs supplement the damages
available in arbitration so that a. cotton transactor contemplating
breach is well aware that he must take into account both the monetary
damages he will be ordered to pay and the reputational harm he will
suffer. As a consequence, if these NLSs are high enough (and, in prac
tice, it seems that they are), the system of sanctions as a whole may
discourage inefficient breach, and, because renegotiation is not un-

149. Alternatively, the industry could try to set the damage measure (perhaps through
manipulation of the per-pound penalty) at some approximation of "average expectation
damages" so as to provide more efficient breach or perform incentives. Indeed, it is possible
that this was the original intent of SMR drafters. However, as the minutes of the ATMI
ACSA Joint Meetings from 1947-1990 suggest, raising the penalty amount has proved to be
extraordinarily difficult, since an increase would be more beneficial to mills than to mer
chants. As a consequence, augmenting these monetary remedies with NLSs may have been
the best available way to increase the sanction faced by a would-be breacher. For an ex
tended discussion of the desirability of awarding average expectation damages in a context
where one or both transactors have a secrecy interest, see Ben-Shahar & Bernstein, supra
note 146, at 1894-96.
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common, the loss from inefficient over-performance is unlikely to be
large.150
150. In theory, the use of NLSs to supplement monetary sanctions may lead to ineffi
ciently high levels of performance, because it is difficult for the transactor imposing them to
accurately calibrate their size. In practice, however, in the cash cotton trade, high levels of
contractual performance are considered desirable by market participants and voluntary re
negotiation is considered appropriate (though not obligatory), in the contexts where the
gains from efficient breach are likely to be the largest and most frequent. More specifically,
the cost of renegotiation is lowest in situations where breach is efficient due to an increase in
the seller's cost of performance that is attributable to a market-wide or regional event, like
bad weather that makes cotton of a particular quality largely unavailable. As one merchant
explained, "[y]ou don't breach with a mill. There are exceptions; if you contract for a par
ticular kind of cotton a year in advance, and then everyone knows little of the quality was
produced, there will be an adjustment." Telephone Interview with MCE Executive (Feb.
1997). In such situations, because the event that triggered the increase in the cost of per
formance is both outside the seller's control and observable to the buyer, requesting renego
tiation is not perceived to be opportunistic and is not damaging to a seller's reputation. See,
e.g. , Telephone Interview by Renee Liu with MCE Merchant #15 (Aug. 1997) (noting that
he is willing to "renegotiate if the quality of cotton [contracted for] is not grown"); Posting
of Participant, to Cotton-L@listserv.aol.com (Jan. 27, 1998) ("Most of the cotton we book is
on a 75% pre-harvest fixation, and the merchants are typically very understanding about
crop failures or failure to plant due to weather as long as they are notified as early as possi
ble."). Indeed, a mill (or a large regional merchant vis-a-vis a producer) that insists on per
formance in such circumstances may find it more difficult to purchase on the forward market
for a significant period of time. For example, one year in the early 1990s, many merchants
and mills entered into contracts to deliver cotton of a particular micronaire (a feature of
quality) that turned out not t<;> be plentiful in the crop due to weather conditions. This re
sulted in a large increase in the price of that type of cotton. If mills had insisted on delivery,
it would have imposed huge losses on merchants. Many mills, however, worked with their
merchants and agreed to take delivery of a different type of cotton at a different price. There
were, however, some mills that either could not or would not make these types of adjust
ments. As a consequence, merchants became reluctant to enter into long-term contracts with
these mills, although they remained willing to enter into short-term contracts with them.
Telephone Interview with Mill Representative #1 (Apr. 2, 1997).
On the other hand, proposing renegotiation when an opportunity to sell to a higher
valuing purchaser arises is considered more problematic, perhaps because the amount being
offered by the higher valuing user is largely unobservable to the original buyer. See, e.g. ,
Telephone Interview by Connie Rogers with MCE Merchant #3 (Aug. 8, 1997) (explaining
that he "would not renegotiate a contract because the seller found a better price. Word is
important"); Telephone Interview by Connie Rogers with MCE Merchant #4 (Aug. 8, 1997)
(explaining that he "wouldn't renegotiate because the seller [farmer) found a better price
because I have already sold the cotton elsewhere and am obliged to deliver it"). However,
profitable opportunities to sell to a higher valuing purchaser are uncommon. See Telephone
Interview by Connie Rogers with MCE Merchant #2 (July 18, 1997) (noting that the oppor
tunity to make money by selling to a higher valuing purchaser "doesn't happen very often").
Cotton is generally available on spot markets. When it is not, as the price increases, the
value of the goods increases to all purchasers simultaneously, making breach and resale to a
higher valuing third-party largely unprofitable after the payment of damages. Telephone
Interview with Merchant #1 (no date). Although most transactors strongly condemn routine
renegotiations that are proposed to facilitate sale to a third-party, in the rare instances where
the gains from renegotiation in such contexts are particularly large, transactors do in fact
renegotiate, typically splitting the surplus, especially where they have a long-standing rela
tionship. See, e.g., Telephone Interview by Connie Rogers with MCE Merchant #7 (Aug. 8,
1997) (expressing reluctance to be bought out of a contract, but noting that he "guess[es)"
thr.t he would be willing to be bought out in some circumstances, but adding that "[i)t de
pends on the person or relationship. If the person was a constant pain to deal with, I
wouldn't. But with a good relationship, I'd be more willing"); Telephone Interview with
Merchant #1 (no date) (discussing a time when a new employee of his sold cotton very
cheaply, someone else offered a lot more for it, and they renegotiated).
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The second major benefit offered by the industry's decision to
maintain the availability of NLSs is that it enables transactors to enter
into extralegal understandings that are backed by NLSs and are there
fore likely to be performed over a range of market conditions. These
extralegal understandings can add significant value to contracting rela
tionships. Even when contracting within the industry's well-run PLS,
there is a limit to the amount of value that transactors can create
through the use of legally enforceable contract provisions. Rational
transactors will only agree to legally enforceable commitments that
condition on verifiable information - that is, information that from
an ex ante perspective transactors would find it worthwhile to prove to
a third-party in the event of a dispute. Although the PLS's use of ex
pert adjudicators makes more information verifiable than would be
verifiable if cotton contracts were adjudicated in court, the need for
legally enforceable contract provisions to condition on verifiable in
formation remains a significant constraint on transactors' ability to
create value-maximizing contract governance structures. Although
some verifiable information is also observable, sometimes the most
desirable contract provision conditioning on verifiable information
will condition on information that is either not observable or is more
costly to observe than the information required for a provision that
conditions on information that is only observable. As a consequence,
when transactors are able to supplement their legally enforceable con�
tracts with extralegal understandings that condition on information
that is observable to them but may not be verifiable by a third-party,151
In sum, despite the strong condemnation of unilateral breach, voluntary adjustments are
not uncommon. As one transactor explained, "the reason for . . . requesting an adjustment is
key. If there is a good reason, a shortage, financial problem, etc., the other guy will typically
work with you on the problem. On the other hand, if you were to sell to someone at a higher
price, and this ever became known, which it would very fast, no one would want to deal with
you." Telephone Interview with Merchant #5 (no date).
151. Indeed, a comparison of the importance of reputation-based and other NLSs in
diamond, cotton, and grain markets (all of which are governed by PLSs) suggests that the
importance of these sanctions is closely linked to the importance to the value of a standard
transaction of provisions that condition on information that is observable but not verifiable.
Although the types of events that can disrupt a cotton or grain transaction are similar, repu
tation is far more important in the cotton market. As one merchant observed, "(r]eputation
is still as important to doing business (in the cotton industry] as it was 30 years ago, far more
so than in grain." Telephone Interview with Merchant #7 (no date); see also Bernstein, Mer
chant Law, supra note 60 (presenting a case study of contracting relationships in the grain
and feed markets). Unlike grain, which can be objectively graded, cotton is graded on a
highly subjective basis. Cotton buyers must therefore rely more heavily than grain buyers on
a seller's integrity for delivering the quality promised, especially where the sale is concluded
over the phone. Even when cotton is sold on USDA type, the seller's reputation may remain
important to the buyer since there are nuanced aspects of quality that are not fully taken
into account in official descriptions. More generally, until the introduction of the more ob
jective HVI classing method a few years ago, even a more detailed contract description of
the quality of cotton promised would not have been even a partial substitute for the seller's
reputation for accurately describing goods. Reputation is even more important in diamond
markets than cotton markets, at least in part because there are even more aspects of a dia
mond contract that cannot be adequately dealt with through state-contingent contracting.
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they can create more valuable contract governance structures than
they could create if the extralegal sanctions that support these under
standings were unavailable.152
Moreover, the availability of these NLSs may also increase the
value of the terms of transactors' written contracts, not only by aug
menting the damages imposed in . arbitration, but also by making it
more likely that interior contractual provisions - that is, provisions
whose violation, while costly, would nevertheless not make it worth
while to bring suit - will be performed.153 Given the low profit margin
in most cotton transactions and the large number of these interior
provisions (mostly relating to quality and delivery terms), increasing
the likelihood that they will be performed, while at the same time re
ducing the frictions of trade, can add significant value to contracting
relationships.154
In sum, the cotton industry has succeeded in creating a private le
gal system and a social and informational infrastructure of trade that
improves on the substantive rules and adjudicative procedures in the
public system and is well-designed to maximize the value of transac
tors' legally enforceable and legally unenforceable commitments. Yet
For example, it may not even be possible to describe a rough diamond with sufficient preci
sion to enable a third party neutral to determine whether or not the stone contracted one
day is actually delivered another day; yet a buyer will know if the stone delivered is not the
stone contracted for. In·a diamond transaction, reputation is also used to bond the seller's
warranty that the stone has not un�ergone one of several treatments to disguise flaws. Al
though these flaws can be detected through laboratory tests, the tests are too expensive to
use in every transaction. See Bernstein, Diamonds, supra note 133, at 1 15.
152. See Benjamin Klein, Why Hold-Ups Occur: The Self Enforcing Range of Contrac
tual Relationships, 34 ECON. INQUIRY 444, 455 (1996) (arguing that there is a "fundamental
complementarity between court enforcement and private enforcement. . . . The two en
forcement mechanisms work better together than either of them do separately").
153. In the absence of NLSs, if only monetary damages were available, interior contract
provisions might not be performed, because while breach of interior provisions imposes
costs on the promisee, these costs are small in relation to the value of the transaction (and
perhaps the contracting relationship) to the parties, making any threat to sue if such a provi
sion is violated incredible. As a consequence, breach of these provisions would be common
and a lot of contractual value would be lost. However, when NLSs are available, and can be
imposed even after a transaction has been completed (and at a much lower cost than money
damages), the threat to impose them for breach of an interior provision is more likely to be
credible, and the provision is therefore more likely to be complied with.
154. Although reputation-based NLSs in the cotton industry are strong, they would not
create nearly as much value in the absence of the PLS and would not, standing alone, be able
to support efficient levels of trade or induce efficient breach-or-perform decisions. The
PLS's money damages, while under-compensatory, do succeed in bonding the price-risk as
pect of cotton contracts by ensuring that a mere change in the price level will not make
breach attractive. Given the volatility in cotton prices over the length of a typical relation
ship, it would be difficult, if not impossible, for the industry to create reputation-based NLSs
that were strong enough to control the price-risk aspect of transactors' behavior. Moreover,
the existence of the PLS puts a check on the amount of damage baseless gossip can cause,
since at a certain point, the person being gossiped about can defend himself by pointing out
that because the gossiper has not taken him to arbitration, his actions could not have been so
bad.
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to fully understand the reasons that the industry has found it advanta
geous to opt out of the legal system, it is useful to consider how the
system as a whole is structured to create the conditions under which
cooperative contracting relationships are most likely to arise and en
dure.
III. FACILITATING COMMERCIAL COOPERATION
1.

Conditions for Creating Cooperation

One of the most striking aspects of the cotton industry's PLS is the
small number of disputes requiring third-party adjudication. The BoA
and the MCE each decide an average of only two cases a year.155 This
relatively small number of arbitrations, 156 combined with evidence that
the incidence of work-a-day contractual opportunism is low,157 that
most transactional relationships are long-term and repeat, and that
contracts tend to be renegotiated when doing so leaves both transac
tors significantly better off,158 suggests that one of the more important
ways that cotton industry institutions create value is by providing a so
cial and institutional transactional framework that effectively con
strains opportunism and promotes commercial cooperation in its
shadow.159
Supporting the emergence and maintenance of repeat-dealing co
operative contracting relationships is particularly important in indus155. Despite the small number of cases arbitrated by the MCE, its member merchants
consider arbitration to be an important benefit. When twenty-two MCE members were
asked whether arbitration was an important benefit of membership in the exchange, ten an
swered "yes" and twelve did not reply to the question.
156. The SCA and the ACA arbitration tribunals each hear less than one case per year,
Telephone Interview with SCA and ACA Executive (Oct. 2000); the WCSA arbitration tri
bunal hears three to four cases a year, Telephone Interview with Merchant #8 (no date); and
from 1993-95, the TCA heard about three cases per year, Telephone Interview with TCA
Executive (no date).
157. See Telephone Interview with Merchant #6 (no date) ("I've been in the business
near sixty years and there are only two or three people I won't deal with anymore, and they
are people who were marginal to begin with."). See generally BUSH, supra note 113, at 43637 ("Over the generations, the cotton business has been exceptionally honorable, with the
trite but true aphorism of a man's word being his bond applying equally to mills and agents,
merchants and farmers. . . . considering the tens of thousands of transactions taking place in
any given year, and the millions of bales sold, transgressions were remarkably rare. As a re
sult, the cotton business operated in an aura of trust without which it could ill function: two
parties to a contract could make commitments at a firm price as much as a year or more in
advance, and there was never any question that both parties would live up to the letter and
spirit of the contract, thus enabling each other to plan future actions within an established
framework.").
158. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
159. See supra notes 73-87 and accompanying text (discussing several features of the
PLS that encourage settlement and decrease the likelihood that misunderstandings will
arise).
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tries like cotton where prices are volatile, transactional velocity is
rapid, profit margins are slim, and execution costs, that is, the transac
tion costs of performing the contract, tend to decrease over the life of
a contracting relationship (particularly in merchant-to-mill relation
ships) as transactors become more familiar with one another's busi
ness needs, standards, and operations.160
This Part explores the many features of the cotton industry's PLS
that, together with a variety of activities sponsored by industry-run in
stitutions, as well as some social and economic path-dependent fea
tures of the transactional setting, have succeeded in creating the types
of conditions that are generally associated with the emergence of sus
tainable cooperation among market participants.161
In general, in order for cooperation to emerge in a particular mar
ket, transactors must each adopt strategies of cooperating at the be
ginning of each contracting relationship and thereafter responding to
160. There are numerous sources of execution costs savings in repeat-dealing relation
ships. For example, when a merchant has sold to a mill for years, and the mill's quality needs
have remained stable, the merchant will know the quality range of cotton that the mill will
be able to use. As a consequence, if the merchant consistently delivers quality in this range,
the mill may no longer feel the need to spend the money to class (that is, to grade and in
spect) its deliveries. This can result in significant cost savings, some of which are passed on to
the merchant in the form of a higher price. Telephone Interview with Merchant #11 (no
date). Another important component of execution costs is coordination costs. As one mill
buyer explained, these costs are now more important due to consolidation on the merchant
and mill sides of the business, which has given rise to fl "need to coordi,nate more in terms of
deliveries since there are coordination problems . . . [you n)eed greater precision in getting
bales from warehouse to mill . . . as mills have become larger, the timing and scheduling of
deliveries has become a more complex operation, and this is now part of the merchant's
reputation." Telephone Interview with Mill Representative #1 (Apr. 2, 1997). The signifi
cance of the problems caused by lack of coordination and/or standardization in delivery
times and practices is also evident from the minutes of the annual ACSA-ATMI joint meet
ings. The need for some rules and regularities in this area is a regular subject of discussion,
and while no rules on the subject have been adopted, both associations have repeatedly
agreed to circularize their members about the contours of acceptable behavior. See, e.g.,
Minutes of the ACSA-ATMI Joint Meeting (1976) (where the ACSA again requested coop
eration from the ATMI in "urging their members to receive cotton five days a week, thus
utilizing to a greater degree our transportation facilities," and the mills' representatives re
sponded that they were glad to recircularize this message). Finally, as compared to dealing
with a new transactor, an additional advantage of dealing with the same firm on a repeat ba
sis is that it may be easier to detect financial distress. When a firm is familiar with another
firm's payment patterns in situations where it is not in distress, and understands more about
other aspects of its operations, it is more likely to be able to detect deviations from its usual
practices that indicate financial trouble.
161. For more formal discussions of the emergence of cooperation and compliance with
arbitral awards in historical merchant-run PLSs, see Paul R. Milligram et al., The Role of
Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the Champagne
Fairs, 2 J. ECON. AND POL. 1 (1990) (describing the institutions that resolved disputes and
enforced arbitral judgments in the medieval Champagne fairs and demonstrating that
"[e)ven in a community in which any particular pair of people meet rarely, it is still possi
ble . . . for an individual's reputation in the group as a whole to serve as a bond for his good
and honest behavior toward each individual member"); Avner Greif et al., Coordination,
Commitment, and Enforcement: The Case of the Merchant Guild, 102 J. POL. ECON. 745
(1994) (drawing on formal models of repeat play games to explain the operation of merchant
guilds in the late medieval period).
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cooperative behavior with cooperation and responding to uncoopera
tive behavior (defection) with punishment (such strategies are called
"tit-for-tat" strategies). Each transactor must also be able to obtain in
formation about the reputations of other market participants, and
reputation must be at least partially dependent on how a transactor
behaved in previous transactions. In addition, each transactor must be
able to observe whether the person he is dealing with has cooperated
or defected.
Cooperation can emerge under these circumstances because trans
actors have an incentive not to behave opportunistically. Although a
transactor can still obtain a short-term benefit from defection, he will
realize that an act of defection will likely trigger a sequence of non
cooperative responses (most likely, refusals to deal) both from . his
transacting partner and, depending on the type of breach, from a cer
tain number of other market participants. Because these noncoopera
tive responses tend to reduce his future trading opportunities, the
long-run cost of defection will often be greater than the short-term
gain from defection, so a transactor who is not in financial distress is
more likely to cooperate than to defect.162
In essence, when information about past transactional behavior is
available to a significant number of participants, breach of contract as
to one transactor is transformed into breach of contract as to numer
ous market transactors for the purposes of a transactor's commercial
reputation. As the reputational penalty for breach of contract in
creases, more commercial commitments are transformed into self
enforcing obligations,163 and cooperation can emerge as a long-term
equilibrium.
2.

Creating Conditions that Promote Cooperation

In the early days of the cotton industry, the types of trusting inter
personal relationships that created an initial expectation of coopera
tive behavior were common. In the Old South, the culture of honor
was strong. "Laying down on a contract" or violating the maxim "my
word is my bond" would result in social as well as economic ostra
cism.164 As a consequence, even in transactions between strangers,
162. In addition, the ability of the aggrieved transactor to credibly threaten to seek a
monetary recovery through an arbitration proceeding reduces the short-term benefit of de
fection. It therefore reduces the incentive to engage in opportunistic behavior, as well as the
magnitude of the reputational penalty required to induce cooperation.
163. For a more formal discussion of self-enforcing contracts, see generally Benjamin
Klein & Keith B. Leffler, The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance,
89 J. POL. ECON. 615 (1981).
164. See generally SHIELDS MCILWAINE, MEMPHIS DOWN IN DIXIE 293 (1948) ("A
man's word had to be good on Front Street and that's still true. But until recent years the
Memphis trade couldn't have been conducted on any other basis, since there were no written
contracts or legal binders. A trader simply said to a factor, 'I'll take that stuff at nine and a
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each transactor had a well-founded reason to believe that if he acted
honorably (that is, cooperatively), his transacting partner would do the
same. As one merchant explained, the market evolved "as an old boy
network, a club of sorts. There was this idea that a Gentleman's honor
is his bond. Period. Once it started this way, anyone who didn't honor
his word would not get any business."165
Today, while transactors engage in more pre-contractual investiga
tion than they used to, this initial expectation of cooperation remains
common. The industry's active gossip networks continue to provide
valuable reputation-related information.166 Transactors can supple
ment this information by making inquiries of industry bankers and by
using the information bureaus maintained by some of the associations.
In addition, because the associations' membership rules, voting rules,
and application procedures are designed to screen out untrustworthy
or financially shaky transactors,167 the mere fact of association mem
bership communicates valuable information about a transactor's will
ingness and ability to meet his commercial obligations. As MCE
members explained, when dealing with another member you have
"the feeling of security in dealing with someone who is supposed to be
responsibility [sic];"168 membership "shows a standard of ethical per
formance and acceptance by your peers as an acceptable trading partquarter.' The factor jotted it down in his memorandum: 1500 bales, 9\4; the buyer, the same
in his. Or they trusted their memories until the sale was put in the account books. And woe
unto the man who claimed to have misunderstood the oral sale or was found guilty of dis
honest dealing. Mr. Bill remembers that the Exchange expelled a man, and that the trade
ostracized him, for selling reginnings for regular cotton.").
165. Telephone Interview with Large Merchant, Merchant #7 (June 1997).
166. Email from Large Cotton Merchant, to the author (Oct. 30, 2000) ("Reputation is
EVERYTHING . . . The cotton industry is a very small industry. Within any sector and any
region, a substantial number of the industry is personally acquainted. So initial reports move
by word of mouth.").
167. The membership applications used by associations and exchanges require appli
cants to be sponsored by several current members. See, e.g. , SCA Application For Member
ship, attached to SCA Directors' Letter No. 106 - 1983/84 (Mar. 21, 1983) (requiring each
applicant to be sponsored by three members in good standing, or five members if the appli
cant has been in business for less than one year). Applicants are also required to establish
that they are of good character _and commercial standing, and to provide detailed financial
information. For example, the TCA application requires applicants to, among other things,
answer the following questions: (1) "State your experience in the cotton industry, include
firms you have been associated with or employed by, functions perforined, reasons for leav
ing such employment, and references who may be contacted regarding your experience and
qualifications;" (2) "Have you ever filed for reorganization under any of the several chapter
proceedings of the Federal Bankruptcy Act? . . . Explain the status of any such proceed
ing . . . Are there any unpaid past due claims, or claims in controversy, now outstanding
against you? (If so, please give particulars).'' In addition, the form asks the applicant for
"[t]he name of your bank," and the "name of the bank officer authorized by you to discuss
your financial ability to engage in the cotton business." TCA Application For Membership,
attached to SCA Directors' Letter No. 106 - 1983/84 (Mar. 21, 1983). Similar application
forms are used by other associations.
168. MCE Merchant Survey, Respondent #5 (no date).
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ner;"169 it is "like a fraternity."170 As a consequence, when two associa
tion members trade with one another, each is likely to begin the con
tracting relationship ]Jy cooperating and thereafter to respond to co
operation with cooperation.171
More importantly, however, by joining an association, a transactor
implicitly binds himself to make more aspects of his commercial be
havior in future transactions observable to market participants. All
merchant associations and exchanges require members to arbitrate
disputes with other members and the outcomes of most cases become
quickly known within the association or exchange.172 Members who ei
ther refuse to arbitrate when they are obligated to do so or who do not
comply with an award rendered against them may be either suspended
or expelled from their exchange or association, and will have their
names posted at the exchange and/or mentioned in the association's
newsletters.173 Transactors who are suspended or expelled from a re169. MCE Merchant Survey, Respondent #3 (May 27, 1997); see also Telephone Inter
view by Connie Rogers with MCE Merchant #1 (no date) (noting that membership in an ex
change gives a merchant an "aura of respectability," and "lend[s] strength to [his] reputa
tion," in part because the "standards are reasonably high for membership, so [it] is evidence
of a company with high standards, integrity"); Telephone Interview by Connie Rogers with
MCE Merchant #6 (Aug. 8, 1997) (an important benefit of association membership is "to
define who you do business with . . . The exchanges encourage members to do business only
with other members"); Telephone Interview by Connie Rogers with MCE Merchant #7
(Aug. 8, 1997) ("[Membership] gives [you] some legitimacy.").
170. Telephone Interview by Connie Rogers with MCE Merchant #6 (Aug. 8, 1997).
171. The membership rules also create an incentive for some nonmembers who are
dealing with members to be true to their word. Because association membership is a valu
able business asset, most nonmembers hope to be admitted to membership. However, be
cause only a few votes are needed to block a candidate's admission, see MCE BY-LAWS, su
pra note 10, at Art. VII, § 1, nonmembers are particularly wary of breaching contracts with
members. As a consequence, a member dealing with a nonmember also has a reasonable
expectation that the nonmember will behave honorably at the outset of a contracting rela
tionship.
172. See Telephone Interview with Merchant #1 (no date) (noting that at the MCE, al
though "opinions may not be published or any information about the arbitration given
out. . . it [the result] does become generally known"); Telephone Interview with MCE Execu
tive (no date) (same). At the MCE, seven arbitrators hear each case, which ensures that
7.7% of the ninety member firms learn the result. In addition, the nine officers and directors
who sit on the bciard will also know the results. If these board members are all from different
companies, 17.7% of member firms will learn the information even though it is not published
and even if no gossiping occurs.
173. In addition, association circulars sometimes report suspensions for reasons other
than failure to arbitrate or comply with an award, see, e.g., ACA Circular Letter No. 18 1992/1993 (Apr. 7, 1993) (reporting an ACA suspension for non-payment of bale fees), or
resignations under suspicious circumstances, see Letter to ACSA Members from General
Counsel (Aug. 20, 1996) (advising that the resignation of [name of a shipper] "came within
two days of their being advised that pending quality and weight claims, on shipments to the
People's Republic of China, had been brought to the attention of ACSA by the U.S. agent of
the buyer and that 'if requested an immediate review will be undertaken by the Rules, By
Laws & Fair Practices Committee pursuant to ACSA Special Rule 18' "). The Southern Cot
ton Shippers Association. [early name of the SCA] also adopted the practice of publishing
the names of members delinquent in paying dues. See, e.g., Minutes of the SCSA Annual
Meeting (April 28, 1943).
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gional shippers' association will also have their membership in the
ACSA either "suspended or terminated," and the ACSA will notify all
of its individual members and all of the other regional associations of
its decision.174 It is also likely that a transactor who is suspended or ex
pelled from one shippers' association for these reasons will be sus
pended or expelled from other shippers' associations he belongs to.
Three of the four regional shippers' associations make "any willful re
fusal to abide by any final arbitration or award made by this Associa
tion, or by any other Association or Exchange,"1'.5 grounds for suspen
sion or expulsion. This provision for the reciprocal enforcement of
suspension and expulsion decisions, with the attendant publicity pro
vided by each association, greatly increases the magnitude of the ex
pected reputational effect of these sanctions. As a consequence, trans
actors who are suspended176 or expelled may suffer so much
reputational harm that they will be unable to remain in business. Al
though most transactors are willing to deal with nonmembers (albeit
somewhat reluctantly and on slightly different terms) as long as they
have good reputations,177 they are extremely reluctant to deal with
someone who has been expelled from an association.178 As one mill
174. ACSA BY-LAWS, supra note 72, at Art. 6, § 2.
175. SCA BY-LAWS, supra note 72, at Art. 6, § 1.
176. See Telephone Interview with Merchant #5 (no date) (noting that "being sus
pended has a tremendous impact on a trader's ability to do business. Mills do not want to
take the added risk of non-delivery; no one would").
177. Some firms, however, steadfastly refuse to deal with nonmembers of any kind.
Telephone Interview by Connie Rogers with MCE Merchant #9 (Aug. 13, 1 997) ("We shy
away from nonmembers of one of the associations or exchanges.").
178. Of thirteen mills surveyed, twelve said that they would be willing to deal with a
nonmember of a shippers' association or exchange, one said he probably would not. Of those
who would deal with a nonmember, three mentioned that they would want more informa
tion before doing so, and all but one said they cared about whether the merchants they dealt
with were members of a shippers' association. In contrast, when asked whether they would
deal with a merchant who had been expelled by a shippers' association, six mills said they
would not, three said that they would be unlikely to, two said that it would depend on the
reason for the expulsion, one did not answer the question, and one said tl!at he certainly
would not deal with someone who had been expelled from tl!e Liverpool Cotton Associa
tion, but did not comment on domestic associations. The reputational harm of being ex
pelled from a shippers' organization is augmented by the fact that rriost foreign buyers will
not buy from a merchant who is not a member in good standing of the ACSA or one of its
fed�rated associations. As a consequence, a transactor who is expelled for a domestic default
will also lose his international business. See, e.g. , Letter from the ACSA Executive VP and
Secretary to the WCSA Executive VP and Secretary (Jan. 5, 1981) ("[M)any importing
countries look to the ACSA members for their supply of cotton . . . The ACSA sends a copy
of its membership list and changes therein and its list of exporting members to domestic and
foreign cotton organizations and this is constructive notice to these organizations of our cur
rent membership. A number of foreign countries require a certificate from some of our ex
porting firms that they are a member in good standing of the ACSA before they will be con
sidered for tenders, sales of cotton, etc."). On occasion, however, a transactor will continue
to deal with someone who has been suspended, if it is the only way he can expect to be paid.
This is most common when the reason for the suspension is bankruptcy and the transactor
thinks he will get more in a reorganization if he helps the debtor remain a going concern. See
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explained, for a merchant, "be[ing] expelled [from a shippers' associa
tion] is usually a death blow to [his] business."179 In addition, when a
transactor is expelled from an association, he must forfeit his member
ship fee as well as other tangible benefits of association membership
such as price sheets, technology circulars, and access to the group's in
formation services.1so
Although mill associations do not have similar membership rules
and do not expel members who either refuse to arbitrate or default on
arbitration awards, when mills contract under the SMRs and provide
for BoA arbitration in their contracts, they also increase the reputa
tional consequences attached to certain types of misbehavior. BoA
opinions are circulated to all ACSA and ATMI members. Although
the identities of the disputing parties are not revealed in the opinions,
they often become known throughout the industry.1s1 These opinions
Telephone Interview with Merchant #1 (no date) (describing a situation in which, in an ef
fort to obtain some payment, a large merchant continued dealing with a small merchant after
he had been expelled for non-payment of an arbitration award).
179. Mill Survey, Respondent #1 (Aug. 11, 1997). One of the main differences between
contemporary PLSs and the historical PLSs whose operations have been rigorously modeled
by game theorists, see supra note 161, is that the antitrust laws prevent contemporary PLSs
from adopting rules that punish transactors who deal with transactors who have themselves
been expelled or suspended from the group for bad behavior. This limitation on secondary
boycotts weakens the enfo rcement mechanism sustaining cooperation, but has two partially
offsetting advantages. First, if secondary boycotts were available, the effective size of the
sanction created by suspension or expulsion would increase and associations would likely
limit the situations in which they could be imposed to those where the risk of erroneously
imposing them is low, such as non-payment of an arbitral award. If the sanction remained
available for all of the offenses that currently lead to its imposition, see infra note 183, it is
likely that increased procedural safeguards would be demanded before it would be imposed.
Adding these safeguards to the PLS, however, would likely erode some of its speed, cost,
and secrecy-preserving benefits. In the absence of the secondary boycott, market transac
tors' individual attitudes towards dealing with the individual in question determine the mag
nitude of the sanction, placing a check on the power of the arbitrators. If transactors think a
decision was improper, they can continue to deal with the sanctioned transactor as before.
Second, in contemporary commodities markets that move as fast as the cotton markets, if a
transactor viewed himself as being at an absolute end-game stage relevant to the market as a
whole forever, he would have an incentive to engage in extraordinarily risky behavior that
might lead to widespread harm if it did not result in financial gains, behavior that he might
not engage in if he thought that over time he could restore his good name and reenter the
business.
180. The TCA, for example, restricts its information service to members. See TCA BY
LAWS, supra note 72, at Art. VII, § 9 ("All information so received by the Association . . .
[under the rules relating to the information bureau) shall not be divulged or disseminated
except to members. . . and shall be by them treated as confidential."). Similarly, transactors
who are expelled from the ACA must also forgo the use the association's debt collection
bureau. See ACA BY-LAWS, supra note 72, at Art. VI, § l(a) (describing the operation and
benefits of this bureau).
181. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Merchant #3 (no date) (noting that "sometimes
[BoA) disputes stay quiet; some are well known"); Telephone Interview with Merchant #11
(2000) (same); Telephone Interview with Merchant #1 (no date) (explaining that at the
MCE, "opinions may not be published or any information about the arbitration given out,
yet it does become generally known"); see also supra note 172 (discussing how many MCE
members learn about outcomes due to their roles in association affairs).
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have the potential to damage a transactor's reputation. They often
criticize the business practices of one or both of the disputants, and
can be particularly harsh on a party who prevails on a technicality.182
They also commonly mention settlement offers, if any, and while these
offers do not appear to influence the amount awarded, they may have
strong reputation effects since they may signal to the market which
transactor behaved more unreasonably and was responsible for the
need for arbitration.
Thus, for these and other reasons, by joining an association and/or
contracting under the Southern Mill Rules, a transactor greatly in
creases the value of the reputation bond he posts in each transac
tion.183 This, in turn, reduces the likelihood that he will defect and
more credibly signals to other industry members that he is a coopera
tive trading partner.184
182. See supra notes 53-54 (providing examples of BoA decisions that criticize transac
tors' business conduct). Being mentioned in a negative light in an arbitration opinion is
likely to cause more reputational harm than being mentioned in a negative light in a court
opinion. Unlike court opinions which are written, if at all, five or six years after a dispute
arises, making their reputation-related information of little predictive value, arbitration
opinions are rendered very quickly, so any information they reveal will be viewed as current
and relevant In addition, arbitrators' opinions are more likely to cause reputational harm
than court opinions, since they are written by highly respected industry members who under
stand the ins and outs of the business.
183. Joining an association further increases the value of the reputation bond a transac
tor posts in each transaction, since by becoming a member he exposes himself to the sanc
tions of suspension and expulsion with their attendant reputational and material conse
quences, for certain types of commercial behavior that are prohibited by the association By
Laws but not necessarily actionable in a claim for breach of contract. Most association by
laws prohibit certain types of "fraudulent trading practices" and other sorts of uncommercial
conduct, and suspend or expel those who engage in them. Conduct for which these sanctions
can be imposed includes "the adulteration or misrepresentation of the official USDA class in
the form of green cards, computer printouts, or tag lists . . . (T]he shipment of Foreign Cot
ton against any contract specifying U.S. growth . . . [T]he shipment of reginned, blended or
recleaned cotton which reginning, blending or recleaning shall have taken place after its
original baling, unless specified and described as such in the contract," TRADING RULES OF
THE WESTERN COTTON SHIPPERS ASSOCIATION § 2, R. 2 (1994) [hereinafter WCSA TR], as
well as "conduct inconsistent with just and equitable principles of trade or of misconduct or
of fraudulent breach of contract or of wilfully violating the Constitution, By-Laws or Rules
of this Exchange." MCE CONST., Art. IX, § 1. When a complaint alleging fraudulent prac
tices is filed, the board of directors holds a hearing. If two-thirds of the board members pres
ent find that the rules have been violated, the accused is suspended or expelled from the as
sociation. The accused then has a right to appeal in a hearing before the whole Association,
but three-fourths of the votes cast are required for reversal. WCSA BY-LAWS, supra note 72,
at Art. VI, § 1. Claims of fraudulent breach are infrequent, see, e.g. , Telephone Interview
with SCA and ACA Executive (Aug. 1996) (noting that over the past five years, only one
person was expelled from the association for fraudulent breach of contract, when he shipped
"gin motes" (trash) in place of bales), perhaps because they do not result in the aggrieved
party obtaining a monetary recovery. Nevertheless, they may have a strong deterrent value
because the penalty for violating them is high.
184. The reputation bond enhancing effects of exchange membership were even
stronger in the past when social ties among members were even stronger and most business
among members was done fact-to-face on an exchange floor. In those days, membership
made even more aspects of a transactor's business behavior observable to other transactors,
and the fact that members saw one another every day increased the speed with which gossip
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The likelihood that cooperation will emerge in this market is fur
ther increased by the fact that most transactors view contracting rela
tionships as long-term and indeterminate in length.185 Many trading
relationships span entire careers and transactors strongly prefer to
deal with people they have done business with in the past.186 In addi
tion, because many firms are passed down from fathers to sons, fathers
are unlikely to engage in end-of-career opportunism.187 Even transac
tors who do not work in family-owned firms may consider the social
and interpersonal costs of end-of-career opportunism to be prohibi
tively high. Retired merchants often seek honorary membership status
in their associa�ions so that they can remain involved in association
related business and social affairs.188 Most spend a significant portion
of each year in the small southern communities where they spent their
working lives. Their wives are likely to be active in the industry's

was transmitted, thereby increasing the strength of reputation-based NLSs for misbehavior.
See MCILWAINE, supra note 164, at 302 ("The hundred and seventy-five members of the Ex
change see each other every day. About nine or ten o'clock in the morning they drop into
the Exchange to get the quotations off the board and read the cables. The factors or sellers
then go to their firms and the buyers make the rounds of the sample rooms. The pace is slow.
Like Robert Frost's New England farmer they've got time to talk. During the off season,
afternoon sessions of dominoes and checkers with occasional night sessions of poker and
'craps' weld the men into a sort of cotton fraternity. They have a common life of work and
play - and also a common stock of traditional pranks like an initiation."). In addition, in
these earlier times, an expelled transactor would also lose access to information that at the
time was too expensive for transactors to purchase individually, but today can be obtained
cheaply, such as crop reports, weather forecasts, spot prices, and futures prices. See Inter
view by Mary LaBrec with MCE Executive (July 27, 1999) (explaining that in the early days
of the industry, the cost of the information wire carrying quotations from New York and
Liverpool alone necessitated a cooperative investment in an exchange).
185. Most formal, game theoretic explanations of the emergence of cooperation in re
peat play contexts are based on the assumption (which, as the text indicates, holds in the cot
ton industry) that transactors view their contracting relationships as being indeterminate in
length. See ERIC RASMUSEN, GAMES AND INFORMATION 121-23 ( 1989) .

186. See Telephone Interview by Renee Liu with MCE Merchant #17 (Aug. 1997)
(noting that his father dealt with a "certain handful of people . . . stayed with them. That's
what's desired." He [the son] would "shop" until he got the price he wanted, but "stick with
the same people"); Telephone Interview by Renee Liu with MCE Merchant #12, buyer for
mills (July 21, 1997) (stating that he dealt with "the same merchants all the time - approxi
mately 26 or so").
187. Conversely, a transactor's incentive to engage in opportunism when dealing with
someone nearing retirement may be similarly constrained by a desire to retain the firm's
business when it is passed down to the son. See, e.g. , Telephone Interview by Renee Liu with
MCE Merchant #17 (Aug. 1997) (explaining that he "deal[t] with people who [his] father
dealt with," people that he had "known for almost [his] entire life," and that he knew who to
do business with since he "paid attention" to who his father dealt with).
188. MACILWATNE, supra note 164, at 293 (noting that a merchant who had worked on
Cotton Row for forty years explained "I wouldn't have been in any other business. I never
cheated anybody in a deal, and most cotton men can say the same . . . It's interesting, fine
business for any man. When I retired I was made an honorary life member of the Exchange.
I'm proud of that, I can tell you"); see also SCA BY LAws, supra note 72, at Art.I, Sec. 1 (d)
(creating the status "honorary member").
-
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women's groups189 and may suffer social ostracism if their husbands
behave dishonorably.
In sum, the industry has succeeded in creating a contracting
framework that facilitates the emergence of cooperation in its shadow
by "making the future more important relative to the present; chang
ing the payoffs to the players of the four possible outcomes of a move;
and teaching the players values, facts, and skills that will promote co
operation. "190
3.

Maintaining Cooperation

In most contracting contexts, cooperation, once established, is vul
nerable to breakdown. When the stability of cooperation is facilitated
by transactors' decisions to follow a tit-for-tat type of strategy, there is
always a risk that one transactor will misclassify an act of cooperation
as an act of defection and thereby trigger a series of defections and
counter-defections that might well lead to the unraveling of the con
tracting relationship.191 These misclassifications may be due to dis
agreement about the content of the governing trade rule or norm, dis
agreement about what actually took place (for example, whether the
cotton shipped conformed to the contract specifications), or the diffi
culty of determining whether, if an undesirable outcome occurred, it
was a mistake or an act of willful defection. Cotton industry institu
tions take a variety of actions that are designed to reduce the likeli
hood of these types of misclassifications and thereby increase the like
lihood that cooperative contracting relationships, once established,
will endure.
First, the industry devotes significant resources to activities that
reduce the likelihood that transactors will disagree about what types
of behavior are to be classified as cooperation and what types are to
be classified as defection. Associations go to great lengths to draft
clear trade rules and to ensure that industry members know and un-

189. See supra note 1 18 (discussing the Cotton Wives Clubs). More recently, the Cotton
Wives have reconstituted themselves into state and regional associations of "Cotton
Women." Although the stated purpose of these groups is to assist the National Cotton
Council with its "Grown and Made in the USA" consumer awareness campaign, they have
continued many of the Cotton Wives' Clubs more traditional activities. Recently, the Cotton
Women's Committee co-sponsored the first ever U.S. Cotton Champion Award, an updated
replacement for the old Maid of Cotton Pageant. See Texas Firm Receives Cotton Champion
Award, COTION DIGEST INT'L (Feb. 2000), available at http://www .utexas.edu/
depts/bbr/natfiber/natnews/2000/Apr.2000.nat.htm#TEXAS FIRM RECEIVES COTTON
CHAMPION AWARD.
190. ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 126 (1984).
191. See, e.g., AVINASH K. DIXIT & BARRY NALEBUFF, THINKING STRATEGICALLY:
THE COMPETffiVE EDGE IN BUSINESS, POLITICS, AND EVERYDAY LIFE 106-15 (1991) (ex
plaining why a pure tit-for-tat strategy is so vulnerable to cooperative breakdown and sug
gesting some ways that it can be modified to make cooperation more likely to endure).
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derstand them. Association circulars and reports commonly include
discussions aimed at clarifying the meaning of rules.192 Rule changes
are announced at annual meetings, publicized through association cir
culars, 193 and are sometimes discussed in the trade press.194 New mer
chants are strongly encouraged to attend the eight-week summer Cot
ton Institute that includes courses on the content of the most
important sets of trading rules. The associations also urge their mem192. See, e.g., Report of the Committee on Rules, By-Laws and Fair Practices, Adopted
at the 43rd Annual Convention of the ACSA, San Francisco (1967) ("Your Committee
wishes to acquaint the membership with the 'INTERPRETATION OF RULE 9 OF THE
ASSOCIATION'S SPECIAL RULES' passed this year by the Board of Directors, a copy of
which is attached hereto."); Minutes of the ACSA-ATMI Joint Meeting (1951) (where, in
response to a complaint by the mill representatives of trouble caused by the use of cement
sacks, camouflage cloth, and similar materials for bale coverings, the meeting unanimously
resolved that ACSA "circularize its members and (other cotton groups] . . . calling attention
to Southern Mill Rule 37-A and to the fact that the Cotton Committee of the American Cot
ton Manufacturers Institute, Inc., according to its interpretation, states that Rule 37-A is
being violated; that cement sacks, camouflage cloth, etc., do not come within the provisions
of this Rule; and that no cotton bagging does come within the provisions of the Rule except
that specified in U.S. Government Specification . . . that further no allowances would be paid
except for bagging meeting this government specification" ); Minutes of the ACSA-ATMI
Joint Meeting (1974) (where ACSA agreed to circularize its members to "draw[] attention to
responsibility of the respective parties on all 'on-call' sales"); Minutes of the ACSA-ATMI
Joint Meeting (1969) (noting that both ACSA and ATMI agreed to circularize their mem
bership to remind them of the requirements of CSAB Rule 14 concerning size and represen
tative quality of samples for arbitration). In addition, from time to time the rules are repub
lished and sent to the memberships of both ACSA and ATMI. In the past, strips of paper
that could be pasted into old rulebooks over revised rules were mailed to members between
reprintings of the rules.
The MCE also has a Committee on Trade, which has the duty "to consider, and from
time to time report, such rules and regulations regarding the purchase, sale, transfer, etc., of
cotton, as will be convenient to all parties concerned, and thereby facilitate and increase
business." MCE BY-LAWS, supra note 10, at Art. IX, § 1. Circulars are sent out to the mem
bership to acquaint them with amendments passed by the Board of Directors. See, e.g., To
the Members, MCE Circular, Dec. 17, 1951 (reporting the rewrite of a rule, its effective date,
and the rationale for the change).
193. See, e.g. , Minutes of the ACSA-ATMI Joint Meeting (1970) (noting that both asso
ciations committed themselves to circularizing their memberships about the changes in Rule
23 and Rule 26); Letter to All Members, ACSA Series A-Circular Letter No. 43 (Dec. 21,
1970) ("Six changes in the Southern Mill Rules were approved . . . Please place these [copies
of the new rules] in your copy of the rule book for ready reference."); Letter to All Members,
ACSA Series A-Circular Letter, No. 5 (June 18, 1969) (reporting that at the 45th Annual
Convention, Rule 5 and Rule 6 were amended and the following new Rule 1 1 was added:
"RULE 11: THE SPECIAL RULES WILL APPLY ONLY WHERE A U.S. GROWTH IS
SPECIFIED IN THE SALES CONTRACT. THE SPECIAL RULES WILL NOT APPLY
WITH RESPECT TO YEAR OF GROWTH"). The associations also undertake systematic
efforts to inform members about rules changes. After each ACSA-ATMI Joint Meeting on
the SMRs, a report is distributed to the members of both associations.
194. See, e.g. , Cotton Traders To Change Rules, COM. APPEAL, June 9, 1992, at BS (re
porting that "[c]otton trading rules that apply to members of the Memphis Cotton Exchange
will change from Rule 3 to Rule 5 . . . . Under Rule 3 . . . cotton merchants or brokers pay
warehousing costs. . . . Rule 5 . . . shifts those costs to cotton growers"); Exchange to Keep
Cotton Sales Rule, COM. APPEAL, Sept. 26, 1991, at BS (noting that unlike the MCE, the
Greenwood Exchange had no plans to change its trading rules); Charles Conner, Agricul
tural Briefs, COM. APPEAL, Mar. 8, 1992, at C4 (discussing the change from Rule 3 to Rule 5
trading and changes in the "Rule 19 penalty for light-weight bales").
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bers to come to informal understandings on subjects not dealt with ex
plicitly by the rules,195 and sometimes encourage firms to educate their
employees about certain aspects of the rules.196 In addition, the BoA's
practice of circulating its arbitration opinions, which often contain
preachy statements about what is and is not acceptable business be
havior,197 and the many ACSA and ATMI circulars that try to use
moral suasion to induce transactors to adopt particular practices not
required by the rules,198 further contribute to the creation of a rough
consensus as to the contours of acceptable behavior.
Second, the industry has created a separate tribunal, the CSAB, to
deal with the most common type of fact-based misunderstanding,
namely disagreements over whether a delivery conforms to the con
tract's quality specifications. Quality is an aspect of performance that,
in the absence of the CSAB, might lead to the breakdown of many
relationships. Even in the absence of opportunism, two cotton transac
tors, each acting in good faith, might well disagree about how to grade
a particular shipment, and each might ther.efore conclude that the
195. The WCSA Rules, for example, contain a nonbinding note that follows the rules
dealing with the quality of tender. The note states that "[b]uyers and sellers should be care
ful to agree among themselves as to the tolerances of qualities deliverable under the con
tract, when the quality is guaranteed through as stated. While it is almost impossible to pre
clude variances of qualities in a shipment from the quality stated, sellers should be cognizant
of buyers' expectations in this regard, and in keeping with fair and reasonable practices of
the trade, should disclose to buyer any severe variance in quality of the intended shipment."
WCSA TR, supra note 183, at § II, R. 1 , cl. 1.
1 96. See, e.g., Letter to All Members, ACSA Series A-Circular Letter, No. 5 (June 18,
1969), circulated with a copy of the amended rules ("We wish to call forcefully to the atten
tion of the membership the practices which are listed in the Special Rules and to advise that
principals of firms review these rules with their employees.").
1 97. See supra note 54.
198. ATMI and ACSA have each gone to great lengths to persuade the other organiza
tion to circularize its members asking (but not requiring) them to act in particular ways or to
comply with particular rules. This suggests that each believes that these nonbinding recom
mendations have enough force to add at least some value to transactions. See, e.g. , Minutes
of the ACSA-ATMI Joint Meeting (1981) (where the ATMI expressed its reluctance to ap
prove any changes to Rules #22, 46 or 47, but pledged instead to "attempt to influence all
mills to live up to [Rule #22) as written," by publicizing the rule in "Textile Trends," [an as
sociation sponsored publication] and indicated that it was also willing to consider a special
mailing "on the matter" from the Chairman to mill principals); Minutes of the ACSA-ATMI
Joint Meeting (1976) (where ACSA "requested cooperation again from the ATMI in urging
their members to receive cotton five days a week, thus utilizing to a greater degree our
transportation facilities," and the mill representatives responded that they would be glad to
recircularize this message); Minutes of the ACSA-ATMI Joint Meeting (1974) (where
ACSA "again requested that the ATMI circulate a memorandum to its members pointing
out the problems incurred by some shippers by failure of the mill to properly care for rejec
tions," and ATMI responded that it would be "happy to do this again, as it was definitely the
responsibility of the mills to properly care for rejections"); Minutes of the ACSA-ATMI
Joint Meeting (1973) (where ATM! agreed to circularize its membership about returning
rejected bales to the shippers in the same condition in which they had arrived); Minutes of
the ACSA-ATMI Joint Meeting (1966) (where ATMI and ACSA failed to agree on a rule
dealing with Friday delivery, but the ATMI agreed to try to enlist "the cooperation of
everyone" by circularizing its own membership on the subject).
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other has defected. The ability to submit the goods to a neutral tribu
nal at a low cost and to obtain a quick ruling on the subject without
filing a claim for breach can play an important role in preventing con
tractual relationships from unraveling.199 To understand why, suppose
that a seller (S) ships what she thinks are conforming goods to a buyer
(B) who claims that the goods arrived in a nonconforming state. If B
calls S and says the goods are nonconforming, S will have no way of
knowing if this is true. Although she knows that she shipped con
forming goods, there is always the unavoidable and not insubstantial
risk that they were damaged in transit, which makes it difficult for her
to tell whether B, by complaining, is cooperating or defecting. In such
a situation, S can request that the cotton be sent to the CSAB. If the
arbitrator says the goods are nonconforming, S will realize that she in
fact defected. She might then offer to cure, an option given to her as of
right under the trade rules,200 or she might attempt to reach a price
adjustment with B (most likely, one at least slightly favorable to him).
However, even if these attempts fail and B responds with defection, S
will conclude that B's defection is merely in response to her own de
fection, and that if she decides to respond with cooperation, B may do
the same, thereby preventing the breakdown of the relationship.201 In
general, transactors do not view asking for quality arbitration as dam
aging to their commercial relationship as long as it is not done too of
ten. It is widely recognized that two cotton men acting in good faith
may well grade a particular lot of cotton differently.202
199. The importance of resolving this type of disagreement quickly is reflected in the
MCE trading rules. See MCE TR, supra note 17, at R. 34, cl. 2 ("In any case relating to the
classification and delivery of cotton where it is shown that an immediate decision is desir
able, the President . . . may . . . appoint a special committee of three members with full
power to waive all bond and formalities and render an immediate decision."). In addition, in
merchant-to-mill transactions, the availability of CSAB arbitration creates an incentive for
merchants not to make opportunistic use of the cure provision in the SMRs. When the
CSAB determines goods to be nonconforming, gossip based on this verified fact can be at
least mildly damaging, thereby increasing the cost of cure to the breaching party and giving
him an increased incentive to avoid intentionally sending nonconforming goods in the first
place.
200. SMRs, supra note 5, at Art. III, § 9 ("All cotton rejected by buyer against contract
must be replaced by delivery of an equal quantity as the cotton rejected, and of the quality of
cotton specified in the contract, within fourteen business days of mutual agreement regard
ing rejections, or of final decision by arbitration as herein provided for.").
201. For a more technical discussion of this type of strategy, known as "contrite tit-for
tat," see ROBERT AXELROD, THE COMPLEXITY OF COOPERATION: AGENT-BASED
MODELS OF COMPETITION AND COLLABORATION 34 (1987) (noting that a contrite tit-for
tat strategy is one that "has three states: 'contrite,' 'content' and 'provoked.' It [the strategy]
begins in content with cooperation and stays there unless there is a unilateral defection. If it
was the victim while content, it becomes provoked and defects until a cooperation from the
other player causes it to become content. If it was the defector while content, it becomes
contrite and cooperates. When contrite, it becomes content only after it has successfully co
operated").
202. Telephone Interview with WCSA Executive (July 1996) (opining that most traders
view quality disputes as just a routine part of doing business).
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Although the quality intermediary can determine whether a ship
ment conformed to the contract, it does not reveal any information
about whether the seller intentionally or mistakenly shipped noncon
forming goods or whether the buyer genuinely thought the goods were
nonconforming or attempted to reject them for opportunistic reasons.
Despite the fact that the industry has taken numerous steps to reduce
misclassification risk by promoting widespread agreement on the
meaning of rules, the vagaries of weather and agriculture, as well as
the complexities of cotton storage and transportation, nevertheless re
sult in many situations in which it is difficult if not impossible for the
promisee to determine whether an undesirable outcome reflects an act
of defection, or simply bad luck. Across the market, the risk of inad
vertent breach, even after optimal precautions have been taken, is
high. In such situations, cooperation is more likely to be maintained if
transactors do not respond to every bad outcome by inflicting a pun
ishment. Transactors might, for example, adopt a strategy of attempt
ing to negotiate adjustments in such situations, either until a particu
larly severe bad outcome occurs, or until a pattern of frequent bad
outcomes leads a transactor to conclude that he is dealing with a de
fector and should therefore terminate the relationship. Alternatively,
transactors might adopt a strategy that punishes the defector for a
limited number of transactions or until he starts cooperating again.203
Such strategies are commonly followed in the cotton market.204
Negotiating forgiving adjustments until the relationship is termi
nated is common in transactions between mills and merchants.205
Transactors typically adjust or attempt to adjust their obligations sev
eral times before initiating an arbitration,206 an action that sometimes,
203. See DIXIT & NALEBUFF, supra note 191 (discussing the conditions under which
modified tit-for-tat strategies are desirable); AXELROD, supra note 201, at 34 (explaining
that in a repeat play prisoner's dilemma in a noisy environment, reciprocal strategies can be
improved upon by incorporating "generosity," that is, by "allowing some percentage of the
other player's defections to go unpunished").
204. The "tat" move dictated by these more forgiving strategies - typically either re
fusing to deal for a specified period of time, or terminating the relationship after a series of
defections - is a form of bilateral NLS that is unlikely to be imposed in an opportunistic
manner. Because the execution cost savings of a repeat-dealing relationship accrue to both
transactors, neither has an incentive to suspend or terminate the relationship unless the
other has done something that suggests that he will behave poorly in the future. Thus, while
these sanctions can lead to deadweight losses when they are mistakenly imposed (an action
more forgiving versions of tit-for-tat strategies are designed to reduce), they are unlikely to
be opportunistically imposed.
205. See, e.g., Record, BoA Case No. 136 (1995) (revealing that the seller modified the
payment schedule numerous times and that the buyer consistently failed to meet the modi
fied schedule, leading the seller to file a claim in arbitration); Record, BoA Case No. 121
(1985) (where the buyer gave the seller many extensions on delivery before filing for arbitra
tion).
206. When mill representatives were asked what they did when a dispute arose, most
stated that they would try to work it out with the merchant, see, e.g. , Mill Survey, Respon
dent #5 (Aug. 8, 1997) ("Work out with merchant."); Mill Survey, Respondent #4 (Aug. 6,
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but not always, ends their contracting relationship.207 Members of the
MCE commonly ignore defections or make forgiving adjustments in
response to a certain number of defections, and then respond to defec
tions thereafter with punishment of a limited variety, such as going to
arbitration to obtain a monetary recovery,208 perhaps refusing to deal
for a specified period, or spreading a little negativ:e _gossip,209 and then
returning to cooperation. Similar responses . to defections have also
been adopted by some mills.210
The cost of adopting relatively forgiving strategies is lower in the
cotton industry's PLS than it is in the public legal system. In the public
legal system, the Code's course of performance and course of dealing
provisions increase the cost of agreeing to forgiving adjustments. They
1997) ("[T]ry an amicable settlement; go to arbitration when all else fails."); Mill Survey,
Respondent #3 (July 28, 1997) ("[T]ry to work it out."); Mill Survey, Respondent #7 (July 31,
1997) ("We try to work things out between ourselves. If not we will go to arbitration.");
Anonymous Mill Survey (July 31, 1997) ("Contact individual in which [sic] agreement was
made and discuss all facts pertaining to the dispute and try to seek a reasonable agreement
for both parties. To take a merchant to arbitration would be the result of absolute disregard
of a contract or verbal agreement. Circumstances requiring arbitration would be for ex
tremely poor performance, non-delivery of cotton and failure to make compensation.").
207. A significant percentage of the disputes reaching the BoA appear to be absolute
end-game disputes, that is, disputes where the parties do not intend to deal with one another
in the future. Between 1975 and 1996, for example, 54% of the cases heard by the BoA, were
clearly absolute end-game disputes. Most commonly, the event triggering the end-game was
the insolvency or financial distress of a party, the closing of a cotton office, a change of con
trol of one of the entities involved, or the retirement of a person directly involved in the
transaction, all events that upset settled expectations. Another 18% of the cases involved
disputes that might fairly be classified as end-game. They involved disputes over the effects
of a government subsidy program that made large sums tum on who had possession of cot
ton on a particular day. These cases were ones in which an event took the contract out of the
self-enforcing range and made it worthwhile for one of the parties to end the contracting re
lationship. The remaining 27% of the cases involved primarily factual disputes about late
payment and late delivery.
208. A look at the opinions, written evidence, and moving papers (but not necessarily
the transcripts which were mostly unavailable), in all MCE cases from 1944-1990 provides
evidence that transactors routinely make forgiving adjustments - they accept late payment
or late delivery, extend the time for payment or delivery, cancel deals, or accept substitute
goods - and that the filing of a claim in arbitration is often preceded by several such ad
justments. See also sources cited supra note 205.
209. See, e.g., Telephone Interview by Connie Rogers with MCE Merchant #9 (Aug. 13,
1997) (noting that in "a friendly arbitration, [with] both sides a little wrong and a little right,
the animosity may wear off after a few months and they'll probably deal with each other
again"); Letter from Defendant, to MCE Executive Vice-President and Secretary (Mar. 15,
1976), in connection with MCE Case No. 828 ("[The plaintiff] and I have been friends a long
time and regardless of the outcome we expect to remain such.").
210. For example, in response to the question, "If you go to arbitration against a mer
chant and he complies with the award, will you do business with him in the future? If so,
would you do so immediately?", one mill answered, "should we go to arbitration and it was
settled and the award complied with we would likely do business again - probably we
would wait one or two seasons," Mill Survey, Respondent #5 (Aug. 8, 1997); another said,
"yes . . . would wait a year or two," Mill Survey, Respondent #7 (July 31, 1997); and another
said, "I would carefully weigh the situation and depending on the seriousness determine the
time factor for relations to be re-established." Anonymous Mill Survey (July 31, 1997).
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create a significant risk that a series of such adjustments will be found
to constitute a course of performance or course of dealing that will
operate as a waiver or modification of the terms of transactors' written
contracts and will therefore limit the ability of the breached-against
party to impose formal sanctions in the future for breach of the con
tract's explicit terms if the breaches turn out to have been a series of
willful defections.211 In contrast, the refusal of cotton tribunals to per
mit course of dealing or course of performance to vary or modify con
tractual provisions eliminates the risk that forgiving adjustments will
be interpreted as waivers or contractual modifications.212 It therefore
increases the likelihood that transactors will find it worthwhile to be
have flexibly and encourages them to adopt the types of forgiving
strategies that are most likely to promote commercial cooperation.213
There is an additional efficiency benefit to using a forgiving ver
sion of the tit-for-tat strategy, particularly when the "tat" punishment
is costly for the defected-against transactor to impose. The most com-

211. The fact that transactors are aware of this approach and can therefore adjust their
reliance on extralegal understandings in accordance with their view of their likelihood that
they will be voluntarily performed, together with the short statute of limitations at the MCE
and the other deadlines for objections written into the rules, help to mitigate the likelihood
of the types of opportunism that such an adjudicative approach might lead to. For example,
a buyer who always takes late delivery under a contract then suddenly wants to end the rela
tionship and tries to sue for past deviations will not be able to go very far back in time if he
chooses to do so.
212. The BoA has also consistently refused to uphold oral modifications of written con
tracts. See SEAB Case No. 80 (1957) (where the seller claimed that Buyer's employee said
that Seller "could take all the time needed to make delivery;" the Board held that "this does
not enter into this case since the contracts specify a definite delivery date, and if there had
been any different agreements they should have been embodied in the contracts"); SEAB
Case No. 66 (1953) ("The Appeal Board is interested only in the contract or in written
statements affecting the conditions of said contract. We do not find· any changes agreed to in
writing altering the original contract."); SEAB Case No. 56 (1950) (noting the seller's con
tention that an employee of the buyer orally agreed to a modification of the contract, the
arbitrators held that " [i]t is our opinion that the terms of the contract stand for themselves
and the conditions set forth therein are the only conditions which would pertain to the ful
fillment of the contract"). In addition, the BoA does not look to evidence from precontrac
tual negotiations to determine the scope of the parties' agreement. See NEBoA Case No.
318 (1940) ("The Board . . . finds the parties both bound by the terms of the signed purchase
orders and that prior negotiations are not entitled to consideration as the terms of the pur
chase orders with respect to grade and staple are not ambiguous."). The MCE arbitrators
take a similar approach. See MCE Case No. 789 (1952) (concluding "[t]hat while the trade
was originally [orally] made under Rule 7 of the Exchange Trading Rules, which rule pro
vides that payment shall be made free of Exchange in Memphis funds or the equivalent, and
that exchange to final destination shall be deducted from the invoice, due to the fact that
seller's written confirmation made a change in the exchange provision and as buyer made no
objection to the change outlined in said written confirmation, the written confirmation be
came a mutually agreeable contract and buyer is bound by its terms"). These aspects of the
tribunals' adjudicative approaches increase transactors' confidence that extralegal aspects of
thdr behavior and communications will not be transformed into legally enforceable com
mitments.
213. For a more detailed discussion of how formalistic adjudication can support flexible
contractual relations in its shadow, see Bernstein, Merchant Law, supra note 60.
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mon "tat" moves in cotton transactions - some combination of ter
minating the contracting relationship, seeking arbitration, and/or im
posing a reputation-based NLS like widespread negative gossip - are
often costly to the person imposing them.214 In such situations, more
deterrence can be obtained by imposing a larger sanction less fre
quently than by imposing smaller sanctions more frequently. When
negative gossip is based on one transaction going poorly, others might
dismiss it, since it is difficult for them to be sure that it was not either
an inadvertent breach after sufficient precaution or a breach due to
simple bad luck. Even if the sanction is imposed several times in se
quence, it will be less effective and more costly than a larger sanction
imposed after several defections. Consider, for example, three in
stances of negative gossip, each of which, if imposed in isolation,
would impose $X in reputational harm. If such gossip sanctions were
imposed three times in close proximity to one another, the harm to the
defecting transactor's reputation would be more than $3X because
each instance of gossip gains credibility from the one subsequent to it.
However, when NLSs are imposed seriatim, the cost of imposing them
has to be borne three times, and as more time passes between inci
dents, the cumulative impact of the sanctions will decline - transac
tors are more likely to forget previous incidents if they seemed minor
at the time - and, since the flow of gossip is hard to predict, it is not
clear that the same people will necessarily hear about all three inci
dents, thus decreasing the impact and increasing the cost of imposing
the sanction. In contrast, when the gossip is based on several incidents,
both the person contemplating imposing the sanction and the others
who are told of the wrong doing, will be more confident that the
breaching party is a defector deserving of a "tat" response.215 In such a
214. Spreading negative gossip takes time and a transactor must be judicious in deciding
whether to do it. A transactor who spreads negative gossip too often, or is too harsh in his
judgements, risks being viewed as being difficult to work with. In addition, there is a strong
norm against baseless gossip. A transactor who is found to have fabricated gossip will suffer
tremendous reputational harm. In addition, the availability of low cost access to the PLS
puts a soft check on the extent to which baseless gossip can damage a transactor's reputa
tion. At a certain point, the victim of the gossip can defend himself by asking why, if he acted
so badly, the gossiper did not take him to arbitration. As one merchant explained when
asked why people bother to gossip about wrongdoers, "no one wants to see the industry hurt
by an unscrupulous person." Telephone Interview with Merchant #11 (no date). Others ex
plained that it was an industry where emotions ran high and notions of honor and avenging
honor motivated behavior.
215. Another advantage of this approach is that it will often result in willful breaches
being punished more severely than inadvertent breaches. In contexts like cotton transac
tions, where the risk of inadvertent breach even after optimal precautions have been taken is
high, and where absent successful renegotiation, transactors want performance, not payment
for nonperformance, see supra notes 135-137 and accompanying text, they might find it de
sirable to impose high monetary sanctions for willful breach and moderate sanctions for in
advertent breach - in an effort to encourage performance without encouraging over
investment in precautions against breach. However, a legal system (whether private or pub
lic) that imposed different monetary sanctions on willful and inadvertent breach would face
formidable barriers to implementing such an approach. First, in any one case, the willfulness
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situation, the accuracy of the decision to impose the sanction is im
proved, and the magnitude of the sanction that can be imposed also
increases since negative gossip will be more credible and transactors
will give it more weight in deciding whether or not to deal with the de
fecting party. Thus, when transactors decide to follow a forgiving ver
sion of tit-for-tat they can obtain more efficient deterrence.
More generally, recognizing the importance of reducing the likeli
hood of misunderstanding in any relationships in which valuable co
operation is sustained through both transactors following a variant of
the tit-for-tat strategy suggests that in deciding which provision to in
clude in a contract or what type of extralegal understandings to reach,
the transactors must assess the "misclassification risk" of the provision
or understanding. As their relationship develops, execution costs will
or nonwillfulness of a breach may not be verifiable by a tribunal, or even observable to the
parties. Nevertheless, over a period of time and a series of breaches, the wilfulness or inad
vertence of his transactional partner's actions may become clearer to an aggriev.ed party. As
a consequence, given the inability of a judge or arbitration panel to distinguish between will
ful and inadvertent breach in a particular case, the higher measure of damages would, in
practice, have to be available for all breaches. Such an increase in the damage measure,
however, would likely lead to an over-investment in precautions against inadvertent breach.
Second, given that the industry has adopted something akin to the perfect tender rule with
cure (albeit within the industry's designated allowances on a variety of quality dimensions)
buyers can nonetheless usually find a way to claim breach under the rules. As a conse
quence, if very large monetary damages were available in arbitration, buyers might have an
incentive to declare breach in many situations where they would otherwise simply have ac
cepted the goods. In contrast, where hybrid monetary and NLSs are used to sanction willful
breach, a lower level of monetary sanctions can be combined with a NLS imposed only after
the willfulness or nonwillfulness of breach becomes clear, thereby decoupling the amount
"paid" by the breaching party (the monetary damages ordered by the arbitrator plus the
NLS imposed by the aggrieved party), from the amount "received" by the aggrieved party
(the monetary recovery plus any small deterrence advantage of imposing the NLS, less any
cost of imposing the NLS, see infra notes 227-229 and accompanying text), which in turn
eliminates (or at a minimum greatly reduces) the aggrieved party's incentive to declare
breach when there is a minor nonconformity in tender simply to get the larger monetary re
covery.
There is a great deal of evidence that extent of gossip (and hence the magnitude of the
NLS imposed) is highly dependent on transactors' perceptions of the willfulness or nonwill
fulness of the behavior at issue. See MCE Merchant Survey, Respondent #4 (May 30, 1997)
(When asked whether and under what conditions he would spread negative gossip, a mer
chant replied, "sometimes yes: when defendant refused to honor I'd publicize that fact.
Sometimes no: when an honest mistake was made, I wouldn't talk"); MCE Merchant Survey,
Respondent #3 (May 27, 1997) (noting that he had been involved in two arbitrations. "One
case involved a party who did not deliver in a timely manner," but because the breaching
party "did not understand the importance, [he] would probably deal with him again in time,"
and he did not gossip after the arbitration. In contrast, the second case dealt with "a party
who was looking for any loop-hole to avoid a financial loss." In this instance, he did talk
about the case. He explained that, "in the case of willful non-fulfillment . . . [I talked] as [I]
did not want this party to continue his poor practices"). Moreover, this system of decoupled
hybrid sanctions is particularly well suited to ferreting out opportunistic transactors and
transactors who act in what one industry executive called "the arbitrage way," rather than
the "gentlemen's way." Telephone Interview with ACSA Executive (no date). It confronts
such a person with escalating sanctions, both because each instance of gossip gains credibility
from the one after it (especially if it is from a different person), and because as a person
gradually acquires a bad reputation, transactors are likely to watch the person more care
fully, thereby detecting more instances of wrongdoing.
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decrease and switching costs will increase, making the misclassification
risk an increasingly important feature of their contracting relationship.
This, in turn, may lead them to adopt contract provisions that in the
absence of a need to maintain cooperation would not be chosen. Al
ternatively, either because at the outset of a contracting relationship
transactors may not know whether their relationship will be discrete
or repeat, or because a company enters into hundreds of contracts a
day and therefore finds it cheaper always to do business using a single
standard form,216 recognizing the importance of misclassification risk
might not necessarily lead to the use of different contract terms.
Transactors may prefer instead to vary or supplement some of their
contracts' written provisions through extralegal understandings (made
credible through NLSs) that can reduce misclassification risk, perhaps
because they condition on information that is more cheaply observ
able to the transactors at the relevant time. By using written contracts
and varying them through extralegal understandings that may be bet
ter tailored to the needs of work-a-day interactions, transactors may
be able to capture execution cost savings and reduce the likelihood of
relationship breakdown (for this reason, these understandings are
sometimes referred to as relationship-preserving norms) while at the
same time retaining their right to insist on strict adherence to the
terms of their written contracts if their relationship breaks down.217
216. The best verifiable term for a contract may be quite similar across relationships
since the factors that determine verifiability are unlikely to be vastly different in different
transactions. In contrast, what is observable, varies a great deal from relationship to relation
ship and even varies over time within a given relationship. As a consequence, transactors
may always find it desirable to use the same or substantially the same written provisions
while varying thefr extralegal understandings depending on who they are dealing with and
the stage of their contracting relationship.
217. It is important to note that even in selecting the terms conditioning on verifiable
information that they view as most desirable in the event that a dispute requiring third-party
adjudication arises (a so-called end-game situation of one sort or another, see Bernstein,
Merchant Law, supra note 60), transactors may, in some instances, be influenced, at least in
part, by their desire to provide the most desirable terms for the relationship-preserving
phase of their interactions as well. To see why, consider transactors' choice between two
provisions: provision A, that conditions on information that is verifiable but not observable,
and provision B, that conditions on information that is both verifiable and observable. Fur
ther assume that the cost of verifying the information under provision B is greater than the
cost of verifying the necessary information under provision A. If only the end-game were to
be considered, provision A would be better (assuming that in end-game the two provisions
had the same payoff if performed, and would give rise to the same damages if breached)
since the information it conditions on can be obtained at a lower cost. However, in their
every-day-repeat dealings, provision A would present difficulties. Because transactors would
have difficulty figuring out whether the provision had been satisfied (something that by defi
nition would not be observable to them), its use might therefore increase the likelihood that
an instance of performance would be misclassified as an instance of breach and lead to the
breakdown of the relationship. As a consequence, while provision A would be cheaper to
invoke if a dispute arose, the probability of a dispute arising would be higher. In contrast,
while the cost of adjudication if a dispute arose is higher under provision B, the risk of
breakdown would be much lower since the information provision B conditions on is observ
able to the transactors. Taking the risk of breakdown and the benefits of avoiding it into ac
count, the transactors might prefer to include provision B in the contract.
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Using this two-tiered structure enables transactors to write a con
tract with the provisions best suited to third-party enforcement while
varying these provisions using relationship-preserving norms that are
well suited to reduce misclassification risk and promote cooperation.
There is suggestive evidence that cotton transactors may view them
selves as conducting their everyday interactions according to a set of
flexible understandings that requires them to make many adjustments,
and ignore minor deviations in ways not required by their contract's
written provisions, yet preserves their unfettered right to insist on
strict performance of their contract when they think their contracting
partner is behaving badly. As one mill executive explained, "SMR is
[sic] used as an outline only in most cases . . . but if disputes arise both parties fall back on SMR [sic] to resolve" them.218 And, as an
other explained, when asked whether everyday practices varied from
the SMRs, "yes, I would say many, especially related to late delivery,
late payments, notification of claims, etc. Most mills and merchants
work with each other and have informal unwritten understandings to a
limit. If it became apparent to me that a merchant had bad intentions,
I would immediately invoke SMR rights."219
Once transactors have established a contracting relationship, they
will often structure their contracting relationships in a way that further
increases the costs each will suffer if either defects, thereby making
cooperation the preferred choice. Most merchants and mills, rather
than entering into one large long-term contract with numerous in
stallment deliveries, instead enter into multiple contracts with over
lapping performance times.22° For example, on January 1 , they might
enter into a contract for delivery on February 1 ; on January 15 they
might enter into a contract for delivery on February 15th and another
for delivery on March 1 , and so on. Each time the transactors enter
into an additional contract to be performed in the future, they increase
the cost to both of them of either of them misbehaving today. If one
transactor defects and the other responds by defecting, relations be
tween them will quickly deteriorate. In the subsequent contracts, each
transactor is likely to demand exact compliance with the contract,
218. Mill Survey, Respondent #1 (Aug. 11, 1997).
219. Mill Survey, Respondent #5 (Aug. 8, 1997); ); see also Telephone Interview by
Renee Liu with Mill #12 (Oct. 7, 1997) (noting that there are differences between everyday
practices and the SMRs in that "payments are looked at loosely . . . fixation term is obso
lete . . . time deadlines [are] often winked at . . . wouldn't buy in cotton sometimes [even if
delivery is late] if we didn't need it badly . . . [we] dance around that"); Telephone Interview
by Renee Liu with Mill #13 (Oct. 8, 1997) (noting that the biggest variation from the rules
relates to payments); Mill Survey, Respondent #5 (Aug. 8, 1997) (explaining that these dif
ferences relate to "late delivery, late payment, notification of claims"); Mill Survey, Respon
dent #6 (July 30, 1997) (noting that most divergences between SMRs and practice "have
evolved through the continued partnership of vendor - customer").
220. See, e.g., Record, BoA Case No. 139 (1976) (illustrating the existence of multiple
separate and overlapping contracts between the parties).
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thereby greatly increasing execution costs and requiring both transac
tors to forgo all of the value created by their extralegal agreements. By
putting these future gains at risk in each transaction, the transactors
create what has been called "private enforcement capital."221 In effect,
they create an implicit performance bond (whose magnitude is further
increased by reputation-based NLSs) that they will sacrifice in the
event of breach. They thereby increase the likelihood of cooperation
by increasing the cost of defection.
Cotton trade associations also take numerous other steps to in
crease the likelihood that cooperation will endure and that the resid
ual opportunities for opportunism will be minimized222 - including
promoting altruism, encouraging people to incorporate the welfare of
the group (or others) into their utility function,223 creating social con
nections between members and their families, and explicitly teaching
transactors about the importance of reciprocity and commercial repu
tation.224 These efforts, many of which are undertaken at the associa
tion level, provide benefits for all group members. The more widely
norms of reciprocity are diffused throughout the relevant population,
the better will be the ability of the group to "police the entire commu
nity by punishing those who try to be exploitative," which in turn "de
creases the number of uncooperative individuals [any one trader] will
have to deal with in the future,"225 thereby lowering the transactions
costs of trade.
221. See generally Klein, supra note 152 (exploring the creation and use of private en
forcement capital).
222. See AXELROD, EVOLUTION, supra note 190 (discussing steps that increase the sta
bility of cooperation).
223. Cotton industry institutions go to great lengths to instill a sense of solidarity or joint
purpose in their members. See, e.g., Dr. Orley B. Caudill, Interviewer, An Oral History with
Mr. W.D. Lawson, III, Mississippi Oral History Program of the University of Southern
Mississippi, Vol. 126 at 15 (1980) ("We would have meetings as merchants, in fact we think
we were better organized than any group there because we even had meetings before meet
ings. We were in constant communication with one another. Being a smaller group, we could
do this and we spoke with one voice."). To encourage international solidarity, cotton firms
around the world have long educated each other's apprentices or "squidges." See BUSH, su
pra note 113, at 13 (relating that "[a]mong the firm's half-dozen samplers and sample-room
porters, there's nearly always one foreign squidge; this is a time-honored practice in all cot
ton houses and has made the cotton world a club. Family connection often plays a part").
224. The industry sponsors a college for new members that encourages young traders to
inquire closely into the reputations of their trading partners. See Neal P. Gillen, Resolution
of Contract Disputes in the Commerce of Cotton Within and Without the U.S., Lecture at
Rhodes College (July 20, 1995) (transcript on file with author) ("I urge each of you to deal
only with those who you know and trust. If you do not know the producer, the ginner, mer
chant, or textile mill, check them out thoroughly. If the price or terms are too good to be
true, they usually are. This is a competitive business, and when your contract price and terms
are significantly better than the norm in the market, something usually goes wrong and the
losses far exceed the potential profit you thought you would realize."). In addition, in many
large firms, retired traders come in a few days a week to serve as mentors and teachers to
younger traders.
225. AXELROD, supra note 190, at 139.
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Restoring Cooperation

Although there are certain typei; of disputes that are likely to end
even long-standing cooperative contracting relationships, there are
others in which it may be possible to restore cooperation even after it
has broken down and parties are negotiating in the shadow of their le
gal rights. In this latter class of disputes, the industry's decision to
maintain the availability of both monetary and nonlegal sanctions may
make the restoration of cooperation at least slightly more likely by
giving transactors who are contemplating arbitration an additional in
centive (beyond mere avoidance of the deadweight cost of dispute
resolution) to settle their differences and enter into another transac
tion, thereby increasing the likelihood that their trading relationship
will continue.
Consider a situation where a contract is breached, liability is clear,
and the parties know that if the case goes to arbitration, the breaching
party will be ordered to pay $D in damages and the aggrieved party
will be able to impose a reputational loss of $L on him . as well. In such
a situation, if the breaching party views the aggrieved party's threat to
impose $L in reputational harm as credible,226 he would be better off
226. Given that reputation-based NLSs such as strong negative gossip are costly for an
aggrieved party to impose and result in no direct pecuniary benefit to her, it is important to
explore why, apart from a strong retributive instinct (something that is present in many in
stances), her threat to impose them could ever be credible. Consider a situation in which a
buyer (B) is trying to decide whether to impose such a sanction on a breaching seller (S). If
B imposes the sanction, it has two distinct effects. First, it imposes a cost on S without re
sulting in any direct pecuniary benefit to B. Second, and perhaps more important, B signals
to the market that she is likely to be willing to impose such sanctions on those who breach
contracts with her in the future. B's signal in this context is credible precisely because the
sanction is costly for her to impose and results in no pecuniary gain to her. It would there
fore be irrational for her to impose the sanction if she didn't plan to stay in the market long
enough to reap the benefits of the enhanced "deterrence" she has purchased. As a conse
quence, when B imposes such a NLS, she signals to the market that she has a low discount
rate, that is, that she is a cooperative type, and by implication, that she cares about obtaining
performance rather than a remedy for nonperformance. However, when B imposes a NLS,
she also signals to the relevant pool of market transactors that she is more expensive to deal
with than previously thought. As a consequence, B's decision to impose a NLS in one trans
action will affect her future transactional opportunities.
To more clearly understand how B's future opportunities will be affected, consider a
situation where a B transacts with Ss who all select their level of precaution against inadver
tent breach at the firm, rather than at the transaction, level. This approach to precaution is
common in the cotton industry. Most merchant firms keep different levels of inventory, have
different degrees of diversification of their supply bases, and use a variety of different modes
of transportation, each with its own associated risk of delay and quality harm, making their
precaution levels largely exogenous as to any one contract, and only imperfectly observable
to market participants. Further, assume that in any one instance of breach, B will have diffi
culty accurately distinguishing inadvertent breach after optimal precautions have been taken
from the type of willful breach that transactors view as "laying down on a ·contract" and
strongly indicative of a propensity to behave badly in any of a number of ways in the future.
In such a situation, B will reason that if she imposes the NLS and sends the associated signal
to the market, not all Ss will respond to it in the same way. Merchant firms who take a low
level of precaution ("bad types"), will now view dealing with her as being a great deal more
costly, and while merchant-firms who take a high level of precaution ("good types"), will
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agreeing to any settlement that cost him less than $D+$L. Conversely,
because imposing a $L reputational loss on the breaching party will
not increase her monetary recovery, the aggrieved party would be bet
ter off with any settlement in which she receives more than $D.227 Both
parties would therefore be better off settling for an amount greater
than $D and less than $D + $L, than they would be going to arbitra
tion. However, in order for such an agreement to be feasible, the ag
grieved party must be able to credibly promise not to impose the $L in
reputational harm, something that it is difficult if not impossible to ac
complish through the addition of a provision to the settlement agree
ment. One extralegal way to accomplish this, however, is for the trans-

also view dealing with her as more costly, the expected increment of added cost to them is
lower. Because the "good types" take more precaution, their probability of inadvertent
breach is lower than it is for the bad types, so the expected value of the increased sanction is
less for good types than it is for the bad types. The "good types" will therefore be more
willing than the "bad types" to deal with B. From the perspective of the "good types," the
fact that they face higher sanctions in dealing with B creates a benefit for them - since in
order to obtain a higher price, they are faced with the challenge of establishing that they are
"good types." Although a S's reputation is partially, though imperfectly, revealed through
the information about his reputation circulating in the market (and perhaps his association
membership status), the ability of a S to communicate his "good type" status more credibly
by willingly assuming the risk of a higher sanction is certainly furthered through the sorting
engendered by B's imposition of the NLS.
Once this sorting takes place, and a B who has imposed a quasi-multilateral NLS returns
to the market to buy again, she will face a situation where fewer people will want to deal
with her since she is now more costly to deal with (the "sorting effect"). However, those Ss
who do want to deal with her will be disproportionately good types - those with a lower
probability of breach (the "quality effect"). In market contexts where the "quality effect"
dominates the "sorting effect," B's decision to impose the NLS against S can, up to a point,
increase the value of the subsequent contracts she enters into with this and other S's, thereby
making it worthwhile for her to bear the cost of imposing the sanction.
In cotton markets, the "quality effect" should dominate the "sorting effect." The cash
market price of cotton can be obtained in a variety of ways other than search and the num
ber of S-middleman merchants is very large in relation to the number of B-mills. As a conse
quence, the price effect on a B of dealing with a smaller number of Ss is unlikely to be par
ticularly significant. In contrast, the beneficial effect on the value of B's contracts of dealing
with higher quality contracting partners is likely to be significant - execution and coordina
tion costs are likely to be lower, and the likelihood that cooperation, once established, will
be maintained is also greater since, as the probability of inadvertent breach decreases, so will
the magnitude of misclassification risk.
However, it is important to note that if the sorting effect were the only desired benefit of
imposing the sanction, a similar effect could be achieved if B simply demanded the inclusion
of a huge liquidated damages clause in her contract with S. However, given the industry's
adoption of the perfect tender rule, and the fact that tender is never, in fact, perfect, the use
of such clauses would, as discussed supra notes 147-149 and accompanying text, give B an
incentive to declare that S breached solely to obtain this windfall, and while her incentive to
do this would be constrained by her desire not to get a bad reputation for engaging in
holdup, because it is difficult for other market participants to gauge the extent of the devia
tion leading to the rejection, this constraint would be highly imperfect.
227. If, however, the aggrieved party would get the benefit described supra note 226,
from imposing the NLS of $L, the minimum amount she would accept for settling rather
than litigating, collecting damages, and imposing the NLS would be $D plus some additional
increment representing the nonpecuniary benefit of imposing the NLS less the cost of doing
so.
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actors to immediately enter into another contract.228An aggrieved
party's claim that the breaching party is not to be trusted will not be
believed if the breaching party can produce a contract demonstrating
that the parties are continuing to deal with one another. Thus, the $L
reputation loss is a joint benefit the parties can share if they continue
to do business with one another. The availability of the hybrid
sanction encourages the transactors to deal with one another again,
relative to a purely monetary sanction of the same magnitude, and
may therefore help transactors restore cooperation even after it has
broken down.229
The MCE arbitrators sometimes render decisions in a form that
can be understood as an attempt to encourage the restoration of coop
eration. In situations where they think the parties can continue to
work together, they sometimes render a partial decision, leaving some
aspects of the outcome to be agreed on by the parties. In one case, af
ter deciding liability, the opinion "direct[ed the parties] to equitably
settle the costs of damages and reasonably incurred expenses."230 The
arbitrators' handwritten draft of the decision (filed with the case rec
ord) explains that the idea is for Firm A and Firm B to "work together
to equitably settle," which suggests that forcing the parties to deal with
one another face-to-face may be viewed as a way to lessen tensions
and to reestablish trust. An MCE executive confirmed that restoring
cooperation is an important reason these types of decisions are
made.231 Although there is nothing in the opinion of the arbitrators or
any of the applicable rules that says what happens if parties who are
directed to agree on damages or any other post-arbitration issue can
not, arbitrators' general distaste for repeat litigants creates at least
subtle pressure for them not to return to arbitration.
228. Although the magnitude and structure of the hybrid sanctions available in the in
dustry could be replicated though an ordinary decoupling scheme in which a portion of any
recovery is paid to the association's treasury, the incentives created by the association's re
course to hybrid monetary and nonlegal sanctions would not be replicated. The decoupled
monetary sanction would not succeed in bonding interior contractual promises nor would it
create any additional incentive for the parties to enter into a subsequent transaction and
thereby potentially restore their cooperative dealings. In addition, the absence of the NLSs
would make it difficult for the transactors to vary their written agreements through credible
extralegal understandings.
229. This might have been more important in the past when both merchant and mill
concerns were smaller and emotions were an important reason disputes went to arbitration.
230. MCE Case No. 840 (1991); see also MCE Case No. 827 (1975) (holding, in the con
text of a multi-person and multi-country string trade, that the gin, not the defendant mer
chants, was at fault and directing the defendant to "give full support to [the plaintiff] in their
efforts to collect this claim"). Sometimes MCE arbitrators try to pressure the parties to work
out their problems before a hearing. See undated memo in case file for MCE Case No. 838
(1991) (noting that "[a]t Meeting on August - 13, [sic] 1991, the firms were asked by the
committee to please make every attempt to deliver, class, and accept the cotton due on this
con-tract [sic]." They were talked to by several members of the committee and given a "two
week deadline").
·

231 . Telephone Interview with MCE Executive (Feb. 1997).
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Conclusion

For over a century,232 the cotton industry has succeeded in devel
oping rules, norms, and institutions that have made it possible for
transactors to create and maintain remarkably cooperative contracting
relationships.233 At the early stages of contracting relationships, the
reputation-based NLSs, whose use and availability is facilitated by in
dustry institutions, play an important role in facilitating cooperation
by supplementing monetary remedies and bonding extralegal under
standings. As the transactors' relationship develops, however, these
sanctions decline in importance as the threat of terminating a mutually
beneficial relationship becomes an increasingly powerful motivator of
cooperative behavior. The reputation-based NLSs, however, remain in
the background throughout the life of the relationship. They both con
strain transactors' incentives to deviate from interior promises, and
become relevant to transactors' decision making if they are consider232. See Perre Magness, Memphis History Woven in Cotton, COM. APPEAL, May 11,
2000, at CC2 (noting that the MCE was organized in 1873, and that by 1900, the "Exchange
absolutely controlled the cotton dealings of the Memphis merchant and provided for arbitra
tion of any differences that arose among its members over sales delivery, or character of the
cotton prescribed in sales contracts").
233. Over the past ten years, however, technological advancements and other market
changes have occurred that may, over the long run, undermine the ability of industry institu
tions to promote cooperation. Changes in mill production methods have made certain types
of flexibility much more costly. New mill equipment is more sensitive to small differences in
cotton quality. Mills producing certain types of goods have therefore become much more
exacting and much less flexible about the precise quality of goods delivered. In addition, as
mills have adopted just-in-time inventory methods, on-time delivery has become more im
portant. Even small delivery delays can cause costly shut downs of production runs. This
change in inventory control methods, combined with other technological innovations that
have greatly increased the productivity of mill runs, has increased the cost of responding
flexibly to quality shortfalls by negotiating a price adjustment, or to delays by accepting
goods late and waiving applicable fines. It has resulted in a situation where even short shut
downs can lead to large losses. As the cost of flexibility increases, the likelihood that coop
eration, once established, will break down also increases, particularly where, as in cotton
trading, the probability of certain types of inadvertent breach is high.
Another change that may affect the likelihood that cooperative relationships will arise
and endure is the introduction of the relatively objective High Volume Instrument ("HVI")
method of grading cotton. Although HVI classing is too expensive to use on every bale, its
cost is going down and it may soon supplant reputation as the more desirable bond of qual
ity. Since the need to rely on reputation to bond quality made the marginal cost of relying on
it to bond additional obligations quite small, when HVI classing becomes inexpensive
enough to use in everyday transactions, the marginal cost of using reputation to bond other
aspects of these transactions will increase and it is possible that a rapid shift to more formal
contracting methods will result. On the other hand, because HVI reduces misclassification
risk, it may make existing cooperative relationships somewhat more stable.
Finally, the move from small firms to huge concerns with multiple agents buying and
selling for their accounts may also undermine the maintenance of cooperation by making
agents less willing to be conciliatory when disputes arise. As one merchant who had been in
the business for a long time explained, today "people are more insistent on proving that they
are right even when they are wrong, primarily since there is a perceived need to cover your
tail within your own company since jobs are no longer life-long as they used to be." Tele
phone Interview with Merchant #9 (July 1996).

July 2001]

Creating Cooperation

1787

ing making or responding to a decision to enter an end-game situation.
Together, reputation-based NLSs and the threat of terminating a
valuable bilateral relationship work in tandem with the PLS's provi
sion of monetary remedies {which make pure price volatility a largely
unprofitable reason to breach a contract) to support highly coopera
tive contracting relationships. The stability of these contracting rela
tionships may be due, in large part, to the fact that the framework the
industry has created to support them has more than one feature that
can satisfy (or partially satisfy) most of the conditions that are gener
ally associated with the emergence and maintenance of cooperative
trading relationships. By creating these redundancies in the infrastruc
ture of trade, the industry has reduced the likelihood that real-world
events that undermine the working or existence of a particular rule,
norm, or institutional feature, at a particular time or within a particu
lar relationship, will lead to the breakdown of established cooperative
relationships. In addition, the stability of this and other cooperative
based commercial systems may also be due, in whole or in part, to the
fact that social norms of honor, particularly when reinforced through
group activity and a basic human desire to think of one's self as trust
worthy,234 are more powerful motivators of transactional behavior
than economic models of behavior typically assume.235
Ill. CONCLUSION
This Article has explored in some detail the complex private legal
system that the cotton industry has created to govern transactions
among its members. It has sought to identify some of the more impor
tant benefits created by the system in an effort to better understand
the reasons that the industry has found it advantageous to opt out of
the public legal system. It has also attempted to identify the types of
benefits that can be created through the use of private institutions that
cannot be fully replicated through private contracts and the use of
public institutions. However, the Article's exploration of the benefits
created by the PLS reveals quite clearly that many of its more impor
tant benefits are contingent in whole or in part on the industry's ef
forts not only to provide a well-developed legal infrastructure to sup
port trade, but also, and perhaps more importantly, on its efforts to
maintain and strengthen the social and informational infrastructures
of trade, efforts that enable individual transactors as well as the system
as a whole to harness the force of reputation-based NLSs. Recognizing
234. For a discussion of these considerations in commercial behavior, see generally
David Charny, Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial Relationships, 104 HARV. L. REV. 373
(1990).
235. This point is forcefully made in Robert Cooter & Melvin Eisenberg, Fairness,
Character and Efficiency in Firms, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1717 (2001).
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the importance of these reputation-based forces suggests that the bar
riers to the creation of a PLS that is as successful as the cotton indus
try's system are far greater than merely overcoming the collective ac
tion problems of funding the creation and operation of a PLS.
Nevertheless, even in the absence of a well-developed social and in
formational infrastructure of trade, such private commercial law sys
tems can offer transactors, in a variety of industries and transactional
contexts, benefits that are either unavailable or only available at great
cost through the public legal system. Identifying the many benefits
that PLSs have the potential to create suggests that it might be desir
able for the public legal system and legislature to actively encourage
their creation, or, at a minimum, remove impediments to their opera
tion,236 especially since in addition to providing significant benefits to
industry transactors, they are, in the main, socially beneficial,237 espe
cially if certain limited regulatory oversights are put into place.238
236. For example, under the Federal Arbitration Act and most state arbitration acts,
arbitrators are bound to decide cases by applying the law. See Ware, supra note 73. As a con
sequence, in industries where social bonds are not strong enough to prevent recourse to the
courts, PLSs cannot adopt written rules that conflict with the UCC, something that the study
of merchant-run PLSs suggests that it might be highly desirable for them to do. See
Bernstein, PALGRAVE, supra note 65; Bernstein, Merchant Law, supra note 60; Lisa
Bernstein, The Questionable Empirical Basis of Article 2's Incorporation Strategy: A Pre
liminary Study, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 710 (1999).
237. There are a nllinber of reasons to think that the cotton industry's PLS is socially
desirable from an economic point of view. First, absent information problems or external
ities, neither of which are present in this industry, ex ante agreements to resolve disputes
through binding alternative dispute resolution generally increase social welfare. See Steven
Shaveil, Alternative Dispute Resolution: An Economic Analysis, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. J (1996).
The presence of coercion or duress is another reason that ex ante agreements to use ADR
may not be socially beneficial. Although the fact that most cotton associations require their
members to arbitrate disputes with other members as a condition of membership might be
viewed as coercive, because transactors view other, unrelated association benefits as nearly
indispensable, the available evidence suggests that industry participants not only view arbi
tration as a desirable alternative to litigation, but also consider it one of the primary benefits
of trade association membership. Second, the PLS and the other institutional arrangements
that support it appear to promote transactional efficiency without creating barriers to entry
or other serious anticompetitive effects. Although an industry's decision to rely on reputa
tion-based nonlegal sanctions does create some barriers to entry, since it takes time to es
tablish a reputation, the availability of association membership, which provides newer trans
actors with a valuable piece of non-relationship-specific reputational capital, lowers these
barriers. In addition, from the time of their founding until the present, these associations
have gone to great lengths to increase the size of their memberships, consistent with the goal
of ensuring that only transactors of good repute were admitted. See, e.g. , President's Ad
dress, Minutes of the SCSA Annual Meeting (Apr. 18, 1936) ("Each member should make it
his business to see that all of the responsible cotton men in his locality are informed as to the
benefits which the shippers' associations have secured not only for their own members but
for the trade as a whole. This is another matter which the incoming administration would do
well to specialize on."); Minutes of the SCA Annual Meeting (Apr. 5, 1957) ("The Southern
Cotton Association is designed to effectuate a cohesiveness of our segment in our territory.
The groundwork for that lines [sic] in keeping our enrollment at a high level. The be.st
'weapon of enrollment' we can employ is the member-to-prospect contact. Let's make use of
it."); Minutes of the ACA Fall Board of Directors' Meeting (Oct. 11, 1980) ("The Secretary
advised the Directors that he had secured the names of nonmembers of the Association and
had requested various members by regions to make the necessary contacts in an effort to
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build-up our membership."); ACA Circular Letter No. 10 - 1994/1995 (Sept. 27, 1994) (ex
horting members to assist in recruiting new members). Moreover, the only association that
explicitly limits the size of its membership is the MCE whose By-Laws provide for a maxi
mum of 132 members. MCE CONST., Art. VI, § 1. In the past, this limit imposed a binding
constraint that led to a secondary market in memberships. See, e.g. , Telephone Interview
with MCE Executive (Feb. 1997) ("In the old days the value of membership might be tens of
thousands of dollars."). In recent decades, however, this ceiling has not restricted admis
sions. The Exchange currently has only ninety member firms, and the tremendous consolida
tion that has taken place in the industry over the past two decades suggests that this mem
bership limit is unlikely to impose a meaningful constraint in the future. Third, most of the
group and individual benefits created by the system - such as the reduction in the caseload
of the public courts, the reduction in the deadweight cost of disputing, and the emergence of
cooperation - are also socially desirable.
Fourth, the existence of these domestic institutions, which are part of a network of insti
tutions that operate all over the world, facilitates international trade. In the absence of these
institutions, many transactions involving developing and formerly socialist countries might
not occur because of the risk of hold-up, the weakened force of bilateral reputation bonds
and nonlegal sanctions, and the difficulties of obtaining and enforcing judgments. In addi
tion, the cost of dealing with foreign transactors, even in countries with well-developed legal
systems, would also be quite high if the deals were governed by public legal systems. En
forcement problems would remain and the applicable laws would still have to be determined
by complex choice of law and jurisdictional rules. In addition, a merchant dealing in many
countries would have to learn the law in all of them. In contrast, the interlocking web of in
stitutions that comprise the cotton industry's PLS, reduces or lowers these barriers to trade
by enhancing the strength of group-imposed reputation sanctions, and by providing simple
sets of rules to govern transactions and well-run adjudicatory fora that resolve disputes
around the world. The cotton industry has developed a number of additional norms and in
stitutional features to attempt to deal with these problems and to facili�ate the use and effec
tiveness of reputation-based NLSs and, at least to some extent, the force of bilateral repeat
dealing incentives in transactions between U.S. merchants and overseas buyers. For exam
ple, the American Cotton Exporters Association and The World Cotton Exporters
Association, maintain "a list of those parties engaged in the purchase and
sale of cotton who have been reported by an exporter as being in default of an
outstanding export contract and, where indicated, have also failed to honor a
technical arbitration award issued by a recognized trade body." http://www.acsa
cotton.org/About_ACSA/Search %20Rules/about_acsa.htrnl. Before listing a person, how
ever, these groups follow strict rules designed to assess the legitimacy of the request for the
listing, yet another institutional safe-guard against the misuse of reputation-based NLSs. The
list itself is freely available on the internet. This list is exempt from the United States anti
trust laws under the Webb-Pomerine Act, 40 Stat. 516 (1918), as amended 15 U.S.C.A. § 6165 (1987); see also PHILIP AREEDA & LOUIS KAPLOW, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS: PROBLEMS,
TEXT, CASES 160 (1988) (under the "Webb-PomerineAct, Congress exempted from the an
titrust laws agreements or acts in the course of export trade by an association entered into
for the sole purpose of engaging in such trade"). The only way to get off the blacklist is to
pay 100% of your obligation. According to informal norms, once you are on the list, your
creditor is prohibited from settling with you for less than full payment or he will be infor
mally blacklisted. Although the bar on settlement for less than full payment after appearing
on the list is imperfectly enforced, this hands-tying arrangement nevertheless increases the
aggrieved seller's bargaining power which may provide a partial counter-balance to the fact
that he is the transactor most vulnerable to hold-up under the contract. (Source's name
withheld on request.) In addition, the industry has taken steps to make bilateral reputation
sanctions more effective. Attempting to use the force of these sanctions in international
transactions is more problematic because transactions are larger, the principals to these
transactions often do not meet face-to-face, social ties among transactors are weaker, and
repeat-dealing is less common. However, some bilateral reputation effects are created in the
market through the use of overseas company representatives and brokers. Both the brokers
and representatives share information about the behavior of particular buyers, and when
one has repeated bad experiences with a company, the others respond with an informal boy
cott or slow-down of trade. The presence of large numbers of brokers in the market is remi-
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niscent of the earlier days of the domestic trade. Although in some markets, brokers' main
function is to communicate price information and to bring buyers and sellers together, in
other markets, particularly in the past, one of their primary functions was to serve as reputa
tion intermediaries. See, e.g., Bernstein, Diamonds, supra note 133, at 133 (discussing the
role of diamond industry brokers in reducing the pre-transaction search cost of obtaining
reputation-related information).
Finally, it is important to note that one critique that is commonly leveled against private
adjudication, namely that it creates external social costs by depleting the future stock of ju
dicial precedent, should not be viewed as a viable argument against the cotton industry's
PLS. Harry T. Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?, 99 HARV.
L. REV. 668, 677 (1986) ("The concern here is that ADR will replace the rule of law with
nonlegal values. . . . [and that] by diverting particular types of cases away from [court] adju
dication, we may stifle the development of the law in certain disfavored areas of the law.");
Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1085 (1984) ("A settlement [as a form
of ADR] will thereby deprive a court of the occasion . . . to render an interpretation," in es
tablishing rules and precedents); John V. O'Hara, The New Jersey Alternative Procedure for
Dispute Resolution: Vanguard of a 'Better Way?,' 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1723, 1745-51 (1988)
("Arbitration can hinder the ability of courts to establish rules and can prevent development
of new areas of the law such as intellectual property."). Although the existence of the PLS
does slightly reduce the number of judicial opinions issued, this effect is likely to be small.
Even if cotton disputes were resolved in court, given the highly fact- and industry-specific
issues they raise, it is unlikely that an opinion would be written and precedent created.
Moreover, to the extent that the creation of precedent or the clarification of existing rules is
considered socially desirable because of its prospective effect on primary contracting be
havior, William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Adjudication as a Private Good, 8 J.
LEGAL STUD. 255 (1979), the cotton industry's private tribunals are likely to create more
social benefits of this type than do public courts. Although the opinions of these tribunals
are not formally accorded precedential value, they nevertheless have a strong effect on con
tracting behavior, particularly when combined with industry efforts to circulate, report on
them, and educate members about their content. This effect on primary behavior may be far
stronger than the effect of state trial court decisions, especially those that are rendered in
unpublished opinions. As for evolution of the rules themselves, industry arbitration tribunals
sometimes note in their opinions that trade rules need to be clarified or amended, thereby
playing a role in the rule clarification function that is said to be one of the primary benefits
associated with common law decision making.
238. Although at present, industry-run PLSs do not, standing alone, create antitrust
problems, the availability of the antitrust laws to ensure that the associations do not engage
in anticompetitive behavior may be important. In addition, state arbitration laws that require
some minimal procedural protections before an award is enforceable also enhance the func
tioning of private systems. However, there are some types of regulatory oversight that are
viewed as socially desirable for reasons having nothing to do with commercial law that may
make it more difficult for new industries to create PLSs that are also able to capture all the
benefits associated with a strong infrastructure of trade. For example, antidiscrimination
laws make it more difficult, if not impossible, to maintain socially, ethnically, or gender
homogenous associations, especially when those groups command economic power.

